How BRICS expansion in Middle East challenges decades-old American hold

The BRICS as an intergovernmental grouping of mostly developing economies from the Global South had humble beginnings in the early 2000’s, and the first formal diplomatic summit of the grouping was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, on 16 June 2009. Over the years, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have become a formidable block leading the global transition towards a more egalitarian and multi-polar world order in the wake of the West’s general economic and geopolitical decline.

In recent months, however, what is bringing renewed attention towards the BRICS is primarily its expansion in the early 2024, which makes the BRICS+ grouping an economic and geopolitical heavyweight. In January 2024, BRICS admitted the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Iran as formal members, transforming the grouping into BRICS+. Saudi Arabia, a middle power with huge economic potential, has been attending BRICS summits but is yet to formally join the grouping. There are almost 30-34 countries, including Turkey, Malaysia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Algeria, that have shown interest in joining the BRICS. After its expansion, the group met for the first time at the 16th BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, between October 22 and 24, 2024.

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The BRICS now represents nearly half of the world’s population and 35 per cent of the global GDP (PPP basis). This is in itself huge given that the share of G7 in the global GDP has been continuously declining in the past two decades and is unlikely to see an upward turn in the future. Also, the BRICS+ is expected to see enhanced economic growth, and combined with other countries of the Global South, it’s expected to overtake the West’s global GDP dominance by 2050.

The fact that Russia hosted a summit of BRICS+ countries and with some 28 heads of government or state to attending the summit in Kazan in the midst of war in Ukraine signals a shift in the global balance of power and exasperation with the role of the West, especially that of America, in the world. This shift is obviously happening in favour of the Global South, led by China, India, and others.

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However, the decline in America’s preponderance and the consequent shift in global balance of power are nowhere more visible than the ‘Greater Middle Eastern’ region. Three of the four new formally admitted members, Iran, the UAE, and Egypt, of the BRICS+ are from the Middle East, a region where America enjoyed near-total military dominance and a huge diplomatic and economic clout at least since the first Gulf War of 1990-1991. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, another close partner of the US, although yet to formally join the BRICS, sent a delegation to the Kazan summit. Turkey too expressed its interest in joining the BRICS and was invited to the Kazan summit.

But how do we explain so many Middle Eastern countries either formally joining or showing interest in a non-Western block when America has been the most dominant power in the region for many decades now?

Iran and America have been at loggerheads since 1979 and more recently over Iran’s nuclear program and its destabilising role in the region. Iran is battling American sanctions, which have adversely impacted its economy. The relations with America’s European allies haven’t improved as well. So it’s quite natural for Iran to join non-Western or non-American blocks in order to improve its economy, end its diplomatic isolation, and seek new long-term partners. Iran, being a victim of American and Western sanctions along with Russia, is poised to play a greater role in the BRICS+ and may even try to transform the BRICS+ into an anti-West alliance.

The UAE, a Gulf economic powerhouse and a middle power influencing events across the region, has lately been seeking a policy of multiple alignments to secure its interests. The Gulf country is no longer interested in permanent alliances but in interest-based partnerships. What explains it more than the fact that the UAE is now part of I2U2 (India, Israel, the US, the UAE), a major defence partner of the US, and yet it has joined a grouping that is led by Russia and China, two of America’s formidable geopolitical rivals or competitors.

However, what is more surprising is that a close American ally from the region, Egypt, has joined the BRICS+ grouping. Egypt is the largest recipient of American military aid to the tune of $1.3 billion a year, after the State of Israel, in the region. Egypt is a ‘major non-NATO ally’ of the US. Yet it has joined a grouping that is purportedly anti-West as BRICS seeks to challenge the dominance of the American-led West. Egypt’s economy has been in struggling mode for quite some time now, and Sisi’s regime desperately seeks to improve Egypt’s economy in order to boost his own legitimacy. Also, the relations between Egypt and the US in the recent past, including Biden’s initial months in the White House, haven’t been warm, and Al Sisi’s government is often subjected to criticism by America and its Western allies for human rights abuses. There is also a certain degree of frustration in the Egyptian leadership with America’s lack of decisiveness when it comes to resolving the ongoing Gaza crisis and putting a full stop to the Israeli war machine in the occupied territories.

