Blood brothers: Al Qaeda, Taliban and the pledge that binds them in 2024

Taliban may have signed the Doha Agreement with the United States, committing to severe all possible connections with Al Qaeda, perpetually pledging to deny its soil to any terror activity against any country. That said, monitoring Taliban’s security and governance apparatus in two years and five (almost) months, the authors identify the presence of numerous Islamist factions (many sympathetic to the Taliban with some shared experiences during their fight against the US-led coalition forces), one such being the Al Qaeda network, which continues to thrive in Afghanistan, today.

Interacting with former and current Taliban members (on the condition of anonymity), the authors found substantial evidence indicating junior Taliban leadership (including provincial governors and commanders) providing potential recruits (for basic weapons training), passports (in the name of erstwhile Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) to key members of Al Qaeda, granting them access to natural reserves (minerals, ores and one mine), enabling them to strengthen existing networks of drug trafficking. This reflects a systematic engagement (curated) between Al Qaeda and the Taliban, pointing towards its continued relevance in the Rahbari Shura, making Al Qaeda perpetually inseparable even after 24 years.

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What appears to be a blatant disregard to Doha Accord, the authors opine the group is retaining (even strengthening) its relationship with Al Qaeda. While interacting with experts focussing on Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, many unanimously agreed to Afghanistan becoming a safe haven of terrorism after the Taliban’s rule. Taking into account their extent of relationship (in the region) there is no doubt, it is highly likely for the Taliban to employ Al Qaeda fighters against hostile neighbours.

The relationship (between Taliban and Al Qaeda) which was exposed after the killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the former leader of the Islamist terror group, housed in one of many guesthouses owned by Sirajuddin Haqqani, the acting Minister of Interior Affairs for Taliban, appears to have evolved in 2024.

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The fabric of relationship: Al Zawahiri’s pledge

To understand the extent of the existing relationship between Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the author referred to the letter written by Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden then, which not only demonstrated Afghanistan’s importance as a territory/topography suitable to Al Qaeda’s survival but a perpetual playground, with the potential to provide seamless recruitment opportunities, then anywhere else in South Asia. In the letter, Al-Zawahiri also reiterated his position on Al Qaeda’s commitment to the Taliban and strived to build greater partnership and trust. To understand Taliban’s perspectives, the authors interviewed current and former members of the Taliban, who not only echoed Taliban’s commitment to the group but detailed the need to preserve and support Al Qaeda.

That said, the Taliban has always denied Al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan, a statement that has echoed repeatedly since the latter’s takeover of Kabul. To confirm the extent of the Taliban’s commitment to the group, the author interviewed a former provincial governor, who not only confirmed Al Qaeda’s presence in the eastern, southern and southeastern provinces of Afghanistan but also detailed the privileges enjoyed by the group. He further confirmed Al Qaeda’s existing safe havens in the region and provided detailed notes on training and recruitment activities, undertaken by Al Qaeda members under the supervision of a Taliban commander, functioning as a caretaker of this training facility.

To confirm the source’s information as legitimate, the author’s reviewed publication released by the United Nations Security Council’s Sanctions Monitoring and Oversight Team, which in its report dated January 2023, emphasised the extent of relationship between the two groups, with active handshake occurring in provinces such as Helmand, Zabul, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Badghis, loya region (Paktia & Paktika) in addition to Kunar. The report not only confirmed (what the source stated in great detail) the existence of numerous safe houses owned by Al Qaeda in Kabul, Farah, Helmand and Herat, with a dedicated media wing operating in one of the three safe houses in Herat.

To that end, the source acknowledged the presence of senior Al Qaeda members holding key responsibilities within the Taliban’s Ministry of Interior (MoI), in particular the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI), the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s intelligence agency. He also confirmed the presence of AQ members holding political appointments (a UNSC report published in January 2023 had stated governors of Kapisa and Nuristan were high-ranking members of the AQ). He further reiterated Al Qaeda members also advise the Taliban’s senior leadership within various security apparatuses.

On enquiring the extent of Al Qaeda’s engagement within the IEA’s MoD, one former Taliban official confirmed the latter to have issued training manuals based on Al Qaeda’s small arms tactics, to train its conventional forces, with most of the Al Qaeda’s curriculum on small arms, large calibre weapons and management of heavy ordinances retained as part of its training curriculum.

What to make of Taliban’s engagement with Al Qaeda for 2024?

Taking the reference from the United Nations Security Council report dating January 2024 (which had declared Al Qaeda operating directly under the Taliban’s supervision). One Taliban leader, on the promise of anonymity, not only confirmed UNSC’s reiteration but also stated Al Qaeda’s ambition to expand its activities in the region. He further reiterated a strong commitment echoed by Taliban leadership within the Rahbari Shura on training active Al Qaeda fighters and also mentioned two nominated members of the Shura maintaining direct communications with Saif al-Adel, the Al Qaeda leader.

According to another Taliban commander, Al Qaeda continues to maintain training camps in the provinces of Ghazni, Faryab, Laghman, Parwan, Wardak and Uruzgan, in addition to three depots for weapons caches in the provinces of Sar-e-pol and Panjshir. The authors also witnessed a pattern connecting Al Qaeda with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which holds active training camps in the province of Kunar with veteran instructors affiliated to Al Qaeda operating in one heavy ordinances training school each in the region of Loya Paktia, Paktika Laghman, Nangarhar, Kunar, Parwan and Nuristan.

Despite reiterating no connection between the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the authors found layers of network connecting not just the two aforementioned groups but also TTP. In addition to this, the Taliban has provided generous access to Al Qaeda for maintaining a steady flow of income, enabling it to generate over $25 million from the gold mines of Takhar and Badakhshan, in addition to controlling a constant supply route smuggling premium Afghan heroin.

Noting the extent of this analysis, the authors did not find any direct engagement/interaction nor any specific instructions issued by either Sirajuddin Haqqani, Mullah Baradar or Mullah Akhundzada, the Emir (through Hasan Akhund) on strengthening the relationship with Al-Qaeda or with any Islamist militant factions that continue to operation in the region.

A perpetual alliance against the ISKP?

The relationship between Taliban and Al Qaeda will remain in the spotlight until the Taliban put an end to its rhetoric of severing ties with the islamists factions (such as AQ) which continue to use Afghan soil as a launchpad. That said, tracing the trajectory of this engagement, Taliban may employ AQ ranks to potentially counter the menace of IS Khorasan (IS-KP), which took the responsibility of carrying out the concert hall attack, on the outskirts of Moscow, claiming almost 137 Russian lives. According to a former Afghan Special Operations Commander, the ISK appears to have organised in the early months of 2024 and appears to reform its target acquisition. According to him, ISK may focus on targeting Taliban leadership, instead of claiming non-combatant gatherings from vivid ethnicities (victimising Shiites and Hazaras previously), limiting civilian casualties.

It is unlikely to predict the lessons learnt by the Taliban from presumed ISK attack in Moscow, among other attacks conducted within Afghanistan, but the rulers of Kabul, as a single entity may face serious challenges in eliminating ISK. This was echoed during the authors’ discussion with scholars and terrorism experts focusing on the Taliban, witnessing a unanimous agreement over the Taliban’s incapability in countering the menace of ISKP, perpetually giving Rahbari Shura a probable cause to nurture AQ fighters.

That said, it remains unclear whether the Taliban could employ AQ or twenty other Islamist factions operating in the region against the ISK, but the roads leading to an enhanced engagement between the two groups appear probable.

Anant Mishra is a visiting fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales. Christian Kaunert is Professor of International Security at Dublin City University, and Professor of Policing and Security at the University of South Wales. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.