 "Admiral SM Nanda: The man who gave Indian Navy its finest hour")
The 1971 war for the liberation of Bangladesh was the Indian Navy’s finest hour. While it had taken part in the coercive action in Junagarh in October 1947 immediately after independence, drawn blood and played a significant part in the liberation of Goa operation in December 1961, and essayed a defensive role—much against its wishes—in the 1965 war, it bloomed to its full potential in the ’71 war and gave an excellent account of itself. The Navy’s performance captured the national imagination and won international acclaim. While all three services fought with clinical precision and the political-diplomatic-bureaucratic apparatus worked in cohesion, the Navy’s achievement is important to highlight for three reasons.
First, while all three services faced denudation at the dawn of independence, the Indian Navy in 1947 was a small coastal force of ‘less than half a dozen sloops’ and comparatively pygmy-sized. By 1971, it had developed considerable assets, such as an aircraft carrier and submarines operating in three-dimensional service, in a span of less than 25 years. Second, the Navy’s operations in the war spanned almost the entire gamut of missions: maritime force engagement, surface ship bombardment of enemy coasts, aircraft carrier operations, amphibious operations, special forces operations, submarine deployment, Surface Action Group (SAG) operations, Search and Attack Unit (SAU) operations, deception, and so on. These operations were undertaken over a wide geography that stretched from the Arabian Sea to the Andaman Sea and were characterised by offensive spirit, chutzpah, bold leadership, and decisiveness across all echelons. The combined effect was the Indian Navy’s supremacy in both the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, considerable destruction of the Pakistani Fleet, and strangulation of the enemy on both fronts, all of which cumulatively led to the denouement of the surrender of more than 90,000 Pakistani combatants.
Third, it had a historical context. Having been colonised by Europeans who came through the sea, the general perception of India as a fighting force was still iffy. While the reputation of our soldiers as courageous and hardy was borne out through the two World Wars, the idea of India as a military force and sea power to reckon with was still far away. We were regarded as a ‘coastal force characterised by sea blindness’ as a national trait. As the late Admiral JG Nadkarni, one of our erudite Navy Chiefs, said, “Although they gave India a large Army, the British realising the importance of the sea, kept the seaward defences of the country firmly in their hands. They humoured the Indians by giving them a Navy of sorts, mostly a coastal defence force. Divided between the two countries after partition, India’s share consisted of few World war sloops and mine-sweepers. Hardly anybody had heard of the Indian Navy in a country dominated by the massive Army." Therefore, our Navy’s performance in the war was cricket’s equivalent of ‘letting our batting do the talking’ and erasing, once and for all, existing colonial stereotypes.
The man responsible for the Navy’s super show and for bringing it into reckoning as a vital part of national power was Admiral Sardarilal Mathradas (SM) Nanda, who was the Chief of the Naval Staff during the war. Unfortunately, Nanda remains less known than his two counterparts, Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw and Air Chief Marshal PC Lal, who headed the Army and Air Force, respectively. Today, May 11, 2024, his fifteenth death anniversary, is an apt occasion to remember him and salute his contribution to the nation. Nanda assumed command of the Indian Navy on March 1, 1970, and when he demitted office three years later, on February 28, 1973, he had served in the Navy in various capacities for more than three decades. While constraints of space do not allow us to highlight each of his appointments and contributions, a brief overview is necessary to provide context for his dynamic leadership at the apex.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsNanda’s Naval Career
The Admiral was born on October 10, 1915, and he grew up on Manora Island off Karachi, where his father worked in the Port Trust. In such surroundings, it was natural for a young Nanda to develop an attraction for the sea, and, thus, he volunteered for the Royal Indian Naval Volunteer Reserve (RINVR) and was commissioned into the Executive Branch in October 1941. His ship and other assignments during World War II took him from Persia to Burma, and somewhere at this time he acquired the nickname ‘Charles’. He also happened to be on board HMIS Talwar when the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) Uprising took place in February 1946. This episode taught him a great deal about man-management and leadership. After Independence, Charles Nanda held a number of important appointments, both afloat and ashore, which exposed him to a range of professional challenges and experiences. In 1948, he was on the commissioning crew, as first lieutenant, on the Indian Navy’s first cruiser, INS Delhi. After that, he served as Director of Personnel at Naval Headquarters from 1949–51. Later, from 1951 to 1953, he commanded the destroyer INS Ranjit and won several laurels during his tenure.
From 1953 to 1956, he held the appointments of Commanding Officer INS Jamuna (concurrently Captain 12th Frigate Squadron), Commanding Officer INS Angre (concurrently Captain Barracks), and Chief of Personnel at Naval Headquarters. In early 1957, he was selected for the prestigious command of our second cruiser, INS Mysore, and he remained in command until September 30, 1958. Mysore, under his leadership, achieved several milestones and was the flagship of the admiral commanding the Indian fleet.
