Fourth anniversary of Galwan incident: Indelible stain on India-China ties

June 15, 2024, marks the fourth anniversary of the incident that took place on the icy heights of Galwan in Eastern Ladakh when troops of both China and India clashed in a barbaric manner. Indian soldiers were attacked with iron rods and clubs, resulting in deaths on both sides. India lost 20 soldiers, including Colonel B Santosh Babu.

The physical clash without a round being fired came amid growing skirmishes between Indian and Chinese soldiers at the Line of Actual Control in the preceding months. On the intervening night between May 5 and 6, 2020, Indian and Chinese soldiers clashed at Pangong Tso in Ladakh. Another skirmish followed four days later at Naku La in Sikkim.

The clashes emerged amid China’s attempts to unilaterally alter the status quo along the LAC. Beginning in early April 2020, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had been massing thousands of soldiers and war waging equipment along the LAC in Ladakh. This massing of troops in violation of multiple agreements was done when India was under Covid-19 lockdown. In early June, amid rising tensions, the military commanders of the two sides agreed to pull back to create a buffer zone at Galwan Valley.

On June 14, when Indian troops went to check if the PLA had indeed withdrawn, they came under attack from Chinese soldiers. The violence unleashed that night has cast a long shadow on bilateral relations, marking a significant deterioration in ties and affecting the strategic calculus of both countries.

Background

India and China have a longstanding border issue and are yet to resolve their boundary problem. China does not accept the alignment of the boundary between India and China that is based on well-established geographical principles confirmed by treaties and agreements, as well as historical usage and practice well-known for centuries to both sides.

China invaded Tibet and annexed it in March 1959, resulting in India then having a border with China. Growing concern over Chinese aggression forced India to relook at its border policy as China became India’s neighbour. India enacted the ‘Forward Policy’ in 1960, which was aimed to prevent Chinese incursions into Indian territory.

In reaction to the Forward Policy, China started gradually enhancing its road infrastructure and strengthening its military positions along the border. The Chinese quickened the forward movement of their posts, and soon the empty area between the two armies disappeared. When some Indian posts, for example, in the Galwan Valley, were established, the Chinese attitude changed and became more threatening. They surrounded some Indian posts to cut off their land route of supply and even opened fire at a number of places. The Chinese forces had surrounded an Indian position in the Galwan Valley in July 1962, and the two sides clashed at Pangong Lake.

The 1962 War put an end to any chance of resolving the border in line with accepted international norms. To complicate matters, in 1963, Pakistan handed over to China the Shaksgam Valley, which was part of Gilgit Baltistan in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

In 1967, a clash took place due to disagreement over the laying of the border fence at Nathu La by the Indian Armed Forces from September 11 to 14. The skirmish escalated to artillery fire. Later, at Tulung La in 1975, an Assam Rifles patrol was fired upon killing four soldiers of the 5 Assam Rifles.

India used to occupy a seasonal post at Wangdong, near Sumdrong Chu, from 1984. When they withdrew from the post in the winter of 1985, it was occupied by the Chinese forces. On June 16, 1986, a patrol of the 12 ASSAM Regiment noticed Chinese presence in the area and the construction of a few permanent structures. The Chinese soldiers were initially estimated to be forty but were soon reinforced by 200 more troops. By August, they had constructed a helipad and were air-supplied. After rounds of diplomatic parleys and talks between military commanders, the two sides agreed to vacate two posts.

Both India and China have formally agreed that the boundary question is a complex issue and have committed to seeking a fair, reasonable, and mutually acceptable solution through dialogue and peaceful negotiations. In the interim, the two sides also agreed that the maintenance of peace and tranquility in the border areas is an essential basis for the further development of bilateral relations.

However, China continues to be in illegal occupation of approximately 38,000 sq km in the Union Territory of Ladakh. In addition, under the so-called Sino-Pakistan ‘Boundary Agreement’ of 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 sq km of Indian territory in the PoK to China. China also claims approximately 90,000 sq km of Indian territory in the Eastern Sector of the India-China boundary in Arunachal Pradesh.

Border Agreements

There is no commonly delineated LAC in the border areas between India and China, and there is no common perception of the entire LAC. The 3488-km-long LAC is neither delineated on the map nor demarcated on the ground and lies in one of the most inhospitable high-altitude terrains and icy cold climatic conditions. Therefore, in order to ensure peace and tranquility in the border areas, especially along the LAC, the two countries have concluded a number of agreements and protocols.

Under these agreements, both sides agreed to maintain peace and tranquility along the LAC without any effect on their respective positions on the alignment of the LAC. It was due to this that overall relations also saw considerable progress since 1988. However, while bilateral relations can continue to develop in parallel with discussions on resolving the boundary question, any serious disturbance in peace and tranquility along the LAC in the border areas is bound to have implications for the positive direction of ties.

A key element of both the 1993 and 1996 agreements is that the two sides will keep their military forces in the areas along the LAC to a minimum level. These agreements also mandate that, pending an ultimate solution to the boundary question, the two sides strictly respect and observe the LAC. Furthermore, India and China also committed to clarification and confirmation of the LAC to reach a common understanding of the alignment.

