 "25 years of Kargil: Lessons on high altitude aerial combat against a bigger enemy this time")
The India-China faceoff in Galwan in 2020 was the worst-ever border tension since the India-Pakistan Kargil War of 1999. The Chinese army had diverted a significant number of troops, who were carrying out a large exercise, towards various points of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on its side. Transgressions were reported at multiple locations in eastern Ladakh, in the larger Hot Springs area, and in the ‘Finger’ area of Pangong Lake. This skirmish came despite the world being under severe China-originated Covid-19 pandemic.
India found such behaviour both surprising and belligerent. The Indian military gave a befitting response. Not only did it hold ground, but it also did tit-for-tat strategic land grabs. Both sides continue to hold last-held ground for the past three years. Their deployed numbers remain enhanced. Both sides have accelerated the pace of infrastructure building. Additional weapon platforms have been brought in. Newer combat equipment, such as light battle tanks, is being developed. Even after 21 rounds of military commander-level talks, the stalemate continues.
Meanwhile, as India celebrates 25 years of Kargil War victory, it is time to look at the lessons that continue to apply to the face-off on LAC.
Pakistani Game Plan in Kargil
India was forced into the Kargil War when General Pervez Musharraf ordered the Pakistani Army to occupy Indian posts, which were traditionally vacated every winter and reoccupied in the summer. The Pakistani plan was to dominate the Srinagar-Kargil Highway and cut off the important road link to Ladakh. Even the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was not kept in the loop. On one hand, it was the repeat infiltration plan of the Pakistan Army, and on the other, it was a failure of Indian intelligence.
The Kargil War was fought between India and Pakistan from May 3 to July 26, 1999, at one of the highest battlefields in the world. The leadership and valour of young officers that motivated and led brave jawans was internationally acclaimed. Indian Air Force’s (IAF) air operations code named ‘Operation Safed Sagar’ supported a decisive victory for Indian forces. Nearly 500 Indian soldiers were killed in action, and Pakistan lost over 700 soldiers.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsIt was also the first direct conventional war between two newly declared nuclear weapon states. The employment of air power and its escalation dynamics were deliberated at length by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) before IAF was given go ahead on May 25, 1999, to mount unrestricted attacks on the infiltrators, albeit ‘without crossing the Line of Control’ (LoC). The full scale air operations began on 26 May.
IAF Initial Losses and Change of Strategy
On 27 May itself, the IAF lost a MiG-27 strike aircraft piloted by Flt Lt Nachiketa, which had an engine failure due to high-altitude rocket firing. He was taken a Prisoner of War (POW). Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, who was escorting Nachiketa, flying a MiG 21, descended trying to trace the downed pilot despite the threat from Surface to Air Missiles (SAM) and was shot down by a Stinger shoulder-fired missile. The following day, a Mi-17 was shot down, with the loss of all four crew, when hit by a SAM. The aircraft did not have a serviceable IR flare dispenser. These losses forced the IAF to reassess its strategy.
The helicopters were immediately withdrawn from offensive roles. All bombing hereafter was from high altitude. Mirage 2000 aircraft with Laser Guided Bombs (LGB) were inducted. All other fighters carried out attacks using gravity bombs. Nearly 100 SAMs were fired during the remaining war, but there were no further hits or losses. IAF learned the hard way.
Precision Bombing: A Game Changer
The targets in Kargil were at 16-18,000 ft. Most aircraft and weapons are not designed for delivery at such high altitudes. No one had ever practiced weapon delivery at these heights. The restriction of not crossing the LoC put limitations on choices of attack directions for strike aircraft. To avoid SAMs, the aircraft had to pull out of the attack at above 30,000 ft. IAF had to use ingenuity, Indian ‘Jugaad’, to modify aircraft and aiming systems to achieve direct hits at those heights. IAF targeted small bunkers, enemy gun positions and logistic camps. IAF struck enemy positions in Muntho Dhalo, Tiger Hill and Point 4388 in the Dras Sector.
