 "Xi Jinping's visits to Tajikistan, Kazakhstan: What's behind China's overtures to Central Asian countries?")
Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Astana, Kazakhstan on Tuesday (July 2). He is there, among other things, participate in the 24th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Then, he is expected to jet off to Tajikistan.
This tour, including a meeting with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and the visit to Tajikistan at the invitation of President Emomali Rahmon, must be seen as part of a broader strategy by Beijing to expand its influence in Central Asia.
There is a power vacuum in Central Asia, and China, which has deep interests in the region, has lunged at the opportunity to fill the void. It has already adapted its approach towards the region to fulfil that goal. We explain all of this in detail.
Power vacuum in Central Asia
Since 2021, the Central Asian Republics have faced growing internal and external challenges. Border clashes and internal unrest have exacerbated regional instability. With Russia’s military and political focus diverted to Ukraine, its historical role as the security guarantor in Central Asia has weakened, creating a vacuum that China is eager to fill. The reduced influence of the United States in the region, especially after its troops exited Afghanistan, is another strategic opportunity for Beijing to enhance its role in the region.
China’s increased engagement in Central Asia is a calculated move to secure its interests amid these changing dynamics. Beijing aims to leverage its economic power and political influence to assert a stronger presence, capitalizing on the region’s strategic importance and its rich natural resources.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsChina’s interest in Central Asian Republics
Central Asia holds great strategic and economic importance for Beijing. The region has vast reserves of energy resources, including natural gas and oil, which are crucial for China’s energy security. In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, China extended significant loans to energy-rich Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, cementing its role as a key economic partne, according to ORF. Turkmenistan received US$3 billion, while Kazakhstan secured US$10 billion under a “loan for oil” agreement, facilitating China’s access to their natural gas reserves.
Infrastructure projects such as the China-Central Asia gas pipeline and the China-Kazakhstan crude oil pipeline only go to show China’s focus on securing energy supplies from the region.
Central Asian countries also serve as a vital transit route for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s flagship infrastructure project aimed at enhancing connectivity and trade between China and Europe.
Then there is the point of trade. According to a 2023 Euronet report, China was the largest trading partner for Central Asia. In the first nine months of 2023, the country accounted for 21.3 percent of Kazakhstan’s total foreign trade, valued at $21.7 billion. Similarly, China held a 21.3 percent trade turnover share with Uzbekistan, worth $12.23 billion during the first 11 months of 2023. Clearly, the region is a key market for China.
The proximity of several Central Asian countries to China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, where Chinese authorities have been cracking down on the Uyghur ethnic minority, adds another layer to Beijing’s interest in the region. Central Asia’s cooperation is crucial for China to maintain stability in Xinjiang and secure its hydrocarbon resources. In return for Chinese loans and investments, the Central Asian Republics have taken measures to suppress Uyghur organizations and enhance surveillance of the Uyghur population within their borders.
China’s ambitions extend to the defence sector, where it seeks to capture the CARs’ defence equipment market. From providing financial aid for military upgrades to supplying arms and military equipment, China has substantially increased its defence cooperation with Central Asian countries. For example, the Kyrgyz Republic received $16 million in 2014 and $14.5 million in 2017 for weapon upgrades and military personnel accommodation. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have also benefited from Chinese military aid and arms sales, reflecting China’s strategic interest in bolstering its influence in the region’s security dynamics.
China’s efforts to fill the power vacuum
China has been recalibrating its approach to Central Asia to fill the power vacuum left by other global powers. Traditionally, China’s Central Asia diplomacy was conducted through bilateral meetings and under the auspices of the SCO. However, last year, the world witnessed a shift: China hosted the first-ever China-Central Asia Summit in Xian, a historic city and the eastern starting point of the ancient Silk Road.
The Xian summit allowed China to emphasise its historical ties with Central Asia and its commitment to regional development. President Xi Jinping pledged billions in development assistance, focusing on poverty reduction, food security, and green development. He also called for expanded regional connectivity and greater energy cooperation, paintaing China as a benevolent, desirable economic partner.
The summit positioned China to play a more direct and prominent role in Central Asia, moving beyond its traditional bilateral engagements. By hosting such high-level summits, China aims to institutionalize its relationships with Central Asian countries and solidify its influence in the region.
China’s economic engagement with Central Asia has also intensified. According to a 2023 report by Eurasianet, China has surpassed Russia to become the largest trading partner of Central Asia. This shift reflects China’s growing economic clout and its ability to leverage trade and investment to deepen its influence in the region.
Mutual interests at play
While China’s ambitions in Central Asia are clear, the Central Asian countries themselves have strategic interests in fostering strong ties with Beijing. As landlocked nations reliant on Russia, China, or the sanctioned countries of Iran and Afghanistan for trade routes, Central Asian states seek to balance their relationships to maximize connectivity without becoming overly dependent on any single power.
Central Asian countries aim to maintain “multi-vector” foreign policies that keep good relations with Russia, China, the West, and other neighboring countries. This approach allows them to navigate the complex geopolitical landscape and avoid choosing sides in the great power competition.
For Central Asian states, engagement with China offers economic opportunities and development assistance. However, they also seek to avoid over-reliance on Beijing and strive to balance their foreign relations to preserve their sovereignty and strategic autonomy.
With inputs from agencies
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