One year after Hasina ouster, how Yunus' Bangladesh has bridged the gap with Pakistan

One this day last year, a mass uprising gripped Bangladesh as the long-serving Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was forced to step down and flee to India.

The wave of unrest, which initially stemmed from discontent over government job quota reforms, quickly morphed into a widespread movement challenging Hasina’s leadership of 15 years.

The situation escalated when security forces, allegedly acting on the prime minister’s orders, unleashed violent crackdowns on demonstrators, resulting in approximately 1,400 deaths and thousands of injuries, according to estimates from the United Nations.

The upheaval reached a climax on August 5, when General Waker-Uz-Zaman of the Bangladesh Army addressed the nation at noon.

At the same time, furious citizens had already taken over major state symbols — the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ganabhaban residence, and the national parliament complex. Police stations across the country came under attack, and the government’s hold on power collapsed.

In the vacuum that followed, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus assumed charge as the interim head of government. He promised reforms, a new electoral process, and a return to stability.

Although political turmoil is not alien to Bangladesh — a country familiar with military coups and street agitations since gaining independence in 1971 — this was the first instance of a sitting prime minister fleeing the country under such dramatic circumstances.

How Yunus’ diplomacy realigned Bangladesh

Muhammad Yunus’s arrival marked a distinct departure from the geopolitical orientation that had defined the Hasina years.

One of the most noticeable changes has been the recalibration of Bangladesh’s foreign relations, especially its outreach toward Pakistan — a nation with which ties had remained frosty since the 1971 Liberation War.

Yunus has engaged in two high-profile meetings with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif — once on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York last year and later during the D-8 summit in Cairo. These meetings have contributed to a thaw in relations and initiated a series of cooperative efforts between the two nations.

In contrast, Yunus’s engagement with India — traditionally Bangladesh’s closest strategic partner — has been far less frequent. He met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi only in April at a regional summit in Bangkok, fuelling perceptions in New Delhi that the new interim leadership was repositioning its alliances.

Hasina’s administration had fostered particularly close economic, defence and infrastructural ties with India, which are now seemingly being diluted.

Yunus has voiced criticisms of India’s narrow focus on cultivating ties primarily through Hasina.

His administration has taken a less vocal stance on issues like the safety of Bangladesh’s Hindu minority — a recurring concern for New Delhi — and opened the door to increased Chinese investments, moves that have unsettled Indian policymakers.

How Yunus’ Bangladesh has moved closer to Pakistan

Resumption of trade with Pakistan

Bangladesh resumed direct trade with Pakistan — an act not seen since the two nations severed formal economic ties following Bangladesh’s secession in 1971.

The reinstatement of bilateral trade led to a measurable boost: trade between August and December 2024 reportedly rose by 27 per cent compared to the same period the previous year.

This turnaround was facilitated by several strategic decisions. In September 2024, Bangladesh removed its longstanding policy of conducting full physical inspections on all Pakistani imports, a move that significantly cut shipping times and reduced operational costs for businesses.

By November, for the first time in 53 years, two Pakistani cargo ships docked at Chittagong Port with shipments of sugar and potatoes.

The following month, Bangladeshi authorities granted Pakistani vessels access to Mongla Port as well.

Efforts to foster private-sector collaboration also gained momentum. On January 13, both governments signed a memorandum of understanding to create a joint business council aimed at deepening commercial ties and coordinating trade promotion activities.

However, this realignment came at a cost to India-Bangladesh trade, which reportedly fell by approximately 9.5 per cent in the latter half of 2024.

Easing borders with Pakistan

Bangladesh’s interim government reversed Hasina-era restrictions on visa processing for Pakistani nationals, streamlining access that had previously required security clearances from multiple state agencies.

In return, Pakistan waived visa fees and abolished the need for Bangladeshi travellers to undergo security vetting.

Direct air travel, suspended since 2018, is expected to resume shortly, further enhancing people-to-people contact.

Additionally, Pakistan extended an offer of 300 fully-funded scholarships for Bangladeshi students to pursue higher education in its universities. This academic initiative, announced in December last year, aims to foster long-term cultural ties and cooperation in science and technology.

