A year after Hasina’s exit, stability remains a distant dream for Bangladesh

Bangladesh, given the history of coups and regime changes, witnessed another dramatic turn of events on August 5, 2024, when its Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, was made to resign and flee the country as a sequel to massive nationwide student protests. Her government’s decision to reserve 30 per cent jobs for the children of ‘freedom fighters’ triggered the protests, as it would have taken the reservation quota to 56 per cent, thus further adding to the high rate of unemployment.

This marked an end to Sheikh Hasina’s 15 years of uninterrupted rule wherein she wielded immense political control, although her authoritarian tendencies and electoral manipulation drew deep dissent. Incidentally, Bangladesh witnessed significant economic progress during her tenure and was hailed as the rising tiger of South Asia.

Immediately after Sheikh Hasina fled to India, Bangladesh Army Chief General Waker Uz Zaman declared the army takeover. Soon he announced the formation of an interim government to be headed by Mohammad Yunus, a Nobel Laureate who was based in Paris and known as a critic of Sheikh Hasina.

The majority of the members of the Yunus government are those who had played a key role in the student protests. The primary task of the interim government is to facilitate the process of electing the new government. However, Yunus is engaged in taking major policy decisions, including the electoral reforms and foreign policy reset.

Bangladesh politics over the last five decades have been dominated by two main political parties – Awami League (AL), led by Sheikh Hasina, and Bangladesh National Party (BNP), led by Khalida Zia. The sudden political vacuum due to Hasina’s departure led to the internal turbulence. Khalida, who was under house arrest and long marginalised by the BNP, has attempted to stage a comeback. Currently, both political parties lack coherence due to internal fissures and power struggles.

With the political environment highly fractured, there is marked erosion of democratic institutions in Bangladesh. The judiciary seemingly is politicised and ineffective, as is also the election commission. A large number of office bearers, civil servants, media personnel and academics from the minority community or those who were seen to be AL sympathisers were forced to resign after being humiliated and thrashed. The ‘Digital Security Act’ continues to be used by the new entities to clamp down on the critics. The temples and minority-owned businesses have been frequently attacked by the radical elements and local mobs.

The Islamist elements and extremist groups like the Jamaat-Ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh and Hefazat-e-Islam, against whom Sheikh Hasina had taken a firm stand, sensing opportunity, are now reasserting themselves. Incidentally, its cadres were part of a paramilitary force (Razakars) who supported the Pakistan Army’s nine-month genocide and loot in 1971. In view of the recent violent incidents in Rajshahi, Sylhet and parts of Chittagong, there is growing apprehension amongst the public about the return of Islamist terror that plagued Bangladesh in the mid-2000s.

While there have been protests and demonstrations during the past year, the Yunus government has not faced major challenges, as the main political parties are in disarray. Recently, the newly formed National Consolidated Party (NCP) workers led a march to Gopalganj with the intent to desecrate the tomb of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, which was resisted by the locals. This was resisted by the army and police along with the elements of NCP and Jamiat functionaries, resulting in the arrests of over 4,000 people with many missing.

The military had adopted a neutral stance during the protests against Sheikh Hasina but now is playing an increasing role in the nation’s governance. The security apparatus evidently is either compromised or paralysed. The police and law maintenance agencies are facing internal corruption and lack of coordination. Law and order has broken down in several districts, with armed groups and political militias seizing control of local governance structures.

Bangladesh’s steady economic boom during the last couple of years was largely driven by the ‘ready-made garment’ sector, remittances and a growing middle class. Due to the internal political crisis and global economic slowdown, Bangladesh’s economy is showing signs of crumbling, marked by inflation, currency depreciation (the taka depreciated by 15 per cent against the dollar this year) and declining investor confidence. Power shortages and hikes in fuel prices have led to protests in urban areas. The IMF has raised concerns about Bangladesh’s rising debt levels.

With Dhaka’s political leaning towards Beijing, the Dragon is rapidly expanding its economic and strategic tentacles in Bangladesh. Infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the sale of defence equipment and joint exercises between the two militaries are indications of growing proximity between Bangladesh and China. Bangladesh is gradually walking into the ‘debt diplomacy trap’, vindicating the IMF’s concern, as brought out earlier.

Yunus has taken pains to mend relations with Pakistan. A military delegation from Pakistan had visited Bangladesh a few months back. Direct trade between the two countries has also commenced, with the process of normalisation being facilitated by China. Recently, a meeting of foreign ministers of China, Pakistan and Bangladesh was held in Kunming (China). It is evident that a new Beijing-Dhaka-Islamabad trilateral is emerging, and Turkey’s growing engagement in the region could well make it a quad.

The India-Bangladesh ties today are in limbo due to the rise in anti-India rhetoric and pro-Pakistani narratives, tacitly supported by the current dispensation in Dhaka. There is apprehension in India about the cross-border spillover of the violence in Bangladesh, especially to its northeastern states.

In a recent instance, an Islamic group in Dhaka, ‘Saltanat-e-Bangla (SeB)’, known to be backed by a Turkish NGO, ‘Turkish Youth Federation’, put out a map of so-called ‘Greater Bangladesh’ that included parts of India. The map in question was displayed in Dhaka University, although the Bangladesh government has denied any evidence of SeB operating in the country.

The strained relations with Bangladesh undermine India’s ‘Act East Policy’. Security of the 4,096 km-long porous India-Bangladesh border is a major challenge for Delhi, especially the large-scale surge in illegal migration into India’s northeastern states, impacting the demographic profile and thus giving rise to local tensions and identity politics. The situation is further compounded with the smuggling of narcotics, arms and human trafficking. Bangladesh harbours nearly a million Rohingya refugees, and there is consistent effort to push them into India. In Bangladesh’s stability and prosperity, India has high stakes, being a close neighbour and once a strategic partner.

A year after Sheikh Hasina’s exit, Bangladesh is in a state of flux, grappling with internal disorder and uncertainty. A country which was once exemplified by development and progress is now sliding into political turmoil and economic volatility. This underscores the importance of strong central leadership, despite its flaws. The Yunus government has announced holding elections in April 2026. With AL banned and radical forces gaining ground, it is to be seen whether Bangladesh will transition into a more inclusive democracy or revert to an authoritarian military rule.

The current state of uncertainty and turbulence in Bangladesh is cause for serious concern, as it stands on the edge, with the road to stability rather arduous. It is imperative that the nation’s political class adopt a bipartisan approach to rebuild institutions, restore democratic norms and address the root cause of the socio-economic discontent to obviate the likelihood of prolonged chaos and even the risk of fragmentation.

The author is a war veteran, former Assistant Chief, served as Defence Attaché in China and North Korea; currently Professor of Strategic-IR & Management Studies. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.