 "Azerbaijan-Armenia deal: Why Trump is interested in South Caucasus")
For many of us in India, the South Caucasus is an abstraction. Still, for the people of the South Caucasian nations, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, it is a lived experience. Sitting on the geographical faultline of Europe and Asia, tucked between the Caspian and the Black Seas, the region is part of a critical transport, oil and gas corridor link called the middle corridor, mostly connecting to Russia, but since 1991 has bypassed Russia on pipeline and transport connectivity links.
The region has seen an uneasy peace in the past 34 years. Three major conflicts have dotted the area since its independence. Abkhazia and South Ossetia (between Russia and Georgia) were declared independent states by Russia but are not recognised by the United Nations or major powers, and Nagorno-Karabakh (between Armenia and Azerbaijan).
In a significant turn, Azerbaijan and Armenia reportedly inked a preliminary peace agreement apparently ‘brokered’ by US President Donald Trump on August 8. At the signing ceremony, flanked by heads of state from two countries, Trump said, “It has been a long time—35 years—they fought, and now they claim they are friends, and they are going to be friends for a long time.” It was reported that Trump met separately with the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his counterpart, the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, at the White House before charting a slew of agreements.
At the core of the deal is Armenia’s nod to grant the United States a long-term lease for facilitating a transit corridor, named Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which is a significant development as it provides a direct route for international trade and peace through the Zanzegur region in the southern part of Armenia, linking mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhichevan exclave sandwiched between Iran, Turkey and Armenia.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsPost-2023 Azerbaijan’s decisive victory over Yerevan and eventual military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh led to the exodus of almost all 100,000 Armenians there. The proposed corridor has been a major stumbling block in sealing a peace agreement between the two. Armenia had resisted Azerbaijan’s demand for extraterritorial rights that would allow its nationals unimpeded access to the exclave. The US management of the corridor gives the Prime Minister Pashinyan government a political face-saving to preserve the appearance of Armenian sovereignty over the passage, while effectively conceding to Azerbaijan its primary demand of unhindered access to Nakhichevan.
Background
The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the mountainous Nagorno-Karabakh region, home to predominantly ethnic Armenians, has a deep-rooted history. It began in 1987 when Armenian intellectuals demanded the region’s merger with Armenia. This region was initially an autonomous region within Azerbaijan’s borders, and later, it was under the internationally recognised borders of Azerbaijan but under the control of Armenian rebels, recognised by Armenia as the Republic of Artsakh.
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, separatists backed by Armenia seized the territory, building a buffer between the independent states of Armenia and Azerbaijan, resulting eventually in a frozen conflict, separated by two ‘Karabakh Wars’ from 1988-94 and the Second Karabakh War between September 2020 and November 2020, known as the 44-day war.
In this war, Azerbaijan was supported by Turkey, which provided sophisticated drones and other equipment. Israel also endorsed Azerbaijan in its war efforts, tilting the war in favour of the Azerbaijanis. Eventually, Azerbaijan regained the buffer zone during the war. The whole of Nagorno-Karabakh was reintegrated into Azerbaijan in 2023, forcing 100,000 ethnic Armenians to flee their historical lands and take refuge in Armenia. The Russian forces who were observers in the region stood by, unlike in the 1990s when they had actively supported the Armenians over their claim of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Strategic Landscape
The peace agreement and the prospect of its successful implementation come as a setback for two key regional actors: Russia and Iran. For Russia, this is symptomatic of its waning influence in a region Moscow has long regarded as its exclusive sphere of influence, a policy termed the ‘Near Abroad’. This has resulted in three powers, the US, Turkey and Israel, weaning away the Russian influence in their partnership with Azerbaijan and Turkey. This newfound bonhomie with the US and Armenia has upended Russia’s engagement in this region.
Though Russia still has tremendous clout in Armenia with its sizeable troop presence at its base in Gyumri, Russian troops are manning the Turkish-Armenian borders. Russia controls the entire power supply and banking in Russia. The prospect of expanded US presence in the region, along with its EU partners, with the engagement of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia, has dealt a blow to Russia’s long-held standing in the area.
Historically, Armenia has been its closest ally in the region and a member of the CSTO security organisation led by Russia, which is a collective security treaty among several post-Soviet states. However, Russia’s inability or unwillingness, due to its ongoing war in Ukraine, dented its image as the preeminent regional power. The perceived abandonment not only eroded Moscow’s credibility in Armenian eyes but also created a strategic vacuum that Turkey was quick to exploit, projecting its influence through military and diplomatic means in support of Azerbaijan.
As a result, the diminished Russian role paved the way for deeper US and EU engagement with Azerbaijan and Armenia. This has resulted in reconfiguring the regional balance of power and weakening Moscow’s and Iran’s role in the strategically pivotal region. Of late, Azerbaijan, as well, has become more assertive and upped the ante against Russia on the issue where several dozen ethnic Azerbaijanis were arrested in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg in connection with a series of murders that took place fifteen years ago.
For Iran, the eventuality of an American presence adjacent to its restive, Azeri-populated Northwestern province poses a direct threat to the regime’s stability. An emboldened Baku has the wherewithal to fuel Azeri nationalist sentiment within Iran, potentially reviving dormant aspirations for autonomy or outright independence.
TRIPP and its impact
The deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia has received a mixed response from their neighbours and Russia. Iran has rejected the agreement, stating that it will harshly respond to the deal. Iran fears that it would restrict its access to the Caucasus, foment separatism within Iran, and American projects on its borders will be a threat to its security. Conducting military drills close to the borders with Armenia, the Iranian leadership has stated its intention to block the construction, even if it means going against the wishes of its ally, Russia.
Russia has welcomed it but has opposed excessive external influence in the region. Since Armenia’s relations with Turkey were contingent on this deal directly linking Nakhichevan with mainland Azerbaijan, it also boosts Turkey’s ideas of geographical connectivity to Turkic lands.
The deal for the corridor is bound to impact Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s political standing, as he enjoys only 13 per cent approval ratings within Armenia. Consensus evades Armenia on this deal. The opposition is mainly because Armenia has given too much without quid pro quo to Azerbaijan and the United States, without tangible returns. There is bound to be opposition to this deal in the next year’s election in Armenia, which will likely impact the deal’s longevity.
Amitabh Singh teaches at the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Ankur is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
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