Subsequently, he was appointed Director General, Naval Dockyard Expansion Scheme, in Mumbai, during which assignment he was responsible for the execution of plans for modernization and expansion of the dockyard. He was also key to ensuring that the Cruiser Graving (CG) Dock at Mumbai could be modified and extended to accommodate an aircraft carrier in preparation for Vikrant. After a year in the United Kingdom, attending the Imperial Defence College (now called the Royal College of Defence Studies), he did a short stint at the Naval Headquarters as the Chief of Material (COM) before taking over as the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (DCNS) in May 1962.
In this assignment, his thrust was on improving the Navy’s capabilities. In line with this endeavour, he was part of Defence Minister YB Chavan’s delegation to the US in May 1964, the USSR in September 1964, and the United Kingdom in November 1964. These visits were to be turning points in naval history, including laying the foundation of Indo-Soviet military cooperation and our subsequent procurement of hardware from the USSR, which considerably enhanced our force levels. He also pushed for indigenisation and was responsible for the final selection of design for India’s indigenous warship construction programme.
This led to his next appointment as the Managing Director of Mazagon Docks Ltd. in Mumbai for 18 months. During this period, the re-organisation scheme of the Mazagon Docks and the Leander class frigate project were simultaneously taken up, and he was responsible for giving both a good start. In June 1966, Nanda took over as the Flag Officer Commanding Indian Fleet (FOCIF), the most prestigious seagoing appointment. As the in-charge of the sword-arm, he welded his fleet into a formidable fighting force. In February 1968, he was promoted to Vice Admiral and took over as the First Flag Officer Commanding in Chief of the Western Naval Command (FOC-in-C, WNC). As part of the Navy reorganisation, he was now both the operational authority and the administrative authority of all naval units on the western seaboard. Apart from several initiatives to enhance the overall efficiency of ships, air squadrons, dockyards, and depots, Nanda also laid great stress on bringing the Navy closer to the people, especially in Mumbai. One can, therefore, surmise that all of these roles went to honing, polishing, and developing leadership qualities that were to come to the fore when he took over as the Chief on March 1, 1970. It also highlights that while he is known for his accomplishments as the Chief, he made vital contributions in other ranks too, and as one of the pioneers, he played a big part in key decisions or actions that contributed to the growth of our Navy.
Navy’s Helmsman During War
With this background, let us now examine what was obtained during the war and Nanda’s personal role in the context of those times. It is nobody’s case that the Navy’s sterling show in the war—or, for that matter, its growth and development otherwise—is the outcome of just one person’s efforts. While that may be true in some aspects of human endeavour, it is not so in the Armed Forces, where it is always the team that is the cornerstone of any activity. And in a good team, the whole is always more than the sum of its parts. However, it is the leader who has to motivate the team, provide vision and direction, meld the team as a fighting force, and be the inspiration that enables great deeds. Since Nanda ticks many of these boxes, he is regarded as the architect of the Navy’s victory in the war. While he himself admits, in the foreword to his autobiography ‘The Man Who Bombed Karachi’ (Harper Collins, 2004), that he was “but an instrument of God’s will and a representative of their high standards of professionalism”, most of his contemporaries and colleagues regard him as the right man for the job at that critical juncture. There were many things Nanda had to contend with in the run-up to and during the war.
First, let us begin with a brief background. In the 1965 war, the Indian Navy was assigned a defensive role and directed not to operate north of Porbandar by the authorities at that time. This was to result, among other things, in a furtive raid on Dwarka by the Pakistan Navy. While it was completely inconsequential and caused no damage, it triggered some uninformed criticism of the Indian Navy in the media and by the public. It also caused a lot of disquiet in the rank and file of the Navy about being deprived of action and the Navy’s inherent flexibility not being utilised. The Navy’s senior officers were determined that should another opportunity arise, the service must not be ‘found wanting’ and this presented itself six years later. In the intervening period, the Navy’s leadership also rapidly increased its manpower and augmented its hardware by acquiring submarines, Petya-class corvettes, and Osa-class missile boats, all of which played an important role in the war. In fact, Nanda himself, as FoC-in-C, WNC, had said in an interview to the ‘Blitz’ newspaper on March 15, 1969, “..And if war comes again, I assure that we shall carry it right into the enemy’s biggest ports like Karachi. I know this harbour quite well for I started my career working there. And you have my word that given the opportunity, the Indian Navy will make the world’s biggest bonfire of it.”
