Emerging situations in Myanmar require proactive responses from India

The pace of unfolding events on our eastern borders with Myanmar is fast evolving and needs a closer look by Indian decision-makers. Sharing close to 1600 km of borders with India, Myanmar is at one of the critical points of its nationhood, growth, and survival, all three of which are substantially mixed at this juncture. Myanmar, the name it adopted from its erstwhile name of Burma with effect from June 18, 1989, has been under British India as early as 1886 onwards. Except for the short duration during World War II when it came under Japanese occupation, it continued to remain part of British India. It got some kind of separate geographical identity in 1937 but became independent only on January 4, 1948, from the British as a follow-up to the Burma Independence Act passed by the British Parliament on December 10, 1947. Both the Independence Acts as well as the grant of independence to Myanmar (then Burma) were later in time frame as compared to the Indian Independence Act, which was passed on July 18, 1947, and Indian independence, which was granted on August 15, 1947. By all standards, international norms, and ethical conduct, Britishers should have made Myanmar a part of India, which became the primary successor of British India. The British policy of ‘Divide and Rule’ was modified by the Britishers as ‘Divide and Destroy’ wherein they ceded different parts of erstwhile British India to different countries, separating them from India. The above historical context is important to understand the country’s old and close linkages between India and Myanmar, which stand at crossroads as of now. The dynamics of the country are fast changing since the military junta took over power on February 1, 2021, close to two years now, when they dismissed the civilian government running the state of affairs. It was hoped that the initial emergency of a year’s duration may result in fresh elections to install a civilian democratic government, but that does not appear to be the intention of the current military government. India has four of its critical northeastern states, namely Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram, bordering Myanmar, and therefore the ongoing situation in Myanmar is affecting India ‘in general’ and these states ‘in particular’. As against the ‘wait, watch, and then act’ response, a more mature and proactive response is the need of the hour. The dynamics of these challenges emanate from the British policy of disregarding human relationships while drawing boundaries between nations. They did it while drawing the British India and Afghanistan border in the form of the ‘Durand Line’, where Pashtuns and some other tribes were divided on both sides of this line, resulting in even current-day problems between Pakistan and Afghanistan. They did the same while partitioning India and Pakistan by drawing the Radcliffe line with a similar population split into two parts. In this case, it resulted in large-scale migrations and millions of deaths, the scars of which reverberate even today. The same was done by Britishers in the context of Myanmar; first, they disassociated this geographic entity from India on April 1, 1937, though both geographies continued under the British crown till they won their respective independence. The borders were not clearly demarcated, and their larger alignment had the same phenomenon—tribes split on both sides of the border. Though a land border agreement was signed between India and Myanmar on March 10, 1967, and a maritime boundary agreement was signed in 1982, challenges on the land borders are far too many, and they are becoming complicated in the current military regime, which is not in full control of the country. The Free Movement Regime (FMR) adopted by India and Myanmar was to address the concerns of the local population or tribes residing on both sides of the land border, whether it be their educational, employment, trade, or marriage needs. Though intended as a positive and welcome step, it had created major problems by supporting insurgency in the northeastern states, wherein the insurgents were active in the North East but had their major shelters and habitats across the border in the jungles of Myanmar. China substantially facilitated this by arming these insurgents and providing them with all kinds of logistics support. Despite facing such serious insurgency problems in the northeastern states, India did not engage with Myanmar to further its national interests adequately but operated from a position of ‘high pedestal of ethical conduct’. India did not engage much with Myanmar’s military regime and instead championed the cause of civil democracy. The continuation of military regimes in Myanmar for a larger part of its independent era thus hindered the positive engagement between India and Myanmar. India also learned its lessons well with the passage of time and commenced engagement with Myanmar in furtherance of its national interests. This led to waning logistics support for the insurgents, besides cross-border operations by the Indian Army to flush out these terrorists. This era also blossomed as China took a back seat in supporting these insurgents due to improved relations between India and China. This also facilitated India’s ‘Look East Policy’ and ‘Act East Policy’. With the military junta taking over the reins of Myanmar on February 1, 2021, India faced a new challenge, more so when this military regime of Myanmar could not gain acceptance from most of the countries in the world. India was mature enough to strike this balance, but the tide has started turning against Indian interests as the military regime has started suffering losses and reverses and is being opposed by the combined might of three powerful anti-junta groups—the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Arakan Army, and the Taang National Liberation Army. These anti-junta groups have already overrun close to 500 Myanmar Army posts and achieved sizable territorial gains. The local population is also supporting the anti-junta groups. It is becoming a frequent sight wherein Myanmar soldiers are running away to save their lives and taking refuge in the Indian northeastern states of Mizoram and others. There has been substantial migration of the local civil population from Myanmar to the bordering states of India, in addition to the ongoing Rohingya migration crisis affecting Bangladesh as well as India substantially. Due to the unstable military regime in Myanmar, which is suffering reverses on a regular basis from the anti-junta forces, there are serious security challenges for India, which are broadly covered as under: Chinese intervention: China has transgressed at multiple locations in eastern Ladakh across the LAC, which is nearing four years now and is still to be resolved. China has not only limited its activities to the LAC transgressions but is also now actively fomenting trouble in the Indian northeastern states. Keeping Myanmar on its side is critical for China not only to further its ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ through which it is seeking alternate options to its Malacca Strait challenge but also to further its design against India in its northeastern states by supporting insurgents. China has succeeded in gaining substantial influence on the military junta as well as the anti-junta forces, due to which it has succeeded in brokering a peace deal between these two warring elements, which is something unprecedented. It is therefore evident that both sides are looking for favours and support from China to further their respective interests. As against this, India is in a Catch-22 situation wherein it has to risk the decision of taking one of the two sides. Refugee crisis: India was already facing the Rohingya crisis, wherein these people migrated from the Rakhine state in Myanmar to Bangladesh and India. Added to this, persecution by the military regime in Myanmar has forced a large number of locals across the India-Myanmar border to move across the porous border and settle down in the North East, with a special focus in Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram. The state governments and local populations of these states are supportive of these migrants due to their ethnic linkages, and these numbers are swelling at a fast pace, fracturing the security situation in these states. Fragile peace agreements: As one fraction of ULFA has recently signed a peace agreement in Assam, a similar effort is needed in Nagaland, wherein the peace agreement must be signed with those who are willing to join the peace process rather than waiting for everyone to be ‘on board’. This has also been exploited aggressively by China in the recent past. Manipur crisis: An unprecedented crisis has emerged in Manipur that was never seen in any other state, probably in the history of independent India. There are multiple reasons for the current crisis, but the same is also being accentuated with every passing day. These are being leveraged by anti-India elements, including China, and have become more complex due to the ongoing situation in Myanmar. There are many other implications of collapsing Myanmar for India. India needs to be proactive in responding to the emerging situation in Myanmar to further its national interests. Myanmar being on the Indian side is ‘key’ to its Act East Policy, as Myanmar is a ‘gateway’ to further the national interests of India. Some of the options that need urgent attention by the Indian government are as follows:

