What is the 'mistake of Oslo' that Benjamin Netanyahu brought up?

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Tuesday said Israel would not ‘repeat the mistake of Oslo’ – a dig at the Oslo Accords which were signed 30 years ago. Netanyahu made the remarks after US president Joe Biden warned that Israel’s “indiscriminate bombing” of Gaza was causing it to lose international support. “Yes, there is a disagreement when it comes to ‘the day after Hamas,’ and I hope we will come to an agreement here too,” Netanyahu said. “I want to clarify my position: I will not allow Israel to repeat the mistake of Oslo.” But what are the Oslo Accords? Why are they regarded as a failure? Let’s take a closer look: What are the Oslo Accords? Negotiated secretly in Norway, the Oslo Accords were meant to pave the way to a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians. As per The Economist, this was done secretly as the Israeli government viewed the Palestine Liberation Organisation as a terror outfit. It was the Norwegians who prevailed upon Israel’s then deputy foreign minister Yossi Beilin to open talks with the PLO. The Palestinians were led by PLO chief Yasser Arafat confidant Ahmed Qureia. The Israelis, meanwhile were first represented by  Yair Hirschfeld, an Israeli academic. Then, Uri Savir, the director-general of the foreign ministry, took over. While the most difficult issues such as what to do about Jerusalem could not be resolved, the two sides agreed to put those aside – for now.

As per Al Jazeera, the first accords known as Oslo I was signed on 13 September, 1993.

The deal was sealed by a handshake between then Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO chief Yasser Arafat on the South Lawn of the White House. This, as the then US president Bill Clinton looked on and acted as master of ceremonies. [caption id=“attachment_13499942” align=“alignnone” width=“640”] The deal was sealed by a handshake between then Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO chief Yasser Arafat on the South Lawn of the White House with then US president Bill Clinton looking on. Image courtesy: US State Department[/caption] Israel and the PLO in the deal agreed “it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict,” live in peaceful co-existence and reach a “just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement.” The accords resulted in Israel recognising the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the PLO in turn relinquishing the use of terror as a tactic and acknowledging Israel’s right to exist and live in peace, as per the US state department website. The accords also agreed to the setting up of a new outfit – the Palestinian Authority (PA). As per Foreign Policy, one of its tenets was that the Palestinian Authority would be granted territory in return for assuming security responsibilities in the West Bank and Gaza strip over a five-year period. Then, talks on the more difficult issues would commence. As per The Economist, Israel and the PLO agreed to begin talks on a final deal by May 1996 and finish them by May 1999. The deal was followed by two more agreements – in 1994 the Paris protocol spelled out economic relations between the two parties and  the 1995 Taba agreement defined security arrangements. “The Oslo agreement was possible because of a trade-off,” Dr Ghassan Khatib, a former member of the Palestinian delegation to the Oslo meetings in Washington, told The Media Line. “The Palestinian side gave up the insistence that Israel stop the expansion of the settlements, in return for Israel giving a concession recognising the Palestinian Liberation Authority (PLO): being willing to negotiate directly with PLO and allow the PLO to be the signatory of future agreement and the leadership of the Palestinian Authority.” Why did it fail? While it initially produced some positive outcomes it also resulted in broken promises, bouts of violence and multiple failed attempts to negotiate a final peace deal. A major turning point was the assassination of Rabin by a religious fanatic against the accords and a string of terrorist attacks by Hamas. Meanwhile, opponents of Rabin and the accords like Netanyahu took power. As per Al Jazeera, Israel continued to occupy Palestinian land and refused to leave the West Bank, while a seconf intifada from 2000 to 2005 only dug both sides in deeper. But critics say the accords had a fundamental flaw – the guiding principle that “nothing is agreed on until everything is agreed on.” That was meant to encourage negotiators to be fearless. Instead, it linked the two most difficult issues — Jerusalem holy sites and Palestinian refugees — to those where progress was made. [caption id=“attachment_13498722” align=“alignnone” width=“640”] Thirty years later with the war raging in Gaza, peace seems more distant than ever. AP[/caption] “You can agree on borders … and security, but if you don’t agree on the right of return (of refugees) or who owns the Temple Mount (holy site), then everything else is held hostage to it,” said Israeli analyst Yossi Alpher. The Foreign Policy piece argued that the deal would have held up if both sides had clearly spelled out the final outcome and taken steps to prepare for it.

