Erdogan’s ‘grand vision’ to lead the Islamic world has limitations

Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, recently took a three-nation trip to Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia, which came at a time when Ankara achieved a decisive foreign policy triumph in its Syrian neighbourhood. The visit underscores his long-pursued Islamic foreign policy rhetoric to reach out to Muslim majority countries not only in its neighbourhood but also in the Asia-Pacific.

Ironically, these are the countries with whom Erdogan aspired to form an alternate Islamic forum parallel to the Jeddah-based Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 2019. However, the grouping did not materialise, but his regular visits and attempts to cement ties with these Muslim countries to create an alternate committed “Islamic bloc” actively pursuing Muslim causes across the globe under the tacit leadership of Erdogan in the Islamic world.

Erdogan’s Ambitions and Strategies

President Erdogan has long sought to position Turkey and himself as a voice of the Islamic world since the ascendency of his Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in 2002. Since then, Ankara is recalibrating its foreign policy orientation to project Turkey as a “middle” power, a “model” Muslim state, and an “alternative” leadership in the Islamic world.

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This framework was primarily shaped by Erdogan’s former academician-turned-foreign minister Ahmet Davotoglu’s Doctrine of Strategic Depth. It argues that Turkey and the Muslim world have been alienated and disenfranchised by the West after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and the post-Cold War era necessitates a policy overhaul at Ankara to carve out its own identity and rightful place in an emerging but uncertain world order. Its objectives require pursuing a policy of [over] engagement in the region and beyond, leveraging Turkey’s strategic geolocation, balancing the West and alliances with NATO, and extending its outreach using Islamist rhetoric on the world stage.

Thus, Erdogan has followed a two-pronged strategy. One is opposing Western imperialism in the West Asian region and the West-Israel alliance. Second is asserting his leadership among other competitors, employing a blend of Ottoman symbolism, populism, media and cinematic soft power, including the modern-secular Imam Hatip School models, and diplomatic outreach to ‘brotherly’ Muslim-majority countries.

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Erdogan frequently reiterates the maxim of “ittihad-i-Islam” (unity among Islamic believers), appealing that Muslims are one nation, superficially fragmented into ethno-national and sectarian identities in a West-dominated world. Moreover, taking a dig at the de facto leadership of Saudi Arabia, he claims, “Turkey is the only country that can lead the Muslim world as part of its civilisational duty” and advocates against “the growing threat of Zionist expansionism” in Palestine. He has also lambasted Donald Trump’s recent proposal to settle Palestinians from Gaza in surrounding Arab countries.

Time and again, Erdogan has also voiced concern about the state-sponsored persecution of Uighur Muslims in China and Rohingyas in Myanmar. Further, Turkey is the only major country after China and the only Muslim country that has been instrumental in vocalising the Pakistani narrative on Kashmir after the Government of India withdrew the special status of its state of Jammu & Kashmir in 2019. It culminated in further deterioration of its diplomatic relations with India.

As West Asian countries face internal crises, including failure of government, social discontentment, and economic collapse leading to state failure, Erdogan is advocating his AKP-modelled political Islamist system as a saviour for the modern-day crisis in the Muslim world. During the Arab Spring outbreak, Erdogan backed the Mohammed Morsi-led Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt while supporting the pro-democratic Ennahda party in Tunisia. These illustrate Erdogan’s involvement through Islamist proxies in bringing democratic governance to West Asia and Ottomanistic leadership style and advocacy to be the flagbearer of Islamic governance.

In recent years, aiming to deepen its influence, Turkey has successfully attempted to strengthen and stabilise economic and military ties with Muslim countries via bilateral trade and commercial relations, which have touched $72 billion in 2023. Turkey’s NGOs and agencies like TIKA and Red Crescent are now big players in many regions, providing humanitarian aid, building infrastructure projects, etc. To strengthen the defence and military capacities, Turkey is arming Muslim countries by exporting its military arms and armaments. This gives it an upper hand to emerge as a plausible ‘net security provider’ for Islamic nations through its strong military outreach via the establishment of military bases, deployment of forces, and training armed personnel of various countries.

Limitations and Challenges of the Grand Vision

Erdogan’s strategic manoeuvring to gain prominence in the Islamic world is remarkable but not without challenges. First, Erdogan’s religious revivalism is rooted in the neo-Ottomanism that constitutes a bitter memory for the Arab neighbourhood. Secondly, Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood in the wake of the Arab Spring has caused a rift with the Arab world, particularly the Gulf monarchies. Turkey’s attempt to emerge as a spearhead of the Islamic Ummah faces a Saudi challenge, the de facto leader of the Muslim world, with whom its ties deteriorated following Turkey’s diplomatic support to Qatar during the 2017 Saudi blockade on the small Arabian peninsula. Also, Turkey’s attempt to lead an Islamic summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2019 with the active partnership of Pakistan and Malaysia was diplomatically thwarted by the Saudis putting stringent financial pressures on Pakistan and Malaysia.

Turkey’s ambitions in the North African region, particularly Libya and the Horn of Africa, are facing tough challenges from the UAE and Egypt. His Islamic projects to revive Ottoman-era ports and military bases and increase its presence in the Red Sea region under its Mavi Vatan policy are encountered by the UAE’s strong presence in the region. Erdogan’s dream to become the Messiah of the Islamic Ummah has also been constrained by a contracting domestic economy and highly polarised Turkish society. Particularly, despite a weak opposition, the secular Kemalists have criticised the Islamic rhetoric of President Erdogan that poses a threat to the security and integrity of the already fragmented Turkish society.

However, Erdogan’s attempt to challenge Iran’s role as the saviour of the Muslim Ummah has achieved a minor feat recently with the fall of the Assad regime, Iran’s ironclad ally in the region, and the collapse of Iran’s tentacles, ie, Hamas and Hezbollah. Thus, an opportune moment has given Turkey a chance to emerge as the leader in the region, with the latter backing the Islamist faction Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in the Syrian transition process. Further, Turkey’s extraordinary defence achievements, military outreach across various regions, and Erdogan’s strive to be the mediator in various international conflicts give an edge to Turkey in its attempt to be the leader of the Islamic world. However, the efforts by Erdogan look ambitious yet gloomy amid volatile international circumstances.

The authors are PhD scholars at Centre for West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.