 "Can India protect its rights in harnessing Brahmaputra river?")
It is official now that China will build a massive hydropower dam on the Yarlung Zangbo River (known as the Brahmaputra in India and Jamuna in Bangladesh) in the Tibetan Autonomous Region of China. On December 25, 2024, Xinhua, the state-owned media, reported that the Chinese government has approved the construction of a hydropower project in the lower reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo River. Despite India’s calculative response in a media briefing after more than a week (January 3, 2025), can India protect its interests in harnessing the Brahmaputra River?
The proposed hydropower claims to scale up clean energy to meet carbon neutrality and to minimise the climate change risks—hydrological disasters—in China. Consequently, a large section of media in India has raised concerns against the Chinese plan to build the dam, expected to be bigger than the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River. The transboundary rivers flowing from China to India are clubbed into two groups: the Brahmaputra River system, which consists of the Siang River and its tributaries, and the Indus River system, which consists of the Indus River and the Sutlej River.
As usual, most of the media, in India and abroad, have generated several speculative narratives of the unilateral Chinese intervention in a shared river. The usual promptness of the Ministry of External Affairs of India in diffusing such media-hyped concerns was largely missing. Earlier in such news of dam building in the Brahmaputra as in 2013, 2018, 2020, and 2023, the ‘Brahmaputra anxiety’—apprehension over Chinese unilateral intervention in the Brahmaputra without prior information to downstream countries—successive governments in Delhi have always been consistently conveying their views and concerns to the Chinese counterpart cautiously and diplomatically.
The media speculations with comments from experts on the ability of China as an upper riparian country to use water strategically against India by ‘weaponising water’ or leading to future water wars to uphold leverage as a ‘water hegemon’ during all kinds of negotiations, especially border talks, remain uncorroborated. It is obvious that due to the strained relations between the countries and the lack of sharing information by both countries, the news of Chinese dam buildings has always created ripples in the media in India and beyond.
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More Shorts‘Brahmaputra anxiety’ resurfaces time and again
Here are some specific questions that need to be answered to get rid of such apprehensions. Does the Indian government share similar apprehensions about Chinese damming water in the Brahmaputra as in the media? Is the Indian government capable and efficient enough to disperse this apprehension among its close allies and provincial governments (Assam and Arunachal Pradesh) in India? What measures are being taken by India to resolve the shared water issues with China in priority while protecting its interests?
From border incursions or the construction of military infrastructure to dam building and the formation of artificial lakes, India always receives such news from external sources.
Successive governments in India, from the Congress-led UPA government’s position on Chinese unilateral intervention in the Brahmaputra as ‘media hype’ to the BJP-led NDA government’s stance as ‘closely monitoring the situation’ and ‘will continue to monitor’, the Chinese Brahmaputra conundrum remains untraceable and unresolved. Meanwhile, India stated that it has ‘urged China to ensure that the interests of downstream states of the Brahmaputra are not harmed by activities in upstream areas’. It is not clear if the concern has been shared with the Chinese counterpart after the news of the dam building or earlier. However, it is believed that India has been reiterating constantly such concerns of unilateral development interventions in the river to the Chinese side through existing bilateral and diplomatic channels.
Yet, China’s posture has been persistent that none of its projects, either completed or ongoing or proposed, would do any harm to India as a lower riparian country. During a press conference on December 27, 2024, China stated that the ‘dam project has no negative impact on the lower reaches.’ Moreover, China will continue to maintain communication with countries at the lower reaches through existing channels. Has this proposed dam been communicated officially to India and Bangladesh as lower riparian countries?
Both India and China have operational arrangements for sharing information on the shared rivers—the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej (Langquin Zangbo). Since 2002, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Brahmaputra, renewed every five years, allows the sharing of hydrological information (water level, discharge, and rainfall) during flood season from 1st June to 15th October every year at three locations (Nugesha, Yangcun, and Nuxia in China). During the non-traditional security threat from the Pare-chu artificial lake (Glacier Lake Outburst Flood/GLOF) in Tibet (2004-2005), India and China showed exemplary cooperation with exchanges of site visits and in-depth discussions in Beijing and Lhasa. Therefore, in 2005, an MOU was signed, with a five-year renewal period, concerning the Sutlej (Langquin Zangbo) River for the supply of hydrological information (abnormal rise/fall in water level/discharge in real time) in flood season at Tsada station in China. As per all MoUs, India bears the maintenance costs of these four stations. Interestingly, in 1954 both the countries had almost signed an MoU on the Brahmaputra, but the border war halted the progress.
On the institutional level, one of the cornerstones of accelerating transboundary cooperation and minimising climate change risks in basins, a consultative joint Expert-Level Mechanism (ELM) between two countries has been meeting annually in alternative countries since 2006. This mechanism allows both countries to interact and discuss means and ways of cooperation on the provision of flood season hydrological data, emergency management, and other related issues regarding shared rivers. Technically, this platform should erase any apprehension that arises from unilateral interventions or misinformation regarding the transboundary rivers. While 14 ELM meetings had been concluded, the last in Delhi in June 2023, both countries still have a tremendous gap in information sharing on the unilateral interventions in international rivers.
One must be aware that the Chinese government is very famous for its secret, aggressive, and nontransparent gargantuan projects. Don’t forget the Three Gorges Dam. Despite an agreement on border issues inked on October 21, 2024, high-level meetings, including the foreign minister’s meetings in Rio in November, the information on the proposed hydropower structure was elusive to India. In the words of India’s External Affairs Minister, India has a very complex relationship with China. However, it is agreed that a meeting of the Special Representatives and the Foreign Secretary-Vice Minister mechanism will take place soon that will consider issues related to transboundary rivers.
India and China can resolve these apprehensions and beyond through constructive and transparent engagement. However, it seems it’s the border issue first and foremost for India, then the water issue in northeast India. Perhaps the Indian establishment considers the North East of India to be water-rich even though China diverts or controls the Brahmaputra water. It is equally illogical and unscientific for India to engage in a dam-building spree in its stretch of the Brahmaputra to counter China’s motive without proper assessments of the ecological sensitivity of the region.
While both countries are not party to two UN Water Conventions—the 1992 Water Convention and the 1997 Watercourses Convention—it’s not an obligation to follow universal principles governing shared water. Besides, both agreed to the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and SDG-6, which guides transboundary basin cooperation in reducing climate change risks. It’s almost certain that China, having the extra edge of being upper riparian, does not need any agreement with India right now, which would curtail its freedom to develop water resources till the famous U-bend near Arunachal Pradesh in India. On the contrary, India, being a middle riparian, must persuade China tactically for a long-term water framework on the Brahmaputra River, beyond just information sharing, at the earliest.
The author works as an international advisor on transboundary cooperation and climate change risks with GIZ. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
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