“With no clear end goal to work toward, the process floundered. By 1999, not a single Oslo deadline had been met,” the piece argued.

A piece in The Economist quoted former Israeli legal advisor Joel Singer as pointing out that the creation of a  Palestinian police force to keep the peace in areas in the West Bank did not work. Qureia, meanwhile, pointed to the fact that the accord failed to dissuade Israel from building its settlements. Mustafa Barghouti, a former member of the Palestinian official delegation, agreed. He told The Media Line, “The first flaw was no insistence on complete and total freeze of settlements activities. That meant that they allowed the continuation of the same process that kills the very potential of peace and a two-state solution.” “The second failure was an unequal agreement,” Barghouti continued. “The Palestinian side recognized Israel and its right to existence. But Israel didn’t recognize a Palestinian state. All they did is to recognise the PLO as a representative of the Palestinians.” “Most importantly, the agreement was an interim one about interim arrangements without identifying the end goal—which should have been a Palestinian state,” Barghouti said. Qureia on the accords’ 20th anniversary said that if he knew then what he knows now he wouldn’t have agreed to the terms. “With such kinds of blocs of settlements? No. With the closure of Jerusalem? No. Not at all,” Qureia said in an interview at his office in the Jerusalem suburb of Abu Dis. Qureia’s Israeli counterpart in those secret talks, former Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin, said it was a mistake to allow for a five-year interim period of Palestinian autonomy. This, he said, gave veto powers to hard-liners — Hamas on the Palestinian side, settlers and right-wing politicians on the Israeli side. “It was a foolish idea. We had to get immediately to a permanent agreement, as we did with Egypt, as we did with Jordan, rather than to open up the process for the oppositions on both sides,” Beilin said. The negotiators should have seized a “moment of grace” in 1993, he said. But Beilin noted that Israel’s then-prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, feared failure if he moved too quickly. “What undermined the foundation on which the peace process was built was the Likud Party, which came to power to abolish in its own way the principle of peace with the Palestinians. Oslo failed because the Israeli side did not want it to succeed,” former Palestinian minister Nabil Amer told The Media Line. Accords split opinion Meanwhile, the accords themselves split opinion today. Jerusalem Post in October quoted an Israeli Voice Index poll from Israel Democracy Institute as saying that just 39 per cent of Israelis think signing them was a bad idea. Meanwhile, 36 per cent remain supportive of the accords. The support among the Arab populace is higher with 39 per cent believing it was right to sign the accords, while 28 per cent believe it was the wrong decision. “Young Israelis grew up during a bloody intifada; young Palestinians came of age watching settlers gobble up the land meant for their future state. It is no surprise they have both lost faith,” the Economist Piece noted.

Thirty years later with the war raging in Gaza, peace seems more distant than ever.

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Meanwhile, the US is subtly pressuring Israel. Speaking at a forum hosted by The Wall Street Journal before either leader’s comments, Sullivan reiterated the Biden administration’s position that it does not want to see Israel reoccupy Gaza or further shrink its already small territory. The US has repeatedly called for a return of the internationally recognised Palestinian Authority and the resumption of peace talks aimed at establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Sullivan said he would also speak to Netanyahu about his recent comments that Israel Defense Forces would maintain open-ended security control of Gaza after the war ends. “I will have the opportunity to talk to Prime Minister Netanyahu about what exactly he has in mind with that comment, because that can be interpreted in a number of different ways,” Sullivan said. “But the US position on this is clear.” With inputs from agencies