Track II diplomacy also resumed, with Pakistani academics participating in the “Bay of Bengal Conversation” seminar in Dhaka in November.

The cultural sphere was activated through a Pakistani artist’s visit to Bangladesh and the Bangladeshi cricket team’s tour of Pakistan, both of which were praised as symbolic gestures of renewed friendship.

Military engagement with Pakistan

In what is arguably the most strategic component of this evolving relationship, defence ties between Bangladesh and Pakistan have grown stronger in the past year.

A major breakthrough occurred in January when a high-level delegation from Dhaka, led by Lt Gen SM Kamrul-Hassan, visited Pakistan for meetings with top military officials including Army Chief Field Marshal Gen Asim Munir.

Discussions covered a wide range of topics, from regional security cooperation to joint training exercises and potential arms transfers.

Pakistan described the talks as indicative of a “brotherly” relationship, and the tone of engagement suggested a mutual intent to reshape the defence dynamic of South Asia.

The Bangladesh Navy’s participation in “Aman 2025,” a multinational naval exercise hosted by Pakistan off the Karachi coast in February, was a particularly notable event.

The deployment of BNS Samudra Joy marked the first time in over a decade that a major Bangladeshi warship had docked in Pakistan.

Reports also indicate that Bangladesh placed orders between September and December 2024 for 40,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, 2,000 rounds of tank ammunition, and 40 tonnes of RDX — tripling its imports from the previous year.

These purchases align with Bangladesh’s broader military modernisation agenda, dubbed “Forces Goal 2030,” and represent a significant shift in its procurement sources.

There is also strong interest from Dhaka in acquiring JF-17 Thunder fighter jets — co-developed by Pakistan and China — to further support its air force modernisation.

Training programmes are also underway and it was reported that from February, a Pakistani Major General would oversee instruction at Bangladesh’s Momenshahi Cantonment.

High-level visits with Pakistan

Between late January and early February, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief Lt Gen Asim Malik made an unprecedented visit to Rangpur, Bangladesh.

The visit drew attention in India, particularly due to its proximity to India’s northeastern states, heightening regional security sensitivities.

Admiral Mohammad Nazmul Hassan, Bangladesh’s chief of naval staff, met with Pakistan’s army commander, Syed Asim Munir Ahmed Shah.

In June, three senior officers of the Pakistan Army visited Bangladesh and proceeded to the headquarters of the 10th Infantry Division in Ramu, located near the Myanmar border.

These visits suggested possible coordination on border security issues, including those relating to the Rohingya refugee crisis.

On July 23, Pakistan’s Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi met Bangladesh’s Home Adviser, Lt Gen (Retd) Md Jahangir Alam Chowdhury, in Dhaka.

Naqvi proposed memorandums of understanding to enhance police cooperation, including officer exchanges between academies.

With Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar set to visit Dhaka on August 23 this year, relations between the two countries appear set for further consolidation.

Dar’s upcoming talks with Bangladeshi Foreign Advisor Touhid Hossain are expected to be about new agreements across sectors.

One lingering divide between Bangladesh-Pakistan: 1971

Despite the recent warmth, the shadow of the 1971 Liberation War continues to affect Bangladesh-Pakistan relations.

In October 2024, Bangladesh’s Foreign Adviser Md. Touhid Hossain publicly stated that reconciliation would be easier if Pakistan issued an apology for wartime atrocities.

During the December D-8 summit in Cairo, Yunus reiterated these demands to Sharif, asking for the resolution of lingering historical issues. Sharif, in response, said that “main issues had been resolved” under the 1972 Shimla Agreement, but expressed openness to reviewing remaining concerns.

On April 17, Bangladesh formally repeated its demand for a public apology and raised additional issues — including the repatriation of more than 300,000 stranded Pakistanis, repayment of a $4.5 billion debt it claims Pakistan owes, equitable distribution of the former country’s assets, and the transfer of cyclone relief aid from 1970.

During a meeting between Foreign secretaries Md. Jashim Uddin and Amna Baloch at the Padma State Guest House, Dhaka once again flagged these “historically unresolved issues.”

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With inputs from agencies