 "Arab nations are rediscovering India: Mohammed Soliman")
Mohammed Soliman, director of the Strategic Technologies and Cyber Security Program at the Washington DC-based Middle East Institute, wears many hats. He is credited with germinating the concept of Indo-Abrahamic accord that forms the scaffolding behind the I2U2 minilateral, formalising the rise of a new transregional order. In these turbulent times, as the Middle East (Soliman refers to the region as West Asia) is thrown into the throes of an ideological, territorial and kinetic conflict, I caught up with the brilliant young scholar from Egypt to converse on the ramifications of the security situation in the region, the repercussions of the war, India’s relationship with the Gulf states and much more.
The interview is being produced verbatim with light edits for brevity and grammar.
Do you think the security situation in Middle East will have a bearing on India’s strategic partnership with the Gulf? Will the Israel-Hamas conflict have a short-term, medium-term, or long-term effect?
Excellent and timely question. I don’t believe that the current security escalation in the Middle East will impact India-Gulf relationship. I would argue that the current escalation confirms the thesis that the relationship between India and the Gulf nations is strategic. The Modi-MbS summit (Saudi Arabia crown prince Mohammed bin Salman was on a state visit to India in September last year on the sidelines of G20 summit), the timing of it, the fact that India had launched a naval operation at sea (Al Mohed Al Hindi 23 )… The relationship with the Saudis… all these factors give you one indication – it’s strategic, it’s lasting, and it’s not going to be impacted. It may not improve but there’s going to be a security element to that relationship with time.
How do the Gulf nations perceive India? Is New Delhi seen as a strategic partner, a trading partner, or a partner with whom they can develop a military-security partnership?
Impact Shorts
More ShortsDo the Gulf countries see India as a partner? A hundred per cent. You can see that from the India-UAE trade agreement (CEPA). You can see that from the current intensifying relations between Saudi Arabia and India within the context of G20 on the bilateral level and on the investment level. So that partnership is getting stronger by the day, and they have departed from the old paradigm of ideologically driven relationship into more an alignment over economic interests.
The question of security is a bit difficult. It’s not only about India. Broadly speaking, it’s about the future of the United States’s security role in the Gulf. In the current posture, we have a multidimensional region, meaning the security architecture of the region is (underwritten) absolutely by the United States and there’s not even a competition there… From Navy to Air Force to boots on the ground.
Economically, however, it’s multi-alignment. China is the biggest trade partner. Trading with Asia, more broadly, India, Japan and South Korea are on the rise. So, managing that sort of dichotomy is what the Gulf needs to figure out.
From your comments so far, it doesn’t seem that you are among those who have scepticism over the future of IMEC (the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor). You don’t think it’s dead?
The IMEC was announced in Delhi at the G20 right before the Gaza situation. But the most interesting part is when US President Biden gave his first speech (after the Hamas terror attack) in October. He mentioned IMEC as the way forward for the region. We call IMEC a “corridor” but it is more about economic alignment, mutual interest, clean hydrogen, cross-border data transfers, internet cables… It goes further than just a railway-to-port transportation system. I think the India-Gulf part of the corridor, the southern part of the corridor, is unimpacted. It’s going to be on full force because we already have a trade agreement between India and UAE, which is the biggest hurdle for any sort of economic alignment.
Second, because of the infrastructure in the Gulf that has been in the process of construction for quite some time… The Mediterranean part… The Israel part may take different venues. However, the fact that they have Greek prime minister (Kyriakos) Mitsotakis in Delhi talking about Greece as part of ‘West Asia’ discourse (at last month’s Raisina Dialogue) is clearly indicative of the fact that while the IMEC may be impacted (due to the Israel-Hamas conflict), the timelines may change, but the concept itself will remain.
It seems that the war in the Middle East is not going to die down anytime soon, and we are at a stage when Israel is under tremendous international pressure, but still wants to go ahead with its kinetic action in Gaza. Given that situation, how feasible would it be for Middle Eastern powers such as Saudi Arabia to normalize their relationship with Israel? What is the best-case scenario?
The fact that the regional architecture or the regional minilaterals did not disintegrate even after the catastrophe in Gaza gives you an indication about this idea and the thesis that there’s a regional order taking place. You have the EastMed Gas Forum in Cairo ( East Mediterranean Gas Forum), the NEGEV Forum with five or six Arab countries, and Israel. You have the I2U2 and the IMEC… The very fact that these organisations did not disintegrate gives you an idea that they still perceive this (normalisation) as the way forward.
Saudi Arabia is saying publicly that we do want to normalise… but here is what we feel… We are giving that sort of concession and we have been very pragmatic about it… So, it’s on you right now to meet us in the middle by having concrete steps towards the Palestinian state. The idea that we’re going to have to manage a low-intensity conflict with the Palestinians and neglect their own existence is not only hurtful within the Israel-Palestinian context but is also taking down the entire region. And these countries have economic development, strategic partnership and trade and energy… A lot of things are on the line. So, the best-case scenario is some steps towards that sort of settlement to end the issue because it is a perpetually bleeding wound.
I want to ask you about the Gulf countries’ relationship with China and India. China is clearly their economic partner in a very big way, but given the adversarial relationship between New Delhi and Beijing and the fact that the Gulf nations look at both these countries as their economic partners and strategic partners in case of India as well, is there a dichotomy ahead which they might have to solve?