Thus, in the late 1990s and up until 2003, the two sides engaged in an exercise to clarify and confirm the LAC. However, thereafter, the Chinese side did not show a willingness to pursue the exercise. As a result, there are some areas where the Chinese and Indian perceptions of LAC overlap. In these areas, as well as other sections of the border, the various agreements govern the manner in which troops of both sides should operate and deal with situations of face-offs to maintain peace and tranquility.

In the meantime, the lag between India and China with regard to their economies widened considerably, and this was also reflected in their military capabilities and the development of infrastructure along the LAC.

The last decade has been a decade of military confrontations between India and China, whether it was the Depsang incident in 2013, the Chumar incident in 2014, or the standoff in Doklam in 2017. The confrontations were largely resolved at ground level until the incident at Galwan happened in 2020. The unresolved LAC underscores the challenge of achieving lasting peace and stability.

As per Jaydev Ranade, President of the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy (CCAS), the action was caused by “China’s interest in asserting its dominance as it felt challenged by India’s rapid rise." While Professor Srikanth Kondapalli, Dean of the School of International Studies and Professor of China Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), has stated, “The Chinese are punishing India for closer ties to the West, but added that India too has failed to garner appropriate support from Western and other nations to counter China.”

The Galwan Crisis

Since April 2020, India has noticed a buildup of troops and armaments by the Chinese side in the border areas adjacent to Eastern Ladakh. In early May, the Chinese side had taken action to hinder the normal, traditional patrolling pattern of our troops in the Galwan Valley area, which resulted in a face-off. Even as this situation was being addressed by the commanders as per the provisions of bilateral agreements and protocols, in mid-May, the Chinese side made several attempts to transgress the LAC in other parts of the Western Sector. This included Kongka La, Gogra, and the north bank of Pangong Lake. These attempts were detected early and consequently responded to appropriately.

India made it clear to the Chinese side both through diplomatic and military channels that China was, by such actions, attempting to unilaterally alter the status quo. It was categorically conveyed that this was unacceptable.

Given the growing friction along the LAC, the senior commanders of the two sides, in a meeting on June 6, 2020, agreed on a process of disengagement that involved reciprocal actions. Both sides also agreed to respect and abide by the LAC and not undertake any activity to alter the status quo. However, in violation of this, the Chinese side created a violent face-off on June 15, 2020, in Galwan.

The Indian response was calculative and assertive, and the strength and resilience of the Indian Armed Forces were visible by their occupying dominating strategic heights, both in the Chushul Sub-Sector—south of the Pangong Tso—and in the north of the lake—thus strengthening India’s position to negotiate and diffuse the prevailing tension. Further, this has led to a rebalancing of forces.

Conclusion

Four years after the night of savagery, relations remain strained, and troops remain deployed in a tense standoff as the main issue regarding Chinese intrusions into territory under Indian control is yet to be resolved but also because the fallout of mutual suspicion is creating new cycles of tension.

Military and diplomatic talks at the Corps Commander level have been going on over the past four years. The talks have led to the disengagement of troops from some ‘friction points’, but mutual suspicions continue to run deep.

These negotiations have yielded some results, such as disengagement at five friction points–the Pangong Tso’s North and South banks, Patrolling Points 15 and 17A at the Gogra-Hot Springs area, and Galwan. However, the standoffs in critical areas, including the Depsang Plains and Demchok in Eastern Ladakh, remain unresolved. China is unwilling to discuss these two areas, claiming that these are “legacy issues” as they predate April 2020 and therefore do not come under the ambit of the current talks.

Further, the two armies have not reduced their troop presence at the LAC, which has been built up even during the freezing winter months. The deployment of heavy weaponry and equipment has also seen significant inductions in the region. In addition, land and air connectivity infrastructure is being improved along the entire LAC.

To quote Lieutenant General Rakesh Sharma (Retd), a former Corps Commander in Eastern Ladakh, “The Chinese now know that post-Galwan they have to fight for each and every inch of land, unlike in the past when they would salami slice our territory.” He goes on to say, “The border has changed from benign to active, where both nations have deployed a considerable amount of manpower and equipment.”

The External Affairs Minister Jaishankar recently said, “India responded by counter deployment of forces,” and for four years now, forces have been deployed ahead of the normal base positions at Galwan. “This is a very abnormal deployment along the LAC. Given the tension between the two countries… As Indian citizens, none of us should disregard the security of the country…It is today a challenge”.

There is a huge trust deficit regarding China due to the major standoffs on the LAC. Over the last two decades, with the economic differential continuing to increase between India and China, it may become more aggressive and expansionist on both the continental and maritime domains.

For India, the lesson is clear: Till a resolution on the territorial dispute is resolved, we need to build on our hard power, which is reflected not only in troop strength but also in technology, capability, and operational readiness backed by doctrines and resolve. We cannot afford to lower our vigil.

The author is a retired Major General of the Indian Army. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.