On August 30, India’s Foreign Minister S Jaishankar, speaking on India’s foreign policy, said, “The era of uninterrupted dialogue with Pakistan is over”—a policy that remained the backbone of Congress-led government (2004-2014). Jaishankar’s remarks come in the backdrop of Pakistan extending the recent invitation to Prime Minister Narendra Modi to participate in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) Council of Heads of Government meeting to be held in Islamabad in October.
Following the 2019 attacks by the Pakistani terror group Jaish-e-Muhmmad on the convoy of Indian security forces in Pulwama, Delhi conveyed in the strongest way that terror and talks cannot go together. Jaishankar’s remarks have also put a full stop to any possibilities of diplomatic interactions at any level, including regional forums like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
Since Prime Minister Modi refused to attend the 2016 SAARC summit in Islamabad, citing security concerns, no subsequent summits have been held. The diplomatic freeze is further underscored by the absence of High Commissioners in both capitals, with neither India nor Pakistan having an official representative in Delhi or Islamabad. This diplomatic vacuum reflects the deepening rift between the two nations, signalling a significant downturn in bilateral relations.
In the press briefing on August 30, the Ministry of External Affairs confirmed the invitation to the Indian Prime Minister but added that no decision had been taken. With the mounting tensions in India-Pakistan relations, it is unlikely that Prime Minister Modi will visit Islamabad.
If Modi denies making an in-person presence at the upcoming SCO Summit, it will primarily be for two reasons—security issues and Pakistan’s lip service to combating the menace of terrorism. At the SCO Council of Foreign Ministers Summit in May 2023, Foreign Minister Jaishankar reminded the member states that tackling terrorism was one of the SCO’s mandates.
The absence of political dialogue has come at a cost for Islamabad. There is no cross-border trade, meaning Pakistan does not have access to one of the largest regional markets. Does it matter for the Pakistani economy? The answer is yes.
Impact Shorts
View AllBefore Pakistan decided to cut off trade ties with India in 2019, it exported US$500 million worth of goods to India and imported goods worth US$2.06 billion in FY 2018-19. In 2023, Pakistan’s exports were down to US$ 3 million in FY 2023-24—a fall of 99.4 per cent in four years. While the informal trade continues, the existing trade is routed through third-country ports like Dubai or Singapore, significantly increasing costs and logistical challenges for Pakistani businesses.
In October 2023, on his return to Pakistan after years of self-exile in London, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was seen advocating improving ties with India. However, neither the deep state in Pakistan let Nawaz enter the Prime Minister’s Office nor did the ties improve. Had he entered office, it was unlikely that Senior Sharif could change the course of relations, considering the ‘establishment’ remains all in all of Pakistan.
But this is not to say that the Modi administration never favoured dialogue with Pakistan. The historic handshake between Prime Minister Modi and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif at the 18th SAARC Summit in Kathmandu in November 2024, followed by Modi’s brief stopover in Lahore in 2015, signalled the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government’s willingness to resume dialogue with Pakistan in the post-2008 terror attacks in Mumbai.
However, Pakistan’s obsession with the abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian constitution, which granted special status to the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir, has marked a closure to the bilateral dialogue.
Pakistan continues to raise the issue of Article 370, saying that it will exercise all possible options to counter illegal steps, but Delhi pays no heed. For Delhi, India is free to decide on the internal affairs of the country. Despite its internal economic and political issues, Pakistan has left no stone unturned in raising the issue of Article 370 at the United Nations. However, its attempts, even with support from some Islamic nations, have largely fallen flat on the international stage.
In contrast, India’s rise as the fifth largest economic power and capacity to invest and attract investments, particularly from the Islamic world, have placed New Delhi differently. Countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Malaysia, and Indonesia, which extended support to Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute, seemed to have overcome the Islamic identity dilemma with Pakistan and moved ahead with Delhi in trade, investment, cyber security, etc.
For instance, Malaysia’s criticism of India’s move to abrogate Article 370 had led to Delhi cutting on its major palm oil imports, which had hit the Malaysian palm oil market. However, the recent visit of Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim to India on August 20 saw a positive shift in bilateral ties, primarily driven by bilateral trade, which reached a record high of US$19.5 billion.
At the same time, the significance of the ‘Pakistan factor’ in raising ultra-nationalistic sentiments in India has diminished. In the 2024 parliamentary elections, Pakistan was notably absent from the manifestos of major political parties. Congress and the Communist Party proposed resuming dialogue with Pakistan, contingent on Islamabad’s firm action against terrorism exported to India, while the BJP focused on bolstering border security.
There has also been a shift in India’s popular political approach towards Pakistan, mainly during elections in India. During the May 2024 parliamentary elections, Pakistan barely figured in the election speeches of the BJP and Congress. Islamabad is a done deal for Delhi.
India appears resolute in rejecting any advocacy or criticism of Kashmir from Pakistan or any third country, including Article 370. Delhi has also sent a clear message to regional parties in Jammu and Kashmir, notably the National Conference (NC) and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), who strongly opposed the government’s move to abrogate Article 370, signalling that the matter is settled.
With Assembly Elections scheduled for September and October in the newly formed Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, the PDP and NC have pledged to restore the region’s “ original status” and reinstate “ Article 370”—a political gimmick that the regional parties have been sporting since 2019.
In fact, mainstream regional parties in the Union territory of Jammu and Kashmir recognise that the state lacks the legal authority to achieve this. Despite this, they are likely to use the issue of Article 370 to fuel an anti-BJP campaign in the state. After ten years, the Kashmir Valley is heading to the polls to elect a state government. The region has been under the Governor’s Rule since 2018 and the President’s Rule from 2019 onwards.
By holding elections, Delhi signals its confidence in the security measures to handle any potential challenges, particularly in countering cross-border terrorism, while moving past global criticism over Article 370. Elections further underscore India’s determination to assert its sovereignty and normalise the situation in Jammu and Kashmir. It also sends a clear message that India remains steadfast in its policies, undeterred by external pressures or threats.
Rishi Gupta is the Assistant Director at the Asia Society Policy Institute, Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.