 "As India plans to rename 30 Tibetan sites, more needs to be done to keep China in check")
China is not happy with the election of Narendra Modi for a third time as India’s Prime Minister. A reaction to an exchange between the new, democratically-elected Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te and Modi may be indicative of China’s displeasure.
Lai congratulated Modi on the BJP-led NDA’s victory in the Lok Sabha elections. He said, “We look forward to enhancing the fast-growing #Taiwan-#India partnership, expanding our collaboration on trade, technology & other sectors to contribute to peace & prosperity in the #Indo-Pacific.” Prime Minister Modi replied, “Thank you @ChingteLai for your warm message. I look forward to closer ties as we work towards mutually beneficial economic and technological partnership.”
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning immediately objected: “First of all, there is no President in the Taiwan region.” He added that China was opposed to “all forms of official interactions between Taiwan authorities and countries having diplomatic relations with China”.
Then, came a rather arrogant message from Xu Feihong, the newly-appointed Chinese Ambassador to India: “Hope China and India will continue to follow the consensus reached between President Xi Jinping and PM Modi to build a sound and steady China-India relationship.”
But then, who broke the consensus reached between Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi — first in Doklam in June 2017 and then in Ladakh in May 2020? It is not India. Before tweeting next time, you need to do some homework, Mr Xu.
With reports suggesting that India, in response to China’s recent renaming of locations in Arunachal Pradesh, is planning to rename about 30 places within China’s Tibet Autonomous Region, let us talk about ‘consensus’ between India and China (not only about Taiwan and Xinjiang, but about Tibet), for which the posts have constantly been changed by Beijing.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsIn October 1950, the People’s Liberation Army crossed the Upper Yangtze river and advanced into Kham Province of Eastern Tibet. A month later, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the then Deputy Prime Minister, wrote a letter to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Patel was concerned about India’s northern borders and pointed a finger at the Indian Ambassador in Beijing: “The Chinese government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention. My own feeling is that at a crucial period they manage to instil into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so-called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. …The final action of the Chinese, in my judgement, is little short of perfidy. The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us. …Our Ambassador has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions.”
Patel passed away soon after.
During the following months, KM Panikkar, the (in)famous Indian ambassador, continued to plead the Chinese case and slowly began to convince the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi about his views.
A Secret Note
On January 25, 1952, in a ‘Top Secret’ communication, the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi gave some instructions to its ambassador in Beijing on the ‘Indian Interests in Tibet’. The note starts: “Soon before Mr. Panikkar left Peking, Chou en lai [Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier] had expressed to him his anxiety to safeguard in every way Indian interests in Tibet, and to stabilise the Tibetan frontier which, he [Zhou] said was a matter of common interest to India, Nepal and China.”
Zhou added that it could best be done by discussion between these three countries. Panikkar informed the Chinese government that “the Government of India appreciated the general line which the Chinese had taken and that they would welcome negotiations to settle these matters.”
What were India’s interests in Tibet?
The Indian ambassador was reminded about an Indian note sent to Beijing soon after the invasion, in October 1950: “…certain rights have grown out of usage and Agreements which are natural between neighbours with close cultural and commercial relations. These relations have found expression in the presence of an Agent of the Government of India in Lhasa, the existence of trade Agencies at Gyantse and Yatung and the maintenance of post and telegraph offices at the trade route up to Gyantse. For the protection of this trade route a small military escort has been stationed at Gyantse for over years”.
South Block expressed its anxiety at the developing situation, and clarified that it wanted the continuation of this set-up. It mentions other Indian interests: (1) the trade agency at Gartok ‘based on an agreement’; (2) the right of Indians, flowing from usage, to carry on trades at places other than the Trade marts established by treaties; and, (3) the right of Indian pilgrims to visit Mansarovar and Kailash.
The Northern Boundary
Perhaps more importantly, Delhi wanted the boundary in the north-east to be discussed: “The only other Indian interest is the affirmation of the McMahon line and the remaining frontier of Tibet which is largely, if not wholly, customary. This implies the integrity of Nepal. …Bhutan for this purpose should be treated, like Sikkim, as part of India.”