Second, at the apex level, he had to take note of the fact that the country’s top leadership, possibly because of earlier history or unsure or unaware about how Navy could be deployed, had very little expectations or plans for its involvement in the war. Defence expert Sandeep Unnithan, writing in an article, on December 21, said of Nanda, “He took over when the navy was already at the margins. It had the smallest part of the defence budget and was seen as inconsequential to the outcomes of three land battles, which is where India’s disputed boundaries lay."
Nanda reminisces in his memoir, “The assessment that the Navy had little or no role to play in India’s wars would come into focus repeatedly during the numerous meetings of the chiefs of the armed forces and top officials with the Prime Minister and Defence Minister in 1971." He further adds, “Every department—be it intelligence, home, Army or Air Force—briefed the PM. The PM would finally ask for Army Chief’s view and then that of the Air Force Chief, and then ask, ‘Admiral, do you have anything to say?’ As though the Navy had no important role to play. No one took the Navy seriously”. Therefore, he had a big challenge convincing the political leadership to buy into his plans, be it on trade warfare, or attack on Karachi, or the use of aircraft carrier to bombard East Pakistan. Possible scenarios of America or other nations helping Pakistan, international repercussions, and the like had to be considered. It is to the credit of both the political and naval leadership that these plans were given the go-ahead.
His next challenge was revamping the thinking of his own staff. Many of them were conservative in their approach. One of the most striking parts mentioned in his memoir was this realisation when he proposed the idea of a missile attack on Karachi. He confesses that he felt he had to “change the staff’s entire mindset at NHQ”. This conclusion was based on his staff’s inputs, which exaggerated the Pakistani Navy’s role and potency while adopting a defensive role for the Indian Navy. To make his commanders think differently, he devised scenarios and numerous war games. He pushed them to think critically and rationally analyse all variables. In the initial rounds, the staff accorded the Pakistani Navy all sorts of long-range capabilities. Spending more time doing this from different perspectives and angles made them realise the practical limitations and past biases in their thought process. It is interesting to note that Admiral Nanda did not push through his opinion or exert his rank, even though he was the CNS. Instead, he devised situations, simulations, and war games (based on realistic threat assessments), which enabled his team to see things from a different perspective and made them think of other possibilities than those they contemplated. The same approach came to be seen in the various other war plans as well, be it in deploying Vikrant or operations in the east.
Third, he had to also consider the operational challenges on the ground. Many ships were ageing, and their material state was worrying. India had just acquired submarines and was comparatively new to the game of submarine warfare. At the same time, only two out of the four submarines were available for prolonged deployment. Since operations were to be prosecuted in both theatres, the two CinCs in Mumbai and Vizag, naturally, wanted maximum resources in their Order of Battle (ORBAT). Some resources had to be allocated for the Southern Naval Area and for local defence in other places too. Above all, Vikrant, the centrepiece of the Navy’s concept of operations, had a defunct boiler, which would have made it a limping combatant if it were to be committed to battle. That he was able to resolve all these problems and exploit all his resources optimally is a tribute to his decision-making prowess, go getting attitude, and bull-headed obstinacy once he was convinced about a plan of action.
Consequently, he was able to prepare the Navy to take the big leap when war happened and be proactive. His signal to the whole Navy on December 3, 1971, at the outbreak of hostilities, is instructive for clarity of thought, offensive intent, and, arguably, a ‘sense of destiny’. It read, “Pakistan has committed an unprovoked aggression against us, and our defence forces have been ordered to meet this challenge with full courage and determination. My objective is to search and destroy Pakistani warships and along with sister services to inflict maximum damage on the enemy war machines. No sacrifice should be too much for us. Let us write a new chapter in the history of our services.”
Reasons for Success
While the events that most captured public imagination then and have remained etched in memory ever since were the devastating attacks on Karachi on December 4 (Op Trident) and December 8 (Op Python), 1971, a lot more transpired at sea. The best summary of that is seen in Nanda’s Navy Day (December 15) message of 1971. It says, “For the first time, the Navy Day has come at a time when we are fighting a war at sea. For many years now our Navy has been training at sea, toughening its sailors, familiarising them with new and sophisticated equipment, while still making do with some old ships and aircraft. They were never really tested in the past, but kept in readiness to meet any threats to the integrity of our country and our maritime interests at sea. …Our Western Fleet has carried out two daring attacks on the very heart of the Pakistan Navy in Karachi. Ships and aircraft of our Eastern Fleet have been pounding away at military targets in enemy-held Bangladesh and have succeeded in cutting off any supplies reaching the enemy by sea. This is the first time that we have used all units of the Navy, that is, submarines under the water, ships on the surface of the sea, and naval aircraft in the air, to our great advantage. Both in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, our ships have successfully apprehended merchant ships carrying contraband to feed the enemy’s war machine. The Indian Navy has played its role most effectively in completely disrupting the maritime trade and the capability of the enemy, at the same time ensuring that all our merchant ships continue to ply the high seas.”