Saudi Arabia, which right before the current Gaza war was reportedly in talks to normalise relations with Israel in return for US security guarantees in the form of a formal defence deal, is seemingly testing waters when it comes to joining any non-American block such as the BRICS. Mohammed bin Salman, de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, has increasingly felt sidelined by the Americans as he has been criticised for his human rights record. In turn, he has proactively sought to challenge or refuse to take American dictates on issues like ensuring steady oil supply in the global market and making warm gestures towards Xi Jinping or Vladimir Putin. Saudis are also feeling threatened, given the lack of security assurances from Washington and the rise of Iran across the region.

Yet the most unprecedented jolt to the Americans or West in the region would be Turkey’s joining of BRICS+ in the future. Turkey is the only member country of NATO from the ‘Greater Middle Eastern’ region and, as such, shares close military cooperation with the US and its Western allies. However, Turkey under Recep Erdogan has been increasingly, what analysts call, ‘looking eastward’, whereby it seeks to foster durable cooperation and strong partnerships with the Global South, including China and the larger Islamic World.

This is because Turkey’s European Union dreams stand shattered; its relationship with the US hasn’t been so good lately given their disagreements in Syria, America’s refusal to sell Turkey Patriot Air Defence Systems and Turkey’s plans to buy Russian S400 Systems, and America’s refusal to extradite Fethullah Gulen. Americans and Europeans alike aren’t happy about Erdogan’s authoritarianism and his populistic Islamist rhetoric, which is threatening the secular foundations of the Turkish Republic. Thus, ever since Donald Trump assumed office in 2016, Turkey has begun an ‘eastward turn’ in its foreign policy.

While Ethiopia has formally joined the BRICS+ grouping, the application for full membership of Algeria was blocked by India allegedly on French President Emmanuel Macron’s request, who didn’t want Algeria to move away from its sphere of influence. In the coming years, we are likely to see more countries, especially from the Middle East, joining the BRICS+ grouping.

The fact that America’s close allies and partners from the region are joining BRICS+ is suggestive of its declining power in the Middle East, leaving regional states fending for themselves. As a result, the countries in the region are seeking new friends and partnerships to better secure their interests in the emerging multi-polar world. America’s decline in the Middle East has been in the making for years now, if not decades, and it’s partly deliberate as America’s pivot is shifting to the Indo-Pacific, where China is emerging as the lead competitor.

The 2018 National Security Strategy of America explicitly mentions China and Russia as chief geopolitical concerns or threats, and its willingness to counter this threat makes a gradual, if not total, withdrawal from the Middle East a necessity. This pivot away from the Middle East has been lately disturbed by the stalled progress on the Abraham Accords under Biden and the current war on Gaza. Under the weight of the Gaza crisis and the threats to Israeli security, the American support for which is Ironclad, from Iran and its proxies, America finds itself trapped in the region, which must be increasing the frustration of the American officials because there are other more urgent geopolitical concerns under America’s global strategy.

Although America’s total withdrawal from the Middle East is unimaginable, it’s no longer going to be the chief concern of the policymakers in Washington. The situation is complicated by a sense of deep and widespread perception in the region, especially among the Gulf countries, that America is leaving the region when they want the Americans to stay back. They feel threatened and also betrayed. For some of them, America is no longer a reliable partner after more than two decades of heightened engagement with the countries of the region across several areas of mutual interest, including security and counter-terrorism. While the regional states have started to overhaul their foreign policies and seek new partners, America’s decline and loss of preponderance in the region is real.

The author is Phd Scholar, Centre for West Asian and North African Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.