Beijing will never accept this point.
The instructions for the ambassador were clear; he had “to remind the Chinese government of our interests and leave it to them to say in what way, if any, they seek a modification of this interest.”
During the following months and years, Panikkar argued with Delhi that if the Chinese do not mention the border issue, India should not say anything. Seventy years later, we can still see the consequence of this fallacy with China claiming the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh as its own.
But how can we undo these blunders today?
An additional note on the ‘Indian interests in Tibet’ was attached; though it was based on the wrong premise that Tibet was part of China for good, it enumerated the legal issues involved.
The Indian Mission in Lhasa
A person who deeply influenced India’s Tibet policy at that time was VK Krishna Menon. About the Indian Mission in Lhasa, Menon affirmed that the British (and then Indian) representative had “strayed into Lhasa and had stayed there”.
The ministry, however, did not fully agree: “The basis for the Mission, although somewhat tenuous, is not quite so non-existent.”
The genesis of the Indian Mission (at par with an embassy in 1952) was explained: during the previous decades, the Tibetan government repeatedly approached the Government of India “for a permanent representative at Lhasa”. Delhi, however, preferred first to send its representative periodically, though regularly; for example, Sir Charles Bell, then Political Officer (PO), Sikkim, was the first representative of the Government of India to visit Lhasa in 1920 at the invitation of the Dalai Lama. He stayed in Tibet for a year. “Subsequently, his successors continued to visit Lhasa every two or three years at the invitation of the Dalai Lama. Sir Basil Gould (PO, Sikkim) was in Lhasa from August 1936 to February 1937 and when he returned his place was taken by [Hugh] Richardson, the [Indian] Trade Agent at Gyantse. Mr. Richardson was succeeded a little more than a year ago by Mr. [Sumul] Sinha, the present incumbent.”
The notes cite many legal documents such as the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904 which provides exclusive British political influence in Tibet: “The Government of Tibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government …no portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any Foreign Power.” Or again no power shall be permitted “to intervene in Tibetan affairs and no representative or Agents of any Foreign Power shall be admitted to Tibet”.
Unfortunately, though this convention was confirmed by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, it was then admitted that China was not a foreign power for the purposes of the above provisions.
The Assam Border
Among the other Indian ‘interests’ mentioned was the boundary between Assam and Tibet. The note asserts that it was defined “on the map as part of the 1914 Simla Convention”. The Chinese at that time had no issue with the northern border of India with Tibet; they only disputed the border between Tibet and China in Kham and Amdo provinces: “The latter boundary [the McMahon Line] was not questioned even in certain proposals which were made by the Chinese subsequent to the Simla convention.”
Interestingly, the note concludes with an interesting suggestion: “The possibility may be explored of arriving at an agreement with the Chinese to demilitarise the border, or limit the number of troops which either side can post.”
India’s interests in Tibet remain as strong today.
Obviously, the new government in Delhi cannot immediately return to its 1950s position, but whether China is happy or not, it is worth to be studied, debated and widely circulated. Thereafter some steps could be taken into the right direction. If it is not done, Beijing will continue to push the posts in its favour, as it has done for the past 70 years.
The writer is Distinguished Fellow, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence (Delhi). Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
 "Russian drones over Poland: Trump’s tepid reaction a wake-up call for Nato?")
 "As Russia pushes east, Ukraine faces mounting pressure to defend its heartland")
 "Why Mossad was not on board with Israel’s strike on Hamas in Qatar")
 "Turkey: Erdogan's police arrest opposition mayor Hasan Mutlu, dozens officials in corruption probe")
 "Russian drones over Poland: Trump’s tepid reaction a wake-up call for Nato?")
 "As Russia pushes east, Ukraine faces mounting pressure to defend its heartland")
 "Why Mossad was not on board with Israel’s strike on Hamas in Qatar")
 "Turkey: Erdogan's police arrest opposition mayor Hasan Mutlu, dozens officials in corruption probe")