Charles Nanda was always a man of action. It was his idea that the war must be taken to the enemy, and the attack on Karachi was the result of such a spirit. In his book, Nanda gives the reasons for targeting Karachi. He says, “Even by 1971, Karachi was still the only large deep-water port in West Pakistan. The economic dependence of Pakistan on imports of raw materials fuel food and military supplies by sea made its ports irresistible targets for trade warfare. We decided to choke the jugular by effective policing of the Pakistani trade routes even as we blockaded the ports of Karachi and Chittagong and enforced contraband control.”
Another operation he did not talk about then because of its classified nature but which, as subsequent records show, contributed a great deal to the success of the war was the Naval Commando Operation, also called ‘Op X’. Unnithan says, “Teaming up with his brilliant director, naval intelligence, the enigmatic captain (later Vice Admiral) Mihir Kumar Roy, Nanda green-lit an ultra-secret operation to train hundreds of Mukti Bahini naval commandos. These Bengali naval commandos, trained at a secret camp on the battlefield of Plassey, went on to sink and disable over 100,000 tonnes of merchant shipping in East Pakistan in multiple covert attacks between August and November 1971. These were the largest special forces missions carried out by an Indian armed force”.
It goes without saying that all these operations affected the ultimate outcome on land. Verily, the Indian Navy had written a new chapter in the annals of history. Unnithan believes that it was largely because of one man, Nanda, and that “under him, the navy was bold, aggressive, took enormous risks, and punched way above its weight”. Many other colleagues of Nanda have the same opinion. What explains this? What were his strong points? The fact that he was a first-class professional with wide experience and several prestigious appointments is borne out by his bio sketch. But going beyond that, I will attempt to highlight two main ones among his many strengths.
First, he thought big, and allied with that, he had huge risk-taking ability. Be it war or peace, operations or infrastructure, he thought, ‘King Size’. He was, as Unnithan says, “a big Mac guy." The ‘big Navy mindset’ that Navy talks of today was present in him at that time. His instincts were unerringly right, but that was only because he was willing to think outside the box and dream in ’70 mm’, to use a cinematic phrase. Not for him incremental gains or timidity of approach; he loved to be aggressive and unorthodox and wanted his subordinates to be similarly wired. Whether in deploying Vikrant in the East despite her boiler problem or the decision to attack the citadel of Pakistan, viz., Karachi, or training the maritime wing of Mukti Bahini, Nanda took considerable risks.
Take the case of Vikrant. The entire staff was against sending the ship to sea because of its poor material state. But Nanda knew that if the carrier was to remain in harbour during the hostilities, it would be, in some ways, the death knell of naval aviation in India. Or see the dilemma of the top brass evident through this excerpt from “Transition to Triumph: The Indian Navy 1965–75” (Lancer, 2000) by Vice Admiral GM Hiranandani. “There were grave risks in sending the fragile boats to the heavily defended port of Karachi. Even if … surprise prevented the detection of these boats on the approach and whilst launching their missiles, they would most certainly be subjected to air and perhaps surface attack in the withdrawal phase. …On the one hand was the tremendous danger to young naval officers and sailors and to many crores worth of ships; on the other the Navy had to show its mettle. A calculated risk had to be taken. But some losses had to be accepted. All these factors were very carefully weighed…” Each of his ideas could have backfired with catastrophic consequences. Nanda not only backed himself but was able to enthuse the rank and file about his plans. It was he who singularly pushed for the unexpected and the implausible. Consequently, the Navy as a whole fought on the front foot with aggressive intent.
His second huge plus point was his legendary ‘man management’ abilities. Most of his contemporaries and others who worked with him or saw him attest to this fact. This provided the main ingredient in his leadership skills. As Hiranandani describes, “whenever he was confronted with a vexing problem, he would go down to where the ships were, sit down with those he considered knowledgeable about the problem, listen carefully to all views, ask basic commonsense questions and gradually evolve workable solutions, making it clear that the responsibility for the final decision would be his.” A summary of various views would bring out that “his down-to-earth and practical approach to problem-solving, an intuitive knack for forging friendships, an uncanny professional vision and foresight enabled him to make a success of whatever tasks were assigned to him." Another facet that many attest to is that Nanda was admired for his bold decision-making and for frequently overcoming bureaucracy in administrative functions too, like, for example, his quest to improve the living conditions of his sailors and their families.
