 "Balochistan attacks show Pakistan is a failed state")
Eighteen years after Nawab Akbar Bugti’s killing, on August 26, 2006, Baloch insurgents undertook a series of dastardly attacks on August 26-27, 2024, spanning widespread areas in the north-east, central, and southern parts of Balochistan, killing at least 23 civilians, mostly petty Punjabi labourers and fruit dealers, in just one incident where passengers were made to get down from a bus, their identity cards checked, and Punjabis were summarily executed.
They also attacked security pickets of the Frontier Corps in Bela, Mastung, and Turbat. Road blockades were enforced for almost 20 hours on the Coastal Highway and other roads, including towards the Iran border. As many as 35 trucks burned, and an old railway bridge on the Quetta-Sukkur-Multan-Lahore rail link, built in British times, was blown up near Kolpur, Bolan (south-east of Quetta), disrupting train and road links between the province and the rest of Pakistan.
The targeted attacks, codenamed “Op Haruf”, which occurred uncomfortably close to the Punjab border, were claimed by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and its `Majeed Brigade’, led by Mahal Baloch, also known as (aka) Zalan Kurd, and Rizwan Baloch, aka Hammal, both of Gwadar.
Reprisals by Pakistan’s security forces ensued swiftly enough in Musakhail, Kalat and Lasbela. The death toll was estimated by Reuters at 73, including 38 civilians, but at least 14 security personnel were martyred.
These incidents cast considerable egg on the face of the heavily securitised XII Corps. The extent and reach of the militants while preparing for and executing these actions could not be anticipated. Despite knowing that Bugti’s martyrdom day usually draws symbolic attacks against the state every year in a festering insurgency, these are intelligence lapses of herculean dimensions on part of the Inter Services Intellelligence (ISI), Military Intelligence (MI) complements in Balochistan, and the civilian Intelligence Bureau (IB).
Apart from the Corps reserve, the XII Corps led by Lt Gen Rahat Nasim Khan (Frontier Force Regiment) has three Infantry Divisions of between 10,000 and 15,000 forces each: the 41 Div at Quetta (Maj Gen Nisar ul Haq), the 33 Div at Khuzdar (Maj Gen Jawwad Ahmed Qazi), and the newly formed 44 Div at Gwadar (Maj Gen Adnan Sarwar Malik), tasked with exclusive responsibility to protect Chinese personnel deployed to execute unfinished projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
Impact Shorts
More ShortsIn addition, there are at least two Independent Infantry Brigades at Turbat and Gwadar (strength around 5,500 each) and an Independent Armoured Brigade at Khuzdar. The Inspector General, Frontier Corps (Balochistan South-Headquarters in Turbat) (Maj Gen Bilal Sarfaraz), whose units at Bela and Mastung were attacked and held on to by the militants for some hours, is equipped with 7 infantry regiments (1,000 strong each) with two or more battalion-sized wings (strength 400 each). There is also an IGFC (Balochistan North—Headquarters in Quetta) (Maj Gen Amir Ajmal), which was not attacked in this operation.
It remains to be seen whether any accountability will be enforced against these lapses.
Not only do these attacks suggest that Baloch militants have intensified their violent campaign against the state and security forces, they emphasise again that sheer superior military force cannot be enough to solve the problem, as long as the reasons behind this wave of disaffection that have led young middle-class men and women to protest continue; they pertain to human rights violations, poor socio-economic conditions, and the denial of political rights. These factors provide a fertile recruiting ground for terrorist groups on the lookout for angry, frustrated elements to join their ranks. The missing persons issue also resonates, accounting for the popularity and international acclaim attracted by agitating female protagonists like Mahrang Baloch.
Yet, politicians at the provincial level, including the People’s Party Chief Minister, Sarfaraz Bugti, and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, have talked only of firm-handed reprisals and cautioned that the state’s actions should not be construed as weakness. No one is mentioning earlier initiatives like the Aghaz e Huqooq package of social and economic measures undertaken, albeit half-heartedly in the past, under the stewardship of former Chief Ministers Abdul Malek (2013–2015) and Akhtar Mengal (1997–98).
Once the present damage is contained, the civil and security leadership must look deeper into the Balochistan question, however unpalatable the exercise, and identify the factors that have intensified the tension between the Baloch and the state, eventually forcing the Federal government to change tack, stop ignoring Baloch voices, and move, even haltingly, towards peace and genuine efforts for change.
The writer is a former special secretary, Cabinet Secretariat. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
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