Mossad, Aman, Shin Bet: How Israel’s intelligence agencies failed to prevent Hamas attack

While the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians rages on, questions are being asked about the failures of Jerusalem’s intelligence agencies. “This is a major failure,” said Yaakov Amidror, a former national security adviser to prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “This operation actually proves that the (intelligence) abilities in Gaza were no good.” But what do we know about Israel’s famed intelligence agencies? And why did they fail? Let’s take a closer look: Aman Israel has three major agencies – Aman, Mossad and Shin Bet (Shabak). Aman is military intelligence, Mossad is its foreign spy agency and Shin Bet handles internal security. As per Jewish Virtual Library website, Aman is known as the Military Intelligence Directorate. It is headed by intelligence chief Aharon Haliva. Among the oldest of the Israel Defense Forces departments, it was founded immediately after Israel’s formation. As its name suggests, its job is to provide intelligence that will allow the government to keep the country safe. It puts together the daily reports used to brief the prime minister and the cabinet, evaluates the likelihood of war, intercepts communications and manages cross-border tasks.

Aman itself comprises three units – 8200, 9900 and 504.

The 8,200 unit is tasked with gathering signal intelligence (SIGINT) and decrypting code. Experts say it is one of the world’s premier intelligence outfits. [caption id=“attachment_13224972” align=“alignnone” width=“640”] Representational image. Image courtesy: IDF.il[/caption] Peter Roberts, senior research fellow at Britain’s Royal United Services Institute, told the website, “Unit 8200 is probably the foremost technical intelligence agency in the world and stands on a par with the NSA in everything except scale.” “They are highly focused on what they look at — certainly more focused than the NSA – and they conduct their operations with a degree of tenacity and passion that you don’t experience elsewhere.” Mossad The Mossad, which handles Israel’s spycraft around the world, is arguably its most famous intelligence agency. Its current chief is David ‘Dadi’ Barnea – who succeeded Yossi Cohen in June 2021. Said to be the second largest intelligence agency in the world – after the CIA, it is the Israeli version of America’s foreign intelligence agencies or India’s equivalent of its Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). [caption id=“attachment_13224982” align=“alignnone” width=“640”] The Mossad logo. Wikimedia Commons[/caption] The Mossad was founded in December 1949 as the Institute for Co-ordination, as per Brittanica. It replaced the intelligence arm of Jewish military force in Palestine known as the Haganah. The Mossad is known all over the world for its daring operations including nabbing the former Nazi Adolf Eichmann in Argentina in 1960 as well conducting Operation Wrath of God –  tracking down and killing those involved in the murder of the Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich games.

As per Spyscape, the Mossad has a mammoth budget of $3 billion and has 7,000 employees.

It has agents all around the world – arguably the most famous of which was Eli Cohen, who infiltrated the loftiest ranks of Syria’s government by pretending to be a businessman. Cohen was found and executed in 1965. The appointment of Mossad’s spy chief is a private affair privy only to some members of the prime minister’s office and Civil Service Advisory Committee. Its internal workings are extremely murky. As per NDTV, the Mossad comprises of several departments including

• The Political Action and Liaison Department – liaisons with other security services
• The Special Operations Division – responsible for assassinations and sabotage
• The Lohamah Psichologit Department (LAP) which works on psychological warfare, propaganda, and deception
• The Research Department – which provides intelligence updates.
• The Technology Department – works on high-tech equipment to support Mossad.

Shin Bet As per the Jewish Defence Library website, Shin Bet handle Israel’s internal intelligence affairs.

Also known as Shabak, its motto is “Defends and Shall Not Be Seen.”

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It protects Israel’s prime minister, other top leaders, security for the national airline and protects sensitive locations both domestic and abroad. As per Britannica, its reputation took a hit in the 1980s after it came to light that its agents beat to death two Palestinians held in connection to a hijacked bus. It also drew criticism for allegedly torturing Palestinian detainees and assassinating alleged Palestinian militants. [caption id=“attachment_13224992” align=“alignnone” width=“640”] The Shin Bet logo. Wikimedia Commons[/caption] Shin Bet also took flak for the 1995 assassination of then prime minister Yitzhak Rabin – following which its chief resigned. It is thought to be the equivalent of America’s Federal Bureau of Investigation. What do experts say? That of all the nations in West Asia, Israel has perhaps the best intelligence agencies. As per BBC, Aman, Mossad and Shin Bet are arguably the best-funded and also most wide-ranging when it comes to having assets within Palestinian groups, in Lebanon, Syria and around the world. Which is no one is sure why this attack, a spectacular public failure, occurred.

