 "Putin in Mongolia amid ICC arrest warrant: Is the country defying international law?")
Vladimir Putin’s arrival in Mongolia has raised concerns about Ulaanbaatar’s obligations under international law. As the Russian president set foot on Mongolian soil on September 2, it marked the first time he visited a country that was obligated to detain him as a member state of the International Criminal Court (ICC) under an active arrest warrant for war crimes connected with the current ongoing war in Ukraine.
The visit places Mongolia in a precarious position, with its role as a member of the ICC being questioned and its foreign policy balancing act under intense scrutiny.
What is Mongolia’s obligation under ICC?
The ICC, established under the Rome Statute in 2002, mandates its 124 member states, including Mongolia, to arrest and hand over individuals who have been indicted by the court.
In March 2023, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin, accusing him of war crimes related to the illegal deportation and transfer of children from occupied territories in Ukraine to Russia. This unprecedented warrant marks the first time the ICC has targeted a sitting leader of one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
The implications of this warrant are severe. By welcoming Putin, Mongolia finds itself at the centre of a legal and diplomatic storm. The ICC’s rules are clear: member states are required to act upon arrest warrants.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsIn 2015, South Africa, another ICC member, faced widespread criticism when it failed to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who was wanted for crimes against humanity, including genocide in Darfur, during his visit to Johannesburg.
The ICC later ruled that South Africa had failed to comply with its obligations under the Rome Statute. However, the court did not refer South Africa to the United Nations Security Council for further action.
Mongolia now faces a similar situation.
What have stakeholders said?
Ukrainian officials have been vocal in their demands, urging Mongolia to comply with its commitments under the Rome Statute. Heorhiy Tykhyi, spokesperson for Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry, described Mongolia’s failure to arrest Putin as “a heavy blow to the International Criminal Court and the system of criminal law.”
Mongolia allowed the indicted criminal to escape justice, thereby sharing responsibility for his war crimes. We will work with partners to ensure that this has consequences for Ulaanbaatar.
— Heorhii Tykhyi (@SpoxUkraineMFA) September 2, 2024
Amnesty International Mongolia’s executive director, Altantuya Batdorj, added, “To shelter a fugitive from international justice would not only amount to obstruction of justice. If Mongolia provides even a temporary safe haven for President Putin, it will effectively become an accomplice in ensuring impunity for some of the most serious crimes under international law.”
Mongolia’s international legal obligations are clear as a member state of the International Criminal Court.
— Amnesty International Mongolia (@AmnestyMongolia) September 3, 2024
They must arrest President Putin and hand him over to the ICC to face charges of war crimes.https://t.co/w2OUdtifCV
Despite these calls for action, there has been no indication that Mongolia plans to detain Putin. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov had earlier brushed off concerns, stating, “We have a great dialogue with Mongolia, and all aspects of the visit have been discussed in advance.”
Why is Putin visiting Mongolia?
Putin’s visit to Mongolia, his first since 2019, was officially tied to the commemoration of the 85th anniversary of the Battle of Khalkhin Gol, where joint Soviet-Mongolian forces defeated Japanese troops during World War II. He is scheduled to meet with Mongolian leader Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh on Tuesday.
This historical marker also coincides with the 75th anniversary of the founding of Mongolia’s national railway operator, a joint venture with Russia. However, beyond these historical commemorations, the visit holds significant geopolitical implications.
The Kremlin also said on Monday that Russia had been in talks for years about building the pipeline to carry 50 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas a year from its Yamal region to China via Mongolia.
The project, Power of Siberia 2, is part of Russia’s strategy to compensate for the loss of most of its gas sales in Europe since the start of the Ukraine war. It is the planned successor to an existing pipeline of the same name which already supplies Russian gas to China and is due to reach its planned capacity of 38 bcm per year in 2025.
Mongolia and Russia have maintained close ties since the Soviet era, and this relationship remains crucial to Mongolia’s strategic interests. In recent years, the two countries have deepened their cooperation through a comprehensive strategic partnership, which was highlighted during the visit.
Mongolia’s dependence on Russia is significant. The country relies on Russia for nearly all of its gasoline and diesel supplies, as well as a substantial portion of its electricity. Moreover, Russia retains a 50 per cent ownership in several key infrastructure projects in Mongolia, including the national railway system, which is vital for trade between China, Russia, and Europe.
This dependency on Russia’s energy and infrastructure support places Mongolia in a vulnerable position, limiting its ability to act against Moscow’s interests.
How is Mongolia dependent on its neighbours?
Mongolia’s foreign policy has long been characterised by a delicate balancing act between its powerful neighbours, Russia and China, and its desire to engage with Western countries through its “Third Neighbour” policy.
This policy, which seeks to strengthen ties with countries outside the region, has allowed Mongolia to assert a degree of independence in its foreign relations and to present itself as a neutral, diplomatic meeting ground.
Mongolia’s “Third Neighbour” policy has seen success in recent years. The country has hosted high-profile international events, such as the annual Ulaanbaatar Dialogue, which brings together regional and global powers to discuss issues ranging from climate change to security.
In 2024 alone, Mongolia has welcomed leaders and foreign ministers from the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and other countries. This diplomatic engagement has earned Mongolia goodwill and respect on the global stage.
However, the visit of a leader under an ICC arrest warrant threatens to undermine this carefully cultivated image. By choosing to host Putin despite the ICC warrant, Mongolia risks alienating its Western partners and weakening its standing within international institutions.
The United States and European Union have both reminded Mongolia of its obligations under the ICC, and Ukraine has stated that it will work with its allies to ensure Mongolia faces consequences for its inaction.
The geopolitical challenges Mongolia faces are further complicated by the growing alignment between Russia and China. The two countries have strengthened their partnership in recent years, culminating in a “no limits” declaration by Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping in February 2022, just days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Mongolia’s geographic position, landlocked between Russia and China, exacerbates its vulnerability. The country is heavily dependent on China for trade, with 90 per cent of its exports, primarily coal and copper, destined for Chinese markets.
Additionally, Mongolia relies on China for the majority of its non-energy imports, including food and consumer goods. This economic interdependence with both Russia and China limits Mongolia’s ability to take actions that could be perceived as hostile by either neighbour.
What now?
Putin’s visit to Mongolia has placed the country in a precarious position, forcing it to navigate the complex intersection of international law, geopolitics, and its own national interests. As an ICC member state, Mongolia is bound by its obligations under the Rome Statute, yet its dependence on Russia for energy and infrastructure, as well as its strategic position between Russia and China, complicates its ability to act on these obligations.
The ICC’s inability to compel member states to act on its warrants, particularly against powerful leaders, highlights the limitations of the court’s authority.
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