How Bangladesh’s struggle with identity, radicalisation can be self-destructive

I remember an incident from the 1980s in Dhaka when some Indian Bengalis were harassed and attacked at a local fish market because the locals identified their accent as being from India’s West Bengal. A mob chased them to their car and shook the car in rage. It was only when their Bangladeshi host intervened, telling them that they were Bangladeshi but their accent was influenced by their education in India, that the mob let go of them. When I heard of this, I wondered what had brought such animosity into the minds of the Bangladeshis, a mere decade and a half after India helped them attain independence from Pakistan. Does history not acknowledge gratitude?

For many in Bangladesh, an Indian Bengali was always assumed to be a Hindu, and the hostility stemmed from the fact that he was Indian and non-Muslim. I spoke about this with a friend, the daughter of a prominent Bangladeshi diplomat, and asked why, just 13 years after Bangladesh’s independence—a freedom struggle aided and won with India’s help—there was so much animosity towards the very people who had assisted in their liberation from Pakistan’s brutal oppression. She explained that while Indians might expect Bangladesh to remain eternally grateful and dependent on India, the pride of the Bangladeshi people would never allow India to believe that out of gratitude, Bangladesh would survive as an ‘appendage to India’!

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I continued visiting Dhaka over the years and saw how Bangladesh was evolving. On one hand, the country was diligently preserving its language and culture—undeniably Bengali. Women, draped in beautiful sarees and wearing bindis and flowers, proudly showcased their heritage, much like their counterparts in West Bengal, India. It was often difficult to tell if these women were Muslim or Hindu. It was heartening to see that despite escaping Pakistan, they had managed to retain what was most important to them—their culture, ethnicity, identity, and language.

However, over time, things began to change. The hijab started to appear more frequently, and women who once wore saris began to cover their heads in Islamic-style hijabs. Arabic terms and nuances began to seep into everyday language, and more skull caps were seen in public. It seemed as though Bangladesh was moving towards a more orthodox stance—the same dogmatic orthodoxy it had fought to escape from Pakistan. I often wondered whether Bangladesh was experiencing an identity crisis: Were they Bengalis first and Muslims second, or had they become Muslim Bengalis?

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Fast forward to today, and Bangladesh is in a state of turmoil. The democratically elected government of the Awami League, led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, has been ousted, with Hasina now living in exile in India. The aftermath has shocked the world. A so-called student movement, with support from Jamaat-e-Islami, has destabilised Bangladesh. Violent attacks between the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and the Awami League supporters have paralysed Dhaka. The ousting of Sheikh Hasina and the dismantling of her party raise the question: Was this what the Bengalis fought for—freedom from Pakistan—so that people of the same religion, culture, and language could end democracy and bring Bangladesh to the brink of self-destruction? Was the student movement meant to turn citizens into murderers and destroy the democratic process that, despite radical pressures, managed to uphold a semblance of secularism?

Bangladesh’s journey has been two steps forward, four steps backward. The country is unknowingly veering toward the very Pakistan it once sought to escape. Bangladesh seems to have forgotten that the Pakistan it is now courting is the same one that committed atrocities against the Bengali people in 1971. The Indian Army, primarily composed of Hindu soldiers, fought to liberate them from Pakistan’s brutality, and countless Indian lives were lost in that struggle. Today, Bangladesh seems to ignore the sacrifices made by India, especially when it is turning a blind eye to the atrocities against Bengali Hindus.

Meanwhile, India has yet to establish a clear policy on its role in protecting Hindus worldwide. Diplomatic efforts to address the violence, rape, and persecution faced by Hindus in Bangladesh are ongoing, but how effective can they be when Bangladesh is speeding towards radicalisation and anti-Indian sentiment? This is yet another story of Islam versus India and Muslim versus Hindu, but its long-term impact on India is uncertain.

When we think of Bangladesh, we cannot ignore its proximity to West Bengal, India. West Bengal is already grappling with the consequences of illegal immigration and the influx of Rohingyas, especially due to porous borders and inadequate security. Many of those coming in are Muslims, for whom Islamic identity often supersedes all others, making them susceptible to radicalisation. This influx threatens India’s security, too. Especially with the current West Bengal government’s policies apparently catering to the Muslim vote-bank, the threat of illegal immigration and its larger impact on the security and demography of the state and the nation remain an internal challenge for India.

Also, Bangladeshis are struggling to get visas for medical treatment in India, a reality that is hurting them. This concern, however, is not a priority for Mohammed Yunus, the head of the interim government. India now needs to use its political leverage more strongly through sanctions on trade, tourism, and education. The message should be clear: Bangladesh must respect the safety of Hindus, or India will take action. India’s stance will shape the future stability of the region, and even Pakistan is watching how the situation unfolds.

The world is preoccupied with conflicts in Israel, Palestine, Ukraine, and Syria, but Bangladesh’s internal turmoil and growing radicalisation cannot be ignored. Bangladesh must choose a path of stability, or it risks alienating itself further from the global community. India’s resolve will be a defining factor in the region’s future. If Bangladesh continues down this dangerous path, India may have to intervene more forcefully. Mohammed Yunus should know that India will not tolerate any harm to its interests or the safety of the Hindu community anywhere in the world.

The international community is watching, and India’s role in ensuring the safety of Hindus in Bangladesh is becoming increasingly important. The Indian government must act decisively, and Yunus must understand that if he fails to protect Bangladesh’s minorities, India will have no choice but to take firm action. What that action might be is unknown.

The world is waiting to see what will happen next, and Bangladesh’s interim government knows deep down that its future depends on how it navigates its relationship with India.

The writer is an author, poet, and a member of the BJP. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.