• Completion of border fencing in ‘mission’ mode. The alignment must be at the ‘border’ as opposed to creating a gap by aligning it on its own side of the ‘border’. This is something that must be done on all our borders.
• FMR should be done away with. Movement must be allowed only with a visa. Visa-free movement on both sides of the border up to 16 km on each side is counterproductive to current national interests. Implementation of this will be possible with strong fencing and effective patrolling.
• The government of the day should take active measures in Manipur to address the current crisis. It is the responsibility of all political parties and religious and tribal segments to douse the ‘fire’ as opposed to letting it fester for years to come.
• In addition to the infrastructure developments, job opportunities must be enhanced for the residents of the North East, with a special focus on border states, whether with China or with Myanmar.
• Identification of all refugees, their efficient management, and their localisation must be accorded priority until they are fully repatriated to their native places. This will be possible only if a ‘peaceful’ situation prevails in their native place, viz Myanmar in this case. The Indian Government must proactively support the creation of such conditions, using even Track 2 diplomatic tools where needed.
• A ‘mission’ mode effort should be spearheaded for the handling of internal fault lines in the NE states so that these are not exploited by inimical elements of the nation.
• An all-inclusive approach should be evolved to sign peace accords with all the insurgent groups through peaceful dialogue.

There are three clear sides in Myanmar: One is the military junta, which is largely controlling Myanmar; the second is the anti-junta brotherhood alliance fighting the military junta; and the third is the group of supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi. It’s time that India engages proactively with all these three elements in a balanced manner so that they look towards India as opposed to China for their support and patronage. Opening the dialogue with anti-junta forces is critical in addition to engaging with the current military regime. The writer is a retired army veteran. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost_’s views._