Azm-e-Istehkam depends on Azm-e-Imran: Why Pakistan Army dilutes its new anti-terror operation

The irony is inescapable. The Pakistan government announced with aplomb a new, comprehensive anti-terror operation which would adopt an all-of-nation approach to eradicate terrorism. The operation was given a grand name: Azm-e-Istehkam (Resolve to bring stability and security). But within days, after strong opposition to another major military operation, the Azm or ‘resolve’ was shaken to a point that the operation was transformed into a ‘vision’ or a strategy. The mortifying U-turn forced upon the Pakistan Army and the civilian government by the refusal and resistance of opposition parties to support another military operation has left an impression that at the political and societal level, there is no consensus or Azm for a fight, without which it will not have any stability or security (Istehkam).

The security situation in both Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan has deteriorated very sharply in the last few months. There are vast areas in which the writ of the Pakistani state runs during the day, while that of the Islamist insurgents — the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other groups like Lashkar-e-Islam, Jaish-e-Umari, and Islamic State Khorasan — and Baloch freedom fighters runs at night. According to reports, the extortion networks run by the militants are back in business. A cut is paid out of every government contract — quite like what used to happen in Afghanistan. The TTP has appointed shadow governors who call the shots and wield more authority than state functionaries. Target killings are back in fashion. Almost every day, there are reports of ambushes, attacks, IED blasts, storming of security forces posts and camps.

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The footprints of the militants extend from Pakistan-occupied Gilgit-Baltistan in the north to the Makran belt in the south. Even in Karachi the TTP is believed to have started making a comeback. The TTP has also changed its tactics. Unlike the past when it didn’t discriminate between civilians and security forces, the TTP is now careful to not attack the former in the wanton manner they had earlier — mass casualty attacks in markets, mosques, mass gatherings. The situation is so bad that someone like Maulana Fazlur Rehman has publicly warned that within a couple of months, some of the areas in K-P in the tribal districts and South K-P (Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Lakki Marwat) could become another Islamic Emirate.

The strategy of the military dominated and dictated hybrid regime that by blacking out all bad news it will be able to control the narrative and convey an impression that everything was under control has clearly failed. The pressure on the state to do something to arrest the situation was palpable. But there was also considerable external pressure. The Chinese had apparently warned the Pakistanis that if there were any more attacks on Chinese workers, they would be forced to pull out their investments. Pakistan could also forget any new Chinese investments until it got a firm handle over the security situation. Given the parlous state of the Pakistan economy and its dependence on Chinese handouts and debt roll-overs to stay solvent, the Pakistan Army and its civilian frontmen were left with no choice but to announce ‘Azm-e-Istehkam’.

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What neither the Pakistan Army brass nor the nominal civilian regime catered for were the two big obstacles that could easily scotch any large-scale military operation. The first was public opposition. Hardly anyone in K-P and Balochistan supports a steam-roller military operation. This despite the fact that there have been numerous demonstrations in both tribal districts (the erstwhile tribal agencies) and settled districts of K-P against the increasing inroads and activities of the Islamist insurgents. The Pashtuns have protested against the muddled approach of the military towards tackling the rising threat of terrorism. And yet, they oppose a large-scale operation because they don’t trust either the Pakistan Army or the civilian government to rid them of the menace of terrorism. The crisis of credibility of the civil-military authorities also emanates from the experience of the people who have lived through and suffered the privations of previous military operations.

The Pakistan Army has carried out scorched earth operations, reducing entire towns, villages, market places into rubble. People were evacuated in hundreds of thousands to allow for the military to steam-roll these areas. Not only did they have to suffer the enormous problems living in camps for internally displaced persons, they were also denied adequate compensation for the homes and hearths that were destroyed during the military campaign. Many of those towns have never been able to recover. Families have been divided, torn apart and forced to settle elsewhere. The rehabilitation has been scandalously shoddy. Just when people have started picking up the pieces of their life, another operation looms over them. Naturally, they don’t want a repeat of the past. The problem for the Army is that without the support and backing of local people, there is no way they can carry out large-scale operations, without which what they will end up doing is what they were already doing — intelligence-based small, targeted operations — which was clearly not working to deter the return of the Taliban.