The precision delivery of laser guided bombs and also dumb bombs by Mirage 2000, Mig-27, Jaguar, and MiG-21 aircraft not only helped turn the tide of war and hastened the recapture of high mountain peaks but also greatly reduced Indian Army casualties. A testament to the effectiveness of the IAF’s attacks came when Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz, during an official visit to New Delhi at the peak of the war on June 12, 1999, implored to “stop the air strikes” as one of the requests he made to the Indian government.
Air Effort
As per the Ministry of Defence annual report, a total of 7831 sorties were flown by IAF. As many as 1730 by fighters (22.7 per cent), 3427 by transport aircraft (44.9 per cent) and 2474 by helicopters (32.4 per cent). Nearly 48 per cent of fighter sorties were for strike missions. Another 39 per cent for Air Defence Combat Air Patrol (CAP) and Escort missions. Nearly 13 per cent were for Recce missions.
Nuclear Bluff Called
Despite Pakistani foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad’s statement on May 31 warning that an escalation of the limited conflict could lead Pakistan to use “any weapon” in its arsenal, Pakistan’s oft repeated nuclear threat bluff was exposed. The possibility of a conventional war under nuclear overhang was re-established.
Post Kargil Review and Actions
The Kargil Review Committee report highlighted the lack of interagency coordination between RAW, IB, and military intelligence just prior to the war. Even human intelligence was found to be weak. A thorough review of the entire national security system was carried out.
Based on the report, a full-time National Security Advisor (NSA) was instituted. Improved aerial surveillance using Indian RISAT satellites and UAVs has been put in place. A centralised communication and electronic intelligence agency, the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), was set up in 2004. The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) has been set up. Based on recommendations, the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), the Andaman and Nicobar Command, the Nuclear Command Authority, the Strategic Forces Command, and the Defence Acquisition Council, among others, were set up.
More recently, the Defence Space and Cyber Agencies and a Special Forces division have been created. And finally, the dawn of 2020 saw the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). The formation of theatre commands is at the advanced stage of discussions. The only thing left is the most important genuine civil-military integration in MoD.
IAF Upgrades Post Kargil
Post-Kargil, the IAF co-developed the Sukhoi Su-30 MKI fighters with Russia. It also upgraded its Jaguars, MiG 29, and Mirage 2000 aircraft with the latest weapons and avionics. Two squadrons of Light Combat Aircraft have been inducted. LCA Mk1A is getting ready for delivery, albeit there are some delays. As many as 36 Rafale cover both the eastern and northern sectors of LAC. There has been a massive increase in transport aircraft capacity with Boeing C-17 Globemaster III, Lockheed C-130J, and Airbus C-295W inductions. Similarly, the helicopter fleet got a boost with the Boeing Chinook and Apache induction. A large number of ALH variants, including the Light Combat Helicopter have been inducted.
BrahMos missiles have been added in large numbers, and more potent variants are being developed. Three units of the potent S400 AD system are in place. Two more will induct soon. The indigenous Akash AD system, and Astra BVR missiles are in service. The Rafale brought the world class MBDA Meteor missile. All new acquisitions are cleared for operations at Himalayan heights.
IAF acquired its Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA) and AWACS after the Kargil War. The numbers are inadequate for operations against the northern neighbour, and new platforms are under acquisition. UAVs too were inducted only in the last two decades. The numbers are going up, and now drones are being added in large numbers. The country now has dedicated military and surveillance satellites. IAF’s secure internal network and Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) are making a game-changing operational impact.
Additional airfields have become operational both in Ladakh and in the North East. The number of hardened shelters has gone up. All advanced landing grounds have been upgraded. Weapon stocking has gone up considerably. IAF is thus much better off for an air war across the Himalayas.
Growing PLAAF
China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force has seen significant modernisation. It today has nearly 250 J-20 fifth-generation aircraft and close to 1,200 fourth generation fighters, most of which are homegrown. They have a very successful aerial missile program. Nearly 50 indigenous large transport aircraft Y-20 have been inducted. These are being converted into AEW&C and FRA variants. Their H-20 stealthy bomber is slated to fly by 2025. China has a very large UAV and drone industry. China already has three aircraft carriers and a few more under construction.