This ability of his to get along with people across echelons in government and strata of society, his natural affinity for people, and his ability to strike personal rapport also made him a natural troubleshooter, problem solver, and ‘go-to person’ in any crisis. His harmonious relationships with the political and bureaucratic apex smoothed lots of issues at Naval Headquarters and solved seemingly intractable problems. Captain Mohan Ram, the legendary shipbuilder, mentioned in a personal conversation with this author that, while he admired many Chiefs with whom he worked, it was “Nanda alone who understood the system in Delhi and knew how to get things done, that he had good relations with fellow Chiefs and others who mattered in the Ministry and government, that he was a go getter who could convey ideas and get a buy in from Defence Ministry and others in the decision loop”. (Paraphrase mine).
Nanda was also astute at selecting the right kind of team members and giving them freedom of action. His Executive Officers (Second in Command) on board the Ranjit and Mysore were EC Kuruvilla and Cawas Nanavati, both highly respected professionals. Similarly, Nanda chose Ronnie Pereira as the person in charge of the President’s Fleet Review (PFR) in 1969, knowing about the latter’s eye for detail and quest for perfectionism. Above all, his team at Naval Headquarters during the ‘71 war shows how Nanda was hugely perceptive. Vice Admiral Jal Cursetji, his Vice Chief, had the uncanny ability to flesh out Nanda’s ideas in detail and work out the nitty-gritty. He was the classic foil to big-thinking Nanda. Captains Stan Dawson at Naval Operations, VEC (Bamby) Barboza at Naval Plans, and MK (Micky) Roy at Naval Intelligence—all three with the finest professional reputations—were the ‘three musketeers’ doing the heavy lifting, harmonising Staff Solutions. In the words of Vice Admiral PS Das “In December 1971, the Indian Navy grew from a relatively unknown force and one seen by the nation as largely ceremonial, to an essential and indispensable component of the nation’s military power. The ships had not changed in quality or in numbers. The officers and men were the same. It was the leader and his leadership which made the difference. The Navy will forever be in debt of this towering personality.” There are several other qualities of his that readily come to mind, such as his outstanding ship handling abilities, his flamboyance, his ready wit, his practical resolution of many problems in the service, his contributions in other domains, and his stoic endurance of personal tragedies that his family faced, but dwelling on them would need many separate essays.
Conclusion
Nanda had an eventful and illustrious career even after demitting office as CNS. These included heading public and private sector organisations and engaging in maritime consultancy. Details of these are given in his highly readable, if somewhat self-congratulatory, autobiography. Unfortunately, after his retirement several controversies, about his family and his companies, dogged him. Nanda has given an elaborate defence in his book maintaining his non-involvement which should have cleared the air. It’s not for this author to comment on the merits of the controversies or allegations. However, it cannot be denied that they, regrettably, cast a shadow over his illustrious naval legacy.
At the same time, these issues must not detract analysts and historians from Nanda’s contributions to Navy and nation, his splendid leadership of the Navy in war and his many other qualities of head and heart. While a grateful nation conferred the Padma Vibhushan to him after the war, many navy veterans feel that he ought to have been promoted to the five-star rank of Admiral of the Fleet. As Nadkarni puts it “Fortunately, nothing can take away Nanda’s role in the Navy and his achievements in 1971. What the government failed to do, the people, especially his Navy colleagues, have given in ample measure. Admiral Nanda remains a revered figure among the men of the Indian Navy, the men for whom be gave thirty years of his life. Nanda gave his service and its men the one thing which is invaluable. Pride in themselves, pride in their service and pride in the country they serve.”
From 1972 onwards, the Indian Navy began to celebrate 4thDecember as the Navy Day in order to commemorate our glorious exploits in the war, including the first deadly strike on the Karachi harbour, just as Vijay Diwas is celebrated on 16th December to mark India’s victory in the 1971 War. Nanda passed away on 11 May 2009, at the age of 95, after a brief illness. He was cremated the next day with full military honours. Reflecting on his association with Nanda, one of his contemporaries Rear Admiral KR Nair said “If we now have a navy that has won the respect of the world for its professionalism, a navy that aspires to be strongest in the East the credit should go to this one man, Admiral Nanda.” Hopefully, our nation and especially young citizens will hoist this message on his death anniversary and offer a big salute to the legend.
Photographs courtesy: Nanda family and the Indian Navy
The author is a navy veteran and writes on maritime issues. He is thankful to insights provided by many officers and especially grateful for research inputs given by Cdr Ankush Bannerjee and Lt Cdr Divyajyot. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
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