I don’t think so. For a couple of reasons. In October, Riyadh hosted the ASEAN-GCC Summit. That is their own Asia-minus-China strategy. They already have their own relationship with India. They’re de-risking by looking to another economic bloc in Asia, which is ASEAN, a huge economy and there are also cultural affairs because of Malaysia and Indonesia. And they’re looking for integration, connectivity and investment in joint ventures. The timing of it, even during the Gaza catastrophe, gives an indication of where the Gulf is in terms of moving forward. Second, the ASEAN-GCC Summit tells you that it’s more about economic resiliency and looking for other avenues. Not really about China. To the core of your point, the question of China versus India, I don’t believe that the Gulf sees it as China versus India dynamic.
I can go further and tell you that they don’t see it as China versus United States dynamic either in terms of economy. They (the Gulf nations) see what China offers is different than what the US offers. Washington offers high-end technology, ships, low orbit satellite technology. For instance, if Saudi Arabia is launching Riyadh Air, they are going to go by Boeing. If you are thinking about electrical vehicles technology and IP, you go to the US and buy an IP.
If you are in the AI space, you want to have a partnership with Microsoft or OpenAI. These are very strategic economic interests that they feel the US is offering and it’s unmatched. At the same time, what China is offering is mass production at scale. Even with China slowing down, with all the questions about derisking and decoupling, China remains the world’s biggest manufacturer. This is the reality. That’s undeniable. They look at India as the middle ground between China and the US.
The Gulf nations perceive India as… not China. So, it’s a bit secure in terms of reputational risk with the US and the West who are looking at India as a strategic partner. So, the thinking is, let’s work with the Indian leadership on ports, connectivity, data centres, joint ventures and cyber security, maybe drones, maybe a lot of things that if they were to pursue with China would be a bit controversial, but with India it’s okay.
At the same time, India is getting up on the scale of technological development. Apple localization, Google producing Pixel in India. These things matter because you are looking for a country that’s able to do this stuff and for quite some time it was always and only China for all these years. So, it was not really a matter of the Gulf choosing China… It’s that every country – Germans and the French and the British and the Americans were all choosing China.
There is a lot of interest in the Arab nations about India right now. What do you think is the main driver for this interest?
I saw a lot of Egyptians here (at the Raisina venue). Whenever I’m sitting in any panel, I hear a lot of Arabic. That’s fascinating. First of all, they’re rediscovering India. Not finding India but rediscovering India. I come from a country of the Nasser-Nehru (former Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser) relationship in the 1950 and 60s. I was born and raised watching Amitabh Bachchan and Shah Rukh Khan in Cairo. That’s part of our culture discourse. It’s not really foreign or new to us… The Egyptians blocked the West from using the Suez Canal during India’s war in Goa… Nehru supported Egypt in the Suez Canal in 1956 (Suez Canal crisis). Egypt used to send high-level diplomats to New Delhi. So that relationship existed.
By the end of the Cold War, everything became flat. There was no strategic discourse. It was the ‘end of history’. Nothing in terms of relationships… There was no competition, fighting, until 9/11 of course. Everything was mild, so there was not really a strategic imperative to that relationship.
What happened was the rediscovering of India in the context of… the conceptualization of West Asia. There’s nothing called the Middle East. It’s the Middle East and South Asia emerging together in one big vision. It’s five hours between Delhi to Saudi Arabia. Between Saudi Arabia and London, it’s almost nine hours.
It’s a region that is characterised by flow of people, capital, investment, technology, maritime security… The very fact that India ended up having to have a naval workforce in the Red Sea confirmed this whole idea that no matter how much you want to make a relationship about economics, it will always have a strategic and security aspect to it, because you always have to protect the flow of money and capital. So, they are rediscovering India.
India had the benefit of a major diaspora in the Gulf. And from a cultural standpoint, Indians had a sort of edge in knowing the Gulf from inside… I think the Gulf and Egypt did not have that sort of flow of people and they are discovering that they want to engage with Indians on policy questions, issues that go beyond the traditional foundation of the relationship with India – diaspora, energy and trade.
The fact you have a Hindu temple in the UAE is unimaginable… That gives you an idea of the culture and the symbolism. President Sisi (Egyptian president Abdel Fattah El-Sisi) was in Delhi as the chief guest (for Republic Day celebrations this year). Modi was in Cairo. The Indian prime minister went to West Asia 14 times. That’s massive.
Final question. I want to press you a little bit about the wave of reformation that I perceive is sweeping across the entire Arabian world. The entire region is becoming less ideological, more pragmatic, more oriented towards how they can move ahead with the times, diversify their economy from oil… How do you see this?
First, there’s nothing called the Arab world any more. That’s over. It’s West Asia. It’s every country with its own national interest. We have a return of interest-based foreign policy. The idea of pure ideological alignment was in my viewpoint a relic of the Cold War. That’s gone.
Let’s talk about Ukraine, Gaza, Taiwan. When you think about the different views on each issue in each capital… It gives you an idea that it’s not really about a consistent ideological viewpoint. It’s just ‘what’s my interest with the Russians? What are my interests with Ukrainians? What is my interest with the United States? How do I perceive China and Taiwan?’ Ther is no ideological framework for each country viewing all of these issues.
The Gulf is going through what I call the ‘Gulf global moment’. This is the only sub-region in addition to United States, which is the only growing economy in G7. The Gulf is the only growing economy with major fiscal spending on major transformative projects. We are speaking about trillions of dollars. Dubai is a global capital in terms of money, diaspora, influence. Think about the number of CEOs in Riyadh. These are unprecedented changes. And these unprecedented changes require interest-based consensus, more common ground, more globalized view. The social transformation in Saudi Arabia (is incredible)… Right now all my friends are going to Saudi Arabia for parties. If someone told that to me that 10 years ago I wouldn’t have believed it.
Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
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