With nearly three times India’s defence budget, it is in a position to fast-track military growth. But their immediate area of threat and interest is on their east coast, where the US and its allies are putting pressure to prevent an invasion of Taiwan. Bulk of China’s military is concentrated in the eastern region. Notwithstanding, China has made significant investments in infrastructure in Tibet and Xinjiang across the LAC. China is fast moving to second position in the global power index. India must take all actions to close the military capability gap and certainly not let it grow.
India’s Exposure
China hasn’t fought a war since the short one with Vietnam in 1979. PLAAF mainly exercises with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and more recently with Russia. Their war and exercise exposure is extremely low.
The Indian military has been operating at the highest battleground on earth, the “Siachen” Glacier. India maintains a very large number of troops in the Himalayas. The Kargil War was at Himalayan heights, and the Indian military has had huge exposure and lessons to learn. The Indian military carries out large scale military exercises with all major military powers, from the US to Australia, Japan to Brazil. Clearly, it is a huge advantage for India.
Lessons from Kargil
The first lesson is to increase the satellite and airborne (fighters and UAV) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability across the LAC. The number of defence satellites has to go up and the latency of ISR pictures is reduced. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) have to be more current.
Operations in Ladakh could include a full spectrum of air operations, namely counter-air strikes against Chinese airfields, destruction of enemy aircraft in the air, and air defence of Indian assets, including landing strips in the region. India has the airfield altitude and numbers advantage. Neutralising even two Chinese airfields would have a much greater impact than if four Indian airfields were to be out of operations.
Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) could be undertaken against Chinese lines of communications, army bridgeheads, troop concentrations, and logistics nodes. The IAF will also have to attack other targets, such as enemy radars. Battlefield strikes would mean taking on adversary troops, bunkers, artillery, and armour engaged in battle with the Indian Army (IA). Fighter aircraft will also use electronic warfare to impede enemy air and ground action. There will be a need for regular Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) missions to plan the next course of action.
Fighter operations in Ladakh and Arunachal have been going up. But fighter squadrons remain at an all-time low, and the strength must quickly go up from the current 31 squadrons to the authorised 42. Meanwhile, the Rafale piloted by much better-trained aircrew will be more than a match for the Chinese J-20 fighters. The Chinese cruise missile carrying H-6 bombers would have to be kept at distance using ground-based and airborne AD assets.
China is likely to use surface-to-surface missiles (SSM). India would also do the same. India’s BrahMos missiles will be very effective in the mountains. The IAF and the Indian Army would have to maintain strong air defences in the area, including the Akash missiles, to counter aerial threats.
Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) have a very important role in the mountains. The IAF’s transport and helicopter fleets will be crucial for inter- and intratheater movements and also for inter-valley transfers. The C-17 can carry the T-90 tank. Similarly, the IL-76 can carry a T-72 tank. The C-130 and An-32 can land at Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) airfield. Many tasks will be done by heavy-lift helicopters. The missile-laden attack helicopters will have a great role in interdiction and battlefield attack roles. The IAF will be an active participant in airborne or air-landed operations of Special Forces. Air power will play a crucial role in the mountains and will do India good in the long term.
Way Ahead India
The Kargil conflict with Pakistan was a reckoning event. It represents a prototype of India’s most likely type of future combat challenge against China. Notwithstanding the eventual victory, there were hits and misses, and hopefully the lessons have been imbibed and amends made to fight a future air war in the mountains with greater finesse and accuracy. But a lot more needs to be done.
Quick political calls must be taken to meet the key requirement of the IAF to acquire modern fighter aircraft, AEW&C and FRA to bridge the gap with China. India needs to increase its inventory of SSMs and AD platforms. Drones are becoming a game-changer. Their numbers and employment must be a priority area. Also, many border airfields still need more hardened shelters and other assets. The IAF needs to train more for mountain warfare and weapon delivery. There is a need for more high-altitude firing ranges. I am sure that IAF will not be forced to fight its next war with a plan ‘B’.
The writer is former Director General, Centre for Air Power Studies. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
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