Deciphering Tehran's 'neighbourhood first' policy: Iran-Pakistan relations

Experts argue that Tehran, by accepting the invitation of Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari, reflected strategic calculus, culminating in Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi’s three-day visit to Pakistan, starting with his arrival in Islamabad on April 22, making him the first Iranian leader to visit Pakistan in eight years. During his visit, the two nations signed over eight agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoUs), strengthening bilateral cooperation and fostering regional security and economic prosperity.

That said, his visit came at a crucial time. Just a week before the visit, Iran had launched rocket barrages using a mix of missiles and drones at Israel in retaliation for the Israeli Air Force airstrike on the Iranian embassy complex in Damascus. This reminded us of the beginning of 2024, when regional security was seriously threatened as Tehran and Islamabad’s diplomatic relations took a dip after the artillery strikes conducted in each other’s territory.

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A bid to revive diplomatic relations?

At the outset, one may argue that President Raisi’s Pakistan visit reflects Tehran’s attempt to win Islamabad’s support (in the backdrop of retaliation against Israel), perhaps even reflecting/demonstrating Pakistan’s importance in Tehran’s neighbourhood policy and its relations with regional economies. That said, Islamabad has serious limitations in the context of internal/domestic security or foreign policy, coupled with a crippled economy, forcing it to take calculative measures even before committing political support through foreign policy engagements without seeking anything in return. That said, for Islamabad, its policy towards Tehran is centred on:

• economic gains,

• border insecurity, and

• terror groups operating on the borders

It is without a doubt that this visit reflects Tehran’s willingness to engage with Pakistan in the context of economic engagement, perhaps bringing more collaborative opportunities in terms of strengthening economic cooperation and reaffirming Tehran’s commitment to strengthen its engagement with Islamabad and bolster relations. That said, President Raisi’s visit did not reflect (or demonstrate) regional influence, making it a focused visit to strengthen relations with Pakistan. During a discussion with an expert from the University of Tehran, he opined that the visit may have carried remnants of recent events, reflecting Iran’s commitment to de-escalate and revive regional stability, emanating from his conversations with IRGC leadership in Tehran, which are visible in comments made by the Pakistan Foreign Office.

Reflecting on the joint statement released by Pakistan and Iran on April 24, member states called on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to take action against Israel, accusing it of having targeted neighbouring states and foreign diplomatic structures illegally. The authors speculate that Tehran has sought assistance from Pakistani authorities to relay messages between Iran and the US or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in an effort to reduce regional escalation (Israel’s retaliation) with Pakistan’s history of mediation between Washington and regional neighbours. It remains unclear whether Tehran sought Pakistan’s assistance to reach Washington due to their strained ties and stark differences on the issue of the fight against terrorism, the hostility that continues to persist after the US operation to kill Osama bin Laden, even today, and Pakistan being the epicentre of China’s CPEC and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

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Taking note of Islamabad’s absence in the Saudi coalition against Yemen and not favouring the Kingdom during the Qatar crisis, Pakistan’s image in the Gulf has taken a dip. Today, Pakistan’s importance in the Arab Gulf is largely dependent on its vitality in Beijing’s Middle East policy and its Belt and Road Initiative. That said, the Gulf (particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia) is looking to expand its relations beyond Pakistan, using formats such as I2U2 or the IMEC Corridor to engage with India, denying Islamabad any room to mediate between Washington, Tehran, and the Gulf.

A game of economics?

Besides diplomacy, President Raisi’s Pakistan trip echoed economic and security cooperation, with both nations agreeing to increase bilateral trade to $10 billion in a time span of five years from the existing $2 billion. The trade of liquified petroleum gas (LPG) in addition to crude oil plays a significant role in bilateral relations between the two states, with Tehran providing electricity supply to the province of Baluchistan among other border regions of Pakistan.

