Chinese game in Bangladesh mirrors Beijing’s Pakistan playbook

The geopolitical landscape of South Asia is undergoing a shift that is driven in part by China’s relentless quest to expand its influence across the region. While Pakistan has been a long-standing partner of Beijing in the west, facilitating China’s strategic interests against India, Bangladesh now emerges as its crucial eastern anchor, especially following the political upheaval that saw Sheikh Hasina’s government fall and the rise of the Yunus-led Islamist regime in Dhaka.

The fall of Sheikh Hasina’s traditionally pro-India government and the Islamist-backed dictatorial regime led by Mohamad Yunus created an opening for China to deepen its foothold in Bangladesh. The new regime, perceived as more amenable to Beijing’s interests, has embraced Chinese investments, infrastructure projects, and diplomatic overtures with open arms. This shift has facilitated not only the implementation of major Chinese-funded projects like the Padma Bridge and the establishment of Special Economic Zones but also the invitation to China to invest in water management of rivers and major ports where traditionally India had the clear advantage. These are the moves that serve not only economic objectives but also strategic military and geopolitical aims.

China’s advance into Bangladesh is largely its mirrored policy from Pakistan. What Pakistan represents for China in the west as a proxy state that espouses Islamist ideology and a mindset of perpetual conflict with India, Bangladesh appears to be taking on a similar role in the east. Both countries harbour significant Islamist movements that share a worldview inclined towards hostility with India, envisioning endless conflicts rooted in ideological, religious, and geopolitical grievances.

This ideological alignment and shared mindset act as a catalyst for regional destabilisation, and China appears to be leveraging this psychological and political climate to its advantage. Beijing’s engagement with Bangladesh is not merely economic, but it is strategic, aimed at fostering a network of sympathisers and governments aligned with its regional ambitions.

Both Pakistan and Bangladesh have histories rooted in Islamic nationalism, and despite their differences, both are increasingly influenced by Islamist ideologies that reject secular nationalism and see India as a perennial adversary. Elements within Bangladesh, including some political factions and radical groups, echo Pakistan’s narrative of a strong opposition to India, often fuelled by conspiracy theories, historical grievances, and religious rhetoric.

This shared Islamist mindset in Bangladesh and Pakistan effectively creates a regional front that perceives India as an existential threat. For China, this provides a strategic advantage: that of an unstable, ideologically aligned region that can be exploited to weaken India’s regional influence and assert dominance.

Beijing’s support for Pakistan’s Islamist extremism and its tacit or active complicity in enabling proxies and shielding terrorists like Masood Azhar, head of the proscribed terror organisation Jaish-e-Mohammad, which has been responsible for multiple terror attacks in India, from getting globally sanctioned in the past are well documented. Now, with Bangladesh increasingly integrated into China’s regional and economic plans, there are concerns that Beijing may turn a blind eye to, or even indirectly foster, radical Islamist elements in Bangladesh. This serves China’s broader goal that is weakening India’s regional rise, creating a buffer zone, and securing choke points in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.

The strategic gain for China is clear. By fostering influence in Bangladesh, China not only consolidates its eastern flank but also isolates India geographically and geopolitically. The deepening of Chinese investments, military ties, and intelligence cooperation in Bangladesh and Myanmar acts as a counterbalance, effectively encircling India in a web of Chinese-controlled infrastructure and influence.

This encirclement strategy diminishes India’s traditional regional dominance and complicates New Delhi’s security calculus, especially in the context of China’s Belt and Road connectivity projects and its growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean. It also threatens India’s internal security by making the eastern border states vulnerable to terror and separatist activities.

Behind the veneer of economic development and infrastructure lies a more troubling reality of Beijing’s likely enabling of Islamist extremism and its strategic use of Bangladesh as a pawn in its grander geopolitical game. This raises serious questions about regional stability, sovereignty, and the long-term health of the democratic institutions in Bangladesh.

The shared Islamist worldview and China’s tacit backing, or at least toleration, of radical elements pose a risk of increased insurgency, cross-border terrorism, and further destabilisation of Bangladesh. These developments threaten not just regional peace but also global security, as the seeds of conflict and extremism could spill over into neighbouring territories, including India and Myanmar, where the Rohingyas are vying for a separate Arakan region.

What Pakistan has long been for China in the west as a strategic proxy rooted in Islamist ideology that antagonises India, the same is now mirrored in Bangladesh, on India’s eastern flank. With Beijing’s backing, both countries are increasingly poised as ideological and strategic opponents of India, shaping a regional landscape marked by instability and mutual hostility.

China’s expansion into Bangladesh is not just about trade or infrastructure, but it is part of a larger, more sinister game of regional dominance rooted in ideological alignment, strategic encirclement, and a shared adversarial stance towards India. As these dynamics unfold, the region faces a future where destabilisation, radicalism, and geopolitical rivalry threaten to dominate South Asia’s trajectory.

Raja Muneeb is an independent journalist and columnist. He tweets @rajamuneeb. The views expressed in this article are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of Firstpost.