Flirting with fire: The West’s soft turn on Pakistan

Despite being placed on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list three times since 2008—first from 2008 to 2009, then from 2012 to 2015, and again from June 2018 to October 2022—Pakistan continues to present itself as a victim rather than a perpetrator in the global fight against terrorism. Yet, despite mounting evidence and India’s diplomatic outreach through multiparty delegations to key nations, including the United States, Pakistan’s narrative seems to be gaining traction.

In a perplexing turn, Pakistan’s top leadership not only secured a luncheon meeting with former U.S. President Donald Trump but also received substantial financial backing: $2.1 billion in aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and a staggering $40 billion commitment over ten years from the World Bank. This seeming Western leniency raises pressing questions about global consistency on counterterrorism.

More from Opinion

Sergio Gor’s senate hearing signals the future of Indo-American ties How Trump’s ‘War on Drugs’ buildup against Venezuela has a hidden agenda

Memories of Osama bin Laden being found in Abbottabad, near a major Pakistani military installation, the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, and the recent Pahalgam attack—which, according to a CLAWS data, has been condemned by over 56% of countries worldwide—remain fresh in the international consciousness.

Yet, in a controversial development, Pakistan has been appointed to key positions within the United Nations Security Council: Chair of the Taliban Sanctions Committee, Vice-Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and Co-Chair of the Security Council’s Informal Working Group (IWG) on documentation. Additionally, it will co-chair the newly established IWG on Sanctions, according to Pakistan’s Mission to the UN.
While it is understood that a country serving a two-year term as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) may be assigned leadership of certain committees, Pakistan’s recent appointments raise serious concerns. Given its alleged involvement in the Pahalgam attack and the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) condemnation of its record on terrorism financing, Pakistan’s elevation to key UNSC roles appears to deviate from accepted international norms.

The situation becomes more precarious for India as the Pakistani military continues to receive robust support from China across multiple military and strategic domains. In leveraging the ongoing U.S.-China rivalry, Pakistan appears to be inserting the “India factor” into the strategic calculus of South Asian geopolitics, thereby gaining manoeuvring space in the international arena.

Impact Shorts

More Shorts

How army remains Pakistan’s biggest business house

60 years on, why 1965 India–Pakistan war still matters

Implications for India

These developments carry significant and multifaceted implications for India. Pakistan’s enhanced international legitimacy and leadership roles within UN frameworks could translate into increased access to resources, diplomatic capital, and institutional leverage. This may, in turn, be redirected towards military posturing or cross-border provocations under a facade of international respectability. Further, it may embolden Pakistan diplomatically and weaken India’s narrative on state-sponsored terrorism, particularly in multilateral forums such as the United Nations, where narratives carry weight in shaping global consensus.

Likewise, Pakistan’s elevation in the UNSC structure could directly undermine India’s efforts to diplomatically isolate Islamabad for its alleged support of terrorism. Similarly, it may also erode India’s influence in keeping Pakistan under continued FATF scrutiny, particularly regarding efforts to push it back into the grey list, which has historically curtailed its financial and military capabilities. The larger impact would be that neutral countries that previously maintained strategic ambiguity may begin to perceive Pakistan as a rehabilitated and credible actor, further weakening India’s efforts to rally international support against terrorism emanating from across the border.

The impact of the recent developments will also encourage Pakistan’s deep state using its leadership roles—especially in critical committees such as the Taliban Sanctions Committee or the Counter-Terrorism Committee—to manipulate narratives, delay unfavourable actions, and indirectly legitimise proxy actors operating in Afghanistan and Kashmir. India’s push for concrete sanctions, naming of terror entities, and resolutions may encounter resistance or stalemate, undermining its core counterterrorism objectives. Finally—and perhaps most consequentially—India’s long-standing aspiration for a permanent seat at the UNSC could be adversely impacted. Pakistan’s current tenure and elevated roles might be used by rival powers to cast doubts on India’s claims of regional stability, thereby slowing down India’s reform-oriented push for a more inclusive and representative global governance structure.

While there are numerous challenges on the diplomatic front, India’s defence preparedness is also likely to come under severe stress. It may need to fast-track modernisation, increase allocations to counterterrorism infrastructure, and significantly upgrade its grey zone and human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities to stay ahead of not only the asymmetric threats but also across the entire spectrum of warfare especially after the stated policy of the country to rightly treat terror act as an act of war—a common interpretation is that it will no more be treated as an activity in the grey zone.

The Way Forward

Given the gravity of the situation, India must consider decisive and calculated measures to safeguard its strategic interests. Some pragmatic steps include:

First, any international attempt to draw false equivalence between India and Pakistan must be categorically and consistently opposed. India’s global partnerships must be shaped based on its distinct geopolitical identity and performance.

Second, India must reassess its policy of strategic autonomy. While the principle remains valuable, its application should be guided by a transactional and outcomes-based approach. In this context, frameworks like I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE, and the US) must be revitalised and expanded to counterbalance adversarial alliances.

Third, without credible hard power, diplomatic influence wanes. India must accelerate defence procurement, enhance its defence budget, and prioritise capabilities in cyber, space, AI, and critical technology alongside conventional modernisation.

Fourth, India must not shy away from adopting realpolitik. Recent actions like recalibrating trade dynamics with Bangladesh to check Chinese influence, and prime ministerial outreach to Cyprus to counter the Turkey-Pakistan nexus, are steps in the right direction.
Fifth, India should use platforms like the G20, Quad, and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework to highlight its role as a stabilising force and counter attempts to legitimise Pakistan’s double game on terrorism.

Sixth, India must invest in global perception management. Dedicated outreach via think tanks, media, and diplomatic missions to expose Pakistan’s duplicity on terrorism and human rights issues will be key to regaining narrative control.

Seventh, countering grey zone threats requires internal cohesion. India must invest in internal intelligence, cybersecurity, border infrastructure, and integrated military-civilian coordination mechanisms.

To conclude, India stands at a strategic inflection point. As Pakistan leverages international platforms for influence, India must respond not with hesitation, but with coherence, capability, and confidence. The choices made now will shape India’s global standing and regional balance for years to come.

The writer is the Director General of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies Lt Gen Dushyant Singh (Retd) is Director General, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS). Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.