The highlight of this bilateral relationship echoes at the energy trade between the two countries. Islamabad and Tehran signed the Gas Sales and Purchase Agreement in June 2009 for a pipeline that was planned to supply 750 million to 1,000 million cubic feet per day of natural gas to energy-starved Pakistan for 25 years from Iran’s South Pars Field. Though Tehran had claimed in early 2011 to have completed their side of the pipeline, construction delays continue to haunt Islamabad, primarily from the fear of Washington invoking sanctions against them. The Biden administration has categorically questioned the Pakistan-Iran pipeline, dismissing its support, opposing it, and reiterating that Iran is under US sanctions for its nuclear programme.

In February this year, the then-caretaker government in Pakistan approved constructing a small patch of pipeline connecting the Iranian border to Pakistani territory out of fear of being penalised billions of dollars due to delays in project construction. Post-election, the incumbent regime of Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif (which took office in March) is yet to authorise construction of the project. The delays from the Pakistani side appear to leave a dent in its relationship with Tehran, which was evident from the lengthy joint statement issued at the end of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Pakistan, with passing mention of the pipeline, raising speculation on further delays.

Energy-starved and cash-strapped, Pakistan is in dire need of cheap oil to support over 240 million people. Pakistan currently imports expensive oil and gas from Gulf countries, primarily from Iran’s arch-rival Saudi Arabia, with Aramco acquiring a 40 per cent equity stake in Gas and Oil Pakistan Ltd., and according to a former Aramco official, the Kingdom staunchly opposes the deal.

Regional stability by countering terrorism?

According to a former IRGC official, terrorism persists as a point of contention in Iran-Pakistan bilateral relations, with both nations pointing accusations towards their inability to curb Islamist factions operating within their territories. One such terror faction is the Jaish al-Adl, popularly known as Jundullah (Soldiers of God), which is a Sunni Islamist group with Balochi ethnicities operating in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as North West Frontier Province) province of Pakistan. According to a Tehran-based security analyst, the groups launched a series of attacks in the Iranian cities of Rask and Chabahar in Sistan and Baluchistan Province in April 2024, which resulted in a sustained gun battle lasting over 17 hours between islamist militants and Iranian security forces. In December 2023, the group was responsible for killing 11 members of the Iranian security forces at a police station in Rask. This prompted Tehran to launch a targeted strike against all Jaish al-Adl bases in Pakistan in January 2024, with the group now posing a direct threat to Iran’s national security.

This resulted in Pakistan retaliating two days later by targeting the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) camps, which Islamabad considers a threat to its national security.

President Raisi’s visit reflects Tehran’s interest in de-escalating tension with Islamabad, which was caused by the former’s attack and the latter’s retaliation. Instead, the authors argue that the visit reflects some pressure Tehran could have faced domestically after Islamabad’s retaliation, which some hardliners may have called for greater exercise of power from Tehran. Tehran’s military action was deemed a response from Islamabad, which many in Tehran considered unwarranted, calling for greater exercise of power and strength in response to Islamabad undermining Tehran’s capability to further retaliate. That said, the decision to strike against Jaish al-Adl exposed limitations in Tehran’s strategic calculus, especially underestimating Islamabad’s capability to retaliate. Additionally, Iran lost the confidence of many of its supporters in Pakistan, tarnishing its reputation in pro-Iranian societies, pro-Tehran lobby groups, and civil society organisations, which President Raisi could have hoped to regain through this visit. During the authors’ discussion with an Islamabad-based scholar, the expert opined of a positive response from general gatherings and local masses towards Raisi’s visit, reflecting the depth of Tehran’s soft power influence.

At the outset, President Raisi’s visit to Pakistan demonstrates Tehran’s willingness to renew relations with Islamabad. This visit may have also set the stage for Tehran to renew its neighbourhood policy, starting with renewed momentum in its bilateral relations with Pakistan and laying the foundation for a pro-active ’look-east’ strategy. President Raisi’s visit appears to have set the stage to not just achieve the aforementioned objectives, but by renewing confidence in Pakistan, Tehran may aim to cloak its regional ambitions from potential US sanctions.

Anant Mishra is a visiting fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales. Christian Kaunert is Professor of International Security at Dublin City University, and Professor of Policing and Security at the University of South Wales. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.