Beijing’s island-grab playbook: South China Sea tactics and their implications for India

China’s island-grab strategy has been a key component in forcibly trying to establish its illegitimate jurisdiction over the entire sea area of the South China Sea up to its self-created Nine-Dash Line, which incidentally is beyond 200 nautical miles from its coast. Unilateralism and bullying have been Chinese hallmarks in this deliberate effort at spreading its hegemony over sea areas and silencing smaller neighbours with every kind of intimidation — diplomatic, economic and military. A quick recap of China’s island-grab story in the South China Sea (SCS) will be of interest.

In the 1950s, when France withdrew from French Indochina, China occupied half the Paracel Islands. South Vietnam also moved towards the Paracels. In 1973, when the US withdrew from South Vietnam, China forced the South Vietnamese out and occupied the entire Paracel Islands by 1974. The collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 and the decrease of Soviet military presence in Vietnam in the 1980s emboldened China to occupy six features of the Spratly Islands by 1988. After the United States withdrew from the Philippines in 1992, China’s designs to occupy Mischief Reef were realised in 1995. In the 2000s, China spread its tentacles further into the South China Sea and gained de-facto control over the Scarborough Shoal by 2012.

From 2014 onwards, China began rapid development and large-scale reclamation around all its grabbed islands including military infrastructure on many of them. It now has developed seven features in the Spratly Islands. There are high-quality satellite pictures that confirm the presence of sophisticated military infrastructure on them, like helipads, SAM shelters, radar and communication stations, gun batteries and underground storage. Woody Island, Subi Reef and Fiery Cross have 3,000-metre runways as well, capable of operating heavy aircraft.

Lies and double-speak characterise the Chinese narrative about these sinister moves. It denies that it intends to militarise the South China Sea. If this isn’t militarisation, what is? Other statements couch these developments as measures for ‘self-protection and self-defence’ and ‘rational expansion’ of its islands and reefs. By the end of the last decade, Y8 and Y9 aircraft had started operating from the runways in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and sophisticated surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles were positioned on some features during military exercises. Drones have also been deployed from Woody Island. The military implications of such developments cannot be lost on any observer of geopolitics.

In 2016, the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) award stated that China’s Nine-Dash Line is invalid, that none of the features in the Spratly Islands is fully an entitled island, which is capable of generating maritime zones, that China had violated sovereign rights of the Philippines, that China had caused severe harm to the marine environment and that there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources falling in sea areas within the Nine-Dash Line. The ITLOS upheld almost all of the Philippines’ maritime claims. However, China has shown scant regard for the ITLOS award and continued with its hegemonistic and coercive policies in the South China Sea. The downward spiral of relations between China and other stakeholders in that region is a direct result of China’s aggressive behaviour.

Are there any lessons for India in this? It is no secret that China has economically bought over several countries in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Its ‘all-weather’ friendship with Pakistan is directed unambiguously at India. China wields tremendous political and military influence in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Several countries in East Africa and South Asia are similarly affected by China’s heft. Many of these nations have entrusted major infrastructure projects to Chinese entities and are major beneficiaries of Chinese defence hardware. Therefore, it will not be surprising if China coerces some of these nations to lease or part with their offshore islands in the name of benign development that could later assume a military colour.

As recently as 2020, it was reported in the media that the federal government of Pakistan had assumed direct control of two islands in the Sindh Province that lie offshore of Karachi. These were the Bundal and Bhuddo islands, and that the Pakistan Island Development Authority, under a presidential ordinance, was to offer these islands for development to China to support the latter’s Belt and Road Initiative. This could have been an undercover sell-off to China had it not run into a domestic political storm in Pakistan. Chinese deep sea fishing fleets are engaged in large-scale Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and such island deals with China could make them havens for Chinese fishing fleets, deprive local fishermen of livelihood and jeopardise maritime claims of the coastal or island state.

It is no secret that such moves would enhance China’s strategic presence in India’s backyard and, therefore, not in the latter’s interest. How smaller nations in the Indian Ocean Region succumb to temptations and coercive pressures by China with regard to its extra-regional island-grab strategy remains to be seen. If the happenings in the SCS right from the 1950s to the present are any indication, they would do so at their own peril. Given the proven Chinese disregard for international law and rules-based orders, any government on the other side of the negotiating table should keep an eye out for any possible Chinese intrigue in attempting to grab sovereign territory.

India, on its part, will have to maintain a sharp lookout for such intentions and shape the neighbourhood in a manner that does not adversely affect its own national security interests.

Vice Admiral Biswajit Dasgupta (Retd) is a former Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Indian Navy. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.