Israeli officials told BBC a major inquiry has already begun and questions ‘will be asked for years’.

A report in Jerusalem Post stated, “Gaza was on the back burner in terms of a sense of security threats because Iran-backed proxies have been increasing threats elsewhere” and gave details of the events unfolded over the last three-four years in the region which, it said, led to “Hamas in Gaza appeared isolated, unable to even get more funds from the usual sources, such as Qatar.” “With Israeli normalisation agreements growing in the region, Hamas seemed to present an outdated ideology living in the past. This seems to have lulled people into a false sense of security,” it pointed out. Jonathan Conricus, ex-spokesman for the Israel Defense Forces, told CNN, “The entire system failed. It’s not just one component. It’s the entire defence architecture that evidently failed to provide the necessary defense for Israeli civilians.” “This is a Pearl Harbor-type of moment for Israel, where there was reality up until today, and then there will be reality after today.” Chuck Freilich, the country’s former deputy national security adviser, making reference to the fact that the attack came a day after the 50th anniversary of the 1973 Yom Kippur war told Politico, “That was a catastrophic failure in regards to Egypt and Syria. This is a catastrophic failure in regards to Gaza.” “It’s a failure in terms of intelligence, operationally,” Freilich added. “It’s clear we were caught totally unprepared by this. The divisional headquarters responsible for Gaza was occupied, they’re in disarray, and so the whole response has been delayed.” Raphael Marcus, a visiting research fellow at King’s College London’s Department of War Studies, told Wired, “There’s no doubt that the scale and scope of this Hamas attack indicate just a colossal intelligence failure on behalf of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] and in Shin Bet, the internal security agency..” “They have such technical prowess and also a legacy of excellent human source capability.” “This was an intelligence failure; it could not be otherwise," said Jonathan Panikoff, the US government’s former deputy national intelligence officer on the Middle East, who is now at the Atlantic Council think tank. “It was a security failure, undermining what was thought to be an aggressive and successful layered approach toward Gaza by Israel,” he said. [caption id=“attachment_13223082” align=“alignnone” width=“640”] A Palestinian celebrates by a burning Israeli civilian car taken from Kfra Azza kibbutz in Beit Lahiya, Gaza Strip. AP[/caption] “They’ve been planning this for a long time,” said former Israeli National Security Advisor Eyal Hulata. “Obviously this is a very coordinated attack, and unfortunately they were able to surprise us tactically and cause devastating damage.”

Experts say, this also shows the dangers of over-surveillance.

