Battlefield Gaza: Hamas’ triad formula of tunnel warfare, FIBUA and sensitive installations

Hamas attacked Israel on 7 October catching the Jewish nation by surprise. It was able to beat the Iron Dome Air Defence System of Israel, negate a vast network of modern surveillance devices, and undermine Israel’s most touted national agency, Mossad’s repute. Hamas inflicted substantial casualties on the Israeli population, including fatal and non-fatal casualties, besides taking a number of them as hostages. Given the history of warfighting with Israel, it was obvious that Hamas would have expected a robust response from Israel. It happened that way only when Israel commenced its operations against the Hamas hierarchy and terrorist infrastructure using its air power, causing large-scale destruction. Had the actions of Hamas on 7 October would have been ‘one-o,ff’ actions without substantial backing, its resistance would have fully collapsed once major operations were launched by Israel. It did not happen that way as Hamas continues to fire rockets at Israel, besides challenging Israel’s warfighting at every stage, which continues to date even when the conflict has been continuing between unequal warring entities. It, therefore becomes important to ponder as to what is the main strength of Hamas in Gaza, which is able to withstand the onslaught of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), a much superior force, whereas Hamas is merely a terrorist organisation. If the actions of the IDF are closely observed, while it commenced air operations of unprecedented magnitude, it also mobilised its ground forces, stationing them close to the border with Gaza, waiting to invade. Before ground operations could be commenced by the IDF in a meaningful manner, news surfaced about the presence of large networks of tunnels created by Hamas in Gaza. These tunnels have been providing effective shelter to Hamas fighters, besides providing them with accommodation for housing the command and control elements, equipment, and warlike stores, including ammunition. These tunnels have tactically planned suitable openings to fire the rockets in the intended directions. Intelligence inputs about these tunnels have forced the IDF to delay their ground offensive, besides modifying their warfighting tactics. Specific intelligence-based operations by the IDF helped to some extent. Inputs obtained from such operations have been used by Israel to show the world the destructive design of Hamas. Hamas has not limited its warfighting and resistance to the IDF through the tunnel network alone. It has intelligently used the dense population and dense infrastructure of Gaza in its well-planned urban warfare plan, taking advantage of Fighting in Built-Up Areas (FIBUA), as it offers a tremendous advantage to the defender against the attacking forces, the IDF in the instant case. The combination of tunnelling and FIBUA is sure to have a substantial adverse impact on the IDF’s ground offensive when launched at full scale. As these twin approaches of resistance by Hamas would not have been enough, it has organisations like civil hospitals, civil rehabilitation centres, and religious places as part of its tunnel network, both connected and unconnected. It used these buildings, their basements, and underground facilities for its resistance. Though the use of religious places has been on the rise around the world nowadays due to their sensitivities, Hamas has combined this with other tenets of resisting the actions by the IDF. By attracting the IDF’s actions against itself, it not only motivates the local civil population for its cause but also draws the support of a large number of Muslim nations. At present, more than 50 Muslim nations are supporting Palestine, whose cause is being championed by Hamas. Other bordering countries and terrorist organisations have also come out in open support of Hamas. The recent bombing of a hospital in Gaza, whether it happened due to the premature detonation of Palestinian rockets or by the IDF, is a separate matter altogether, but it has drawn the attention of almost the entire world, including those favouring Israel, calling on both parties to spare the hospitals and such facilities. The deaths and destruction in these hospitals are being showcased by Hamas to the world to paint the IDF in a poor light, while the IDF has released videos of the underground and basement facilities of these hospitals to illustrate the point that it is the Hamas, a terrorist organisation, that has been using such facilities for their destructive agenda. Whatever the truth, Hamas has used tunnel warfare to resist the IDF, and that too successfully. Tunnel warfare has been more effective due to additional factors such as FIBUA and sensitive installations being made part of it. It is not only in this conflict that the tunnels have been effective against a superior force, but these have had profound effects in other conflicts as well. In fact, all conflicts since time immemorial have been a fight between the defender and the attacker. Though defensive measures are also needed by the superior attackers, these are more needed by the weak defenders. It is due to these reasons that trench warfare began as early as the seventeenth century. Initially in the form of merely dugouts on the ground, these got improved with overground covers with progress in time. Further strengthening of these happened to prevent the damages from the air attacks and the artillery shells, which continues to date in most of the countries in the world. In addition to well-built trenches, their network, through communication trenches and over-head protection, and the use of caves (both natural as well as artificial), started emerging more so for warfighting in the mountainous terrain. These turned out to be excellent options for keeping the warlike stores and ammunition safe from the adversaries actions. As time progressed, the combined characteristics of trench networks and caves got utilised to make them in the tunnels, which were initially smaller in size and used for hiding, avoiding detection and destruction by the superior forces. Later, these were developed in the form of extensive networks housing all allied facilities for warfighting, and more often than not, these have proved successful. These were used effectively by the Taliban in Afghanistan, both against Russian and US forces. Vietnam also used its Cu-Chi tunnels effectively against the US forces in its close to two-decade-long war, resulting in the US being forced to withdraw and lose the fight with the Viet Congs. Viet Congs had not only made an extensive network of the Cu-Chi tunnels housing their entire sustenance resources but had also used the jungle terrain to hide them effectively. It had become a nightmare for the US forces to detect these and initiate actions against the Viet Congs staying in these tunnels. Due to terrain and related factors, the Viet Congs also suffered mostly from malaria in the jungle, besides some casualties due to US actions. Nonetheless, Viet Congs succeeded in defeating the most powerful country in the world, and the contribution of these tunnels was remarkable towards the outcome of this war. Whether the use of tunnels by Hamas for furtherance of its resistance against the IDF was inspired by the previous successful operations from the use of tunnel warfare or its own defensive and inescapable need will be known in due course. But a triad of tunnel warfare, FIBUA, and sensitive installations by Hamas has not only halted the momentum of the IDF now but is likely to have a telling impact on the future outcome of this conflict as well. A number of lessons can be drawn both by the defender and the attacker from these developments. The writer is a retired army veteran. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost_’s views._