The second obstacle facing the Pakistani state is political. None of the main political players in K-P back an operation. This includes Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (which is the ruling party in K-P). But other important political stakeholders like Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s Jamiat Ulema Islam, the Awami National Party, Jamaat Islami, the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement and the National Democratic Movement are also opposed to the operation. While the PTI, JUI-F and JI have always adopted an ambivalent attitude towards the Taliban, the Pashtun nationalist parties like PTM, NDM and ANP have no love lost for the TTP and other Islamist terror groups, and yet they are as vehemently opposed to a military operation as the religious and right-wing parties. The political opposition to an operation is partly because of its unpopularity with the people, partly because of trust issues with the government and the military establishment, and partly simple old fashioned political bargaining.

Neither of these two obstacles confronted the Pakistan Army during past operations. In fact, people and politicians had rallied behind the army when it went in to clear Swat in 2008-09 and subsequent operations in Bajaur, South and North Waziristan, and other parts of K-P. No more. They have serious trust issues and political axes to grind with the Pakistan Army. This is the Pakistan Army’s chickens coming home to roost. Its political shenanigans, engineering, arm-twisting, election interference, repression, high-handedness and insensitivity towards local people is coming back to bite it. Not only has the Army lost its credibility and its ability to shape the public discourse and narrative, it is also no longer able to evoke the sort of dread it could in the past. The bottom line is that if in the face of public and political resistance/opposition, the Pakistan Army unleashes a new operation that will also likely extend into Afghanistan, it is tempting fate, and worse. In other words, prospects of such an operation (or vision or strategy, call it by whatever name) being successful are extremely bleak.

What will be most galling for the Gen Asim Munir led military brass is the fact that their bete noire Imran Khan has the veto on the success or otherwise of ‘Azm-e-Istehkam’. His party controls the K-P government. Even if they don’t actively sabotage the operations, they can always put spokes in the wheel of the military’s steam-roller. Politically, they can make life difficult for the military, not just in K-P but also in Punjab, and even more in cyberspace where PTI dominates the narrative building on social media.

While Imran was reluctant to support past military operations against Taliban, he had gone along with them because at that time he didn’t want to rub the Army the wrong way. Way back in 2014, when operation Zarb-e-Azb was announced, and more so after the attack on the Army Public School, Imran Khan was the Army’s blue-eyed boy, the man the Army was grooming to be Prime Minister. Interestingly, back then, even the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif wasn’t keen on an operation — he had stalled it in favour of negotiations with TTP — but was finally confronted with a fait accompli after the Army launched the operation following an attack on Karachi airport. But back then, the Army was able to force the politicians to come together and back Zarb-e-Azb. That is no longer the case now when Imran Khan is in open conflict with the Asim Munir led cabal of generals.

Although Imran Khan has declared that his party will attend the All Parties Conference called by the civilian government to evolve a national political consensus, he has only said his representatives will listen to what is being said. In all likelihood, he will demand his own pound of flesh in return for even lending lukewarm support to the military. This is his chance to demand a quid pro quo; this could include relief from courts, release from jail, redressal of political skulduggery that denied his party their rightful seats — if not the general seats, then at least the reserved seats — and release of all political prisoners from jail.

Chances are that the Pakistan Army and the civilian appointees will balk at such demands. But they should know that without Imran Khan and his party on board, the other naysayers in K-P will also want to hedge their bets, more so because the operation will only add to the political and economic crisis in Pakistan. This crisis, what some call polycrisis, is only likely to worsen as the economic difficulties and distress levels increase in the next few months and its repercussions are felt on the political side. That this will be happening even as the military operation is proceeding, is an intimation of a perfect storm, one that could buffet Pakistan like never before.

To use a cricket analogy, which Imran Khan is so fond of: He has the ball in his hand. The batsman (Army) is vulnerable. Will he ball a full toss and allow his bete noire Asim Munir to hit it for the maximum; or will he bowl a reverse swinging yorker to force Asim Munir to concede him what he wants, and in the process run himself and his civil-military team out.

The writer is Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.