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“Intelligence in an environment like Israel isn’t finding a needle in a haystack—it’s finding the needle that will hurt you in a pile of needles,” ex-US National Security Agency hacker Jake Williams said to Wired. “Given the number of Hamas members involved in the invasion, it’s not plausible to me that Israel missed every human intelligence reflection of the planning. But I feel confident that there are always Hamas operatives talking about credible plans to attack the IDF. So Israel can’t respond with force to every threat, even every credible one. They’d be at a heightened state of alert or actively engaged all the time, and that’s probably actually worse for security.” The Israelis, meanwhile, are suggesting that corrective steps will be taken down the line. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hecht, the international spokesperson for the Israeli Defense Forces, told CNN, “We were surprised this morning. About failures, I prefer not to talk at this point right now. We’re in war. We’re fighting. I’m sure this will be a big question once this event is over.” “I assume the intelligence question will be talked about down the road and we’ll learn what happened there,” he added. The newspapers, meanwhile, have savaged Israel’s government and its intelligence agencies. “Even as Israel’s political chiefs began to convene in emergency consultations, with the full extent of the infiltration and its consequences still unfolding, Hebrew media began quoting unnamed officials castigating the political and military echelons for the fact that Israel, preoccupied with internal argument, had again been taken by surprise,” said a report in Times of Israel. “The IDF’s assumption, in recent years, was that Hamas was deterred from carrying out major attacks in Israel - fearing the potency of Israel’s response, and wary of plunging Gaza into renewed devastation,” it said, pointing: “All too evidently, that assumption was unfounded.” Eli Maron, the former head of the Israeli Navy told a news channel anchor, “All of Israel is asking itself: Where is the IDF, where is the police, where is the security? It’s a colossal failure; the hierarchies have simply failed, with vast consequences.” The Times of Israel also quoted Amos Yadlin, a former IDF intelligence chief, as saying, (the attack) invoked echoes of the Yom Kippur War - another attack marked by “intelligence failure,” with the enemy initiating conflict. “It cannot be understated or put in less severe terms: The IDF, the strongest military in the Middle East and one of the most respected worldwide was caught completely by surprise in the Hamas attack on Israel on Saturday,” screamed YNetNews, a leading portal. ‘Back to stone age’ Amidror declined to offer an explanation for the failure, saying lessons must be learned when the dust settles. Some say it is too early to pin the blame solely on an intelligence fault. They point to a wave of low-level violence in the West Bank that shifted some military resources there and the political chaos roiling Israel over steps by Netanyahu’s far-right government to overhaul the judiciary. The controversial plan has threatened the cohesion of the country’s powerful military. But the apparent lack of prior knowledge of Hamas’ plot will likely be seen as a prime culprit in the chain of events that led to the deadliest attack against Israelis in decades. [caption id=“attachment_13224562” align=“alignnone” width=“640”] A Palestinian sits on the rubble of a building destroyed in Israeli strikes, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip. Hamas’ actions on Saturday caused Israel to retaliate, leading to the deaths of over 1,100 people. Reuters[/caption] Israel withdrew troops and settlers from the Gaza Strip in 2005, stripping it of a close handle on the happenings in the territory. But even after Hamas overran Gaza in 2007, Israel appeared to maintain its edge, using technological and human intelligence. It claimed to know the precise locations of Hamas leadership and appeared to prove it through the assassinations of militant leaders in surgical strikes, sometimes while they slept in their bedrooms. Israel has known where to strike underground tunnels used by Hamas to ferry around fighters and arms, destroying miles (kilometers) of the concealed passageways. Despite those abilities, Hamas was able to keep its plan under wraps. The ferocious attack, which likely took months of planning and meticulous training and involved coordination among multiple militant groups, appeared to have gone under Israel’s intelligence radar. Amir Avivi, a retired Israeli general, said that without a foothold inside Gaza, Israel’s security services have come to rely increasingly on technological means to gain intelligence. He said militants in Gaza have found ways to evade that technological intelligence gathering, giving Israel an incomplete picture of their intentions. “The other side learned to deal with our technological dominance and they stopped using technology that could expose it,” said Avivi, who served as a conduit for intelligence materials under a former military chief of staff. Avivi is president and founder of Israel Defense and Security Forum, a hawkish group of former military commanders.

“They’ve gone back to the Stone Age,” he said.

He explained that militants weren’t using phones or computers and were conducting their sensitive business in rooms specially guarded from technological espionage or going underground. But Avivi said the failure extends beyond just intelligence gathering and Israel’s security services failed to put together an accurate picture from the intelligence they were receiving, based on what he said was a misconception surrounding Hamas’ intentions. Israel’s security establishment has in recent years increasingly seen Hamas as an actor interested in governing, seeking to develop Gaza’s economy and improving the standard of living of Gaza’s 2.3 million people. Avivi and others say the truth is that Hamas, which calls for Israel’s destruction, still sees that aim as its priority. Israel in recent years has allowed up to 18,000 Palestinian laborers from Gaza to work in Israel, where they can earn a salary about 10 times higher than in the impoverished coastal enclave. The security establishment saw that carrot as a way to maintain relative calm. “In practice, hundreds if not thousands of Hamas men were preparing for a surprise attack for months, without that having leaked,” wrote Amos Harel, a defense commentator, in the daily Haaretz. “The results are catastