Beyond the Lines | India and China: A peace deal amid global disorder

India versus China: Why They Are Not Friends? In his book, author Kanti Bajpai writes how perception, perimeter, partnership, and power have defined the relationship, which has been fractious for the most part in the last century. Among the several facets of conflicts, competition and cooperation that typically frame relations between countries, the one involving India and China has been defined more by conflicts and in some parts, by competition.

The Cold War years, post-World War II, saw India and China land up on opposite sides of the ideological and power divide. The consequent unipolar world, after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, witnessed the two neighbours compete as emerging economies, though technically, the Chinese economy has galloped to $18.53 trillion, and is five times bigger than the size of India’s GDP at current prices at $3.93 trillion. Despite the difference in size, it is to India’s credit that China sees it as competition in the region, thereby underpinning the genesis of the conflict in recent times.

In the past decade, Xi Jinping’s belligerent stance ever since his ascension to power, has resulted in severely deteriorated relations between the two neighbours, culminating in the clash of Galwan in 2020 and reigniting conflict and confrontation as the currencies of relationship between the two neighbours.

Four Years Ago: Recent Scars

To recap the events four years ago, Indian and Chinese troops clashed in the Galwan Valley on June 15, 2020. This skirmish was the first one between the two, since 1975, and resulted in casualties on both sides and more importantly, drove a permanent wedge of enmity and mistrust. Both sides suffered casualties: 20 Indian soldiers died in the clash and there were inconsistent reports about the number of Chinese casualties. Following the clash, the two sides beefed up their presence along the LAC leading to a series of talks on de-escalation that could not prevent tussles and tensions in trade, business and politics.

The recent rapprochement between India and China comes after five years of deadlock. The agreement allows the resumption of patrols along the disputed border in the Ladakh region, with the timing of the announcement set curiously at the edge of the BRICS summit. The disengagement refers to the areas of Depsang and Demchok Nalla. There is a possibility that existing buffer zones would continue to exist and newer ones created too. With the increased spend on infrastructure and manpower resources on both sides, to expect the situation to go to pre 2020 levels is unrealistic. Given the past history between the two countries, India must not lower its guard. However, given the antipathy between the two neighbours, what must have led to the rapprochement at this juncture?

India and China and the Geopolitical ‘Disorder

The recent India-China announcement needs to be seen through the prism of an evolving global order where both have high stakes. The BRICS summit at Kazan in October 2024 was a platform to showcase the potential power of an alternate grouping outside of the US. Such unity could not have happened without the coming together of the two bete noires — India and China. Besides, the group had the advantage of a friendly, willing mediator such as Russia as a member.

The aims of the two countries reflected both leaders’ awareness of their interests in the geopolitical space. Before the BRICS summit began, Prime Minister Modi said that “mutual respect, mutual trust and mutual sensitivities” were essential for moving forward in bilateral relations. President Xi said that India and China were two economic powers who ought to present an example of friendship to the rest of the world. Jinping’s emphasis, while issuing the statement, was on India and China together pursuing the creation of a multi-polar world and challenging Western hegemony.

Why the changed stance now?

A lot has transpired to reshape the global power divide in the last decade. In 2016, Chinese foreign affairs minister Fu Ying denied the possibility of China creating an ‘anti US bloc’. Eight years later, China is keen to form a group that adheres to the “principles of non-alignment, non-confrontation, and non-targeting of third parties,” writes the Foreign Affairs in its piece.

In the last two years, China has intervened to ensure the resolution of a maritime dispute between Iran and UAE and prevailed upon Iran to ensure Houthis do not attack ships in the Red Sea. Last year, China brokered a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran after years of hostility. China has shown signs of playing the role of a mediator to resolve critical imbroglios. With America not having shown inclination to play an active role in international disputes, China is eager to present an alternative dimension to a traditional US led global order.

On the other hand, the US is likely to witness a closely fought election with no clear advantage to any of the presidential candidates at this stage and an undecided outlook about the nature and extent of its role in global politics post the elections. This has provided countries such as India a chance to look at the possibility of operating in the continent, with a less involved America.

Does China therefore view India’s role in the region and rise with less antipathy than before? It is too early to conclude but to assess better, it would be instructive to view a critical global event.

Role of Russia-Ukraine War in India-China relations

In a world divided by war, two foes have found themselves on the same side of the divide. Though the Russia-Ukraine war split the world into two camps with the West supporting Ukraine leaving Russia isolated, China and India were among the two countries that continued its relations with Russia, despite the obvious pressure from the West. China has supplied Russia with over $9 billion in the past year that has helped the latter survive Western sanctions. Almost 40 per cent of Russian import needs are met by Chinese goods.

In Kazan at the BRICS summit, Russia approached India with a ‘cabotage’ proposal to allow India’s airlines to operate their flights on domestic routes since Russia’s own carriers are unable to meet the demand because of Western sanctions. There is an increased economic and political dependence of Russia towards India and China. India, on the other hand, has made attempts to broker peace in the Russia-Ukraine war, even as it has pursued its relations with Russia, despite pressure from the west.

China and India’s stand on Russia has resulted in the latter playing an unlikely arbiter. Russia has been actively engaged in narrowing the trust deficit between India and China that had been split open after the Galwan clashes.

Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared last year at the Raisina Dialogue that Russia was keen to close the gap between India and China. Following that, a Track II initiative in Moscow was set up to address this gap between India and China. In effect, an India-China rapprochement and uninterrupted peace in the long run is likely to favour Russian interests — since it increases Moscow’s relevance in India-China relations and ensures that their allies do not bicker over bilateral issues. Russian President Vladimir Putin said, after PM Modi’s visit to Russia and Ukraine, that India, Brazil, and China could act as mediators in potential peace talks over the Ukraine crisis. The statement was in line with the atmospherics at BRICS, where the club desires to play an independent role in global affairs.

What to Expect from the deal?

India’s approach towards establishing multi-alignment without alienating any global power is consistent with the motivation of the current rapprochement deal and is in line with the discussions in Kazan. On the other hand, China’s aim of establishing an alternative international power hub is in consonance with the recent deal with its neighbour.

The immediate outcome of the bilateral meeting could be that India opens its doors to more Chinese investment. But the pace of reopening such investments will depend on how the finer details of the rapprochement are understood on ground and whether the Chinese army implements the agreement in spirit.

Given the history of past U-turns in India-China relationship, military experts, diplomats and scholars have called for guarded optimism and caution while dealing with Beijing, which had sprung a surprise as recently as in 2020 by abandoning any pretence of goodwill or civilised relations. Disputes over perceptions of the land boundary on both sides exist, use of buffer zones will continue and getting into crosshairs of each other over influence in neighbouring countries will persist. It is yet to be seen how China reacts to India’s role in the region: those issues are unlikely to be resolved soon.

Ironically though, as the world divides itself, India and China appear to find themselves on the same side, at least for now. The two neighbours are yet to walk the talk of rapprochement. The devil is in the details, and time will decide if this promise forms a belief or the start has a beginning.

The writer is the author of ‘Watershed 1967: India’s Forgotten Victory over China’ and ‘Camouflaged: Forgotten Stories From Battlefields’. His fortnightly column for Firstpost — ‘Beyond the Lines’ — covers military history, strategic issues, international affairs and policy-business challenges. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views. Tweets @iProbal