GhoseSpot | How Bangladesh crisis will truly test Indian diplomacy

India’s relationship with its neighbours have always been that of an affluent elder sibling whom the others love to hate. Among them Pakistan is probably the most straightforward as it is mostly hostile with little shade of grey. However, it is most complex in the case of Bangladesh whose birth India had midwifed but the kid sister refuses to acknowledge. That Bangladesh is encircled on three sides by India with a highly nebulous and porous border adds an additional layer. Its religious composition and obvious affinity to the Islamic world is a further dimension. Shared water resources demand a high level of cooperation.

Thus, in short, unlike other countries India cannot afford to look the other way from its internal developments. We are joined at the hips by an umbilical cord as it were. Thus successive governments have been carefully watching local developments in Bangladesh since its creation.

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However, a few questions arise after the August 5 denouement. Should India have been so heavily invested in Sheikh Hasina even when it was apparent that she was losing international support and ground was slipping from beneath her feet at home? Going with Sheikh Khaleda Zia’s Bangladesh National Party (BNP) was not an option given her strong anti-India position and leanings towards radical Islamic elements. But could India not have cultivated other moderate politicians or silently promote potential successors to Sheikh Hasina within Awami League?

It is probably easier to find an answer to the first question. The very weaknesses and challenges that Sheikh Hasina faced made her dependent on India. She knew that no other country would stand by her the way India has over the years irrespective of which regime it was in Delhi. For India, there could not be a better bet than Hasina against its detractors notwithstanding her occasional flirtation with China for pure commercial expediency. More importantly, if India had to tackle cross border infiltration of ‘Jihadi’ assets only Hasina would help because she was afflicted by the same malaise. On this score India reciprocated by handing over to Sheikh Hasina many who were on the look out notice in Bangladesh including the killer of her father.

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With so much at stake India – especially the Modi government – which has been committed more than any government before it to tackling the menace of infiltration – could not afford to antagonise Sheikh Hasina by cultivating alternate leadership in her home. What it could have done, perhaps, is work harder to convince Hasina to take a less rigid line to bring in the moderate elements from the opposition into her fold rather than go for a steam-roller approach. Here, perhaps, there was an uncanny meeting of minds between the Modi-Shah and Hasina and over-confidence in a hardline strategy.

Everyone would remember the not so veiled threats from the United States establishment to hand over the administration to an interim government for overseeing the elections or face consequences. She ignored the warnings and pressed on with the elections that her opposition boycotted to return with a walkover victory. One would assume she had the tacit support of India in her decision. Could India have prevailed on her to follow the US suggestion and would that have taken the heat off her will remain a matter of conjecture.

It is also common knowledge that the United States was not entirely averse to the idea of a regime change in India though it could not have openly called for one. The counter-factual question that is bound to arise, therefore, is whether the current events have escalated so dramatically had Narendra Modi returned with a larger majority even if not his dream number of “400 paar”?

Here it is not difficult to resist the temptation of a flashback of August 15, 1975 when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was brutally assassinated on a day when Indira Gandhi was unfurling the Indian Tricolour at the ramparts of the Red Fort on the occasion of Indian Independence Day. Less than two months ago she had declared an Emergency in the country fearing a popular uprising and put opposition leaders behind bars and muzzled the media. There was no love lost between her and the United States — who were unhappy with her dismembering its vassal state Pakistan in 1971 creating Bangladesh and installing Sheikh Mujib as the prime minister.

At that time Indira was firmly ensconced with the Soviet Union, which had used its veto power in the United Nations Security Council during the India Pakistan War in 1971. Is it possible that Indira was apprehending a similar destabilisation of the country and political overthrow? Finally she did have to relinquish power albeit through elections — which some believe she may have been nudged to call by a friend or foe. Though she returned to power after a hiatus it was not the same Mrs Gandhi one knew post 1971 and prior to 1975. It is ironic that some of her own have been seen to be supping with players of the same club in recent times.

Bangladesh like many nations of its ilk is unfortunately fated to go through turbulent times but the implications of its descent to anarchy would have serious implications for India. Fortunately, political parties across the aisle realise the risks and unequivocally pledged their support to the government, who on its part have taken the opposition into confidence. But once the current crisis blows over some may not be beyond fishing Hilsa in the turbulent waters of the Padma river. Their visceral hatred for Narendra Modi has always been in public and they have found it difficult, or even necessary, to conceal their voyeuristic glee fantasising the prospects of a similar uprising in India and with a similar endgame.

This is going to be a challenge that the Narendra Modi government would have to navigate with diplomatic deftness. India has always been a playground of big powers. Now the world is no longer bipolar but it is not multipolar or a Quad as yet. At best it is tri-polar. Seen to be leaning towards Russia could invite a replay of the seventies and try to push him and by extension India to a corner.

So testing times ahead not just for Bangladesh but for India as well. The Modi government will have to play its cards carefully eschewing the ambitions of being regarded as a “Vishwaguru” for a while.

The author is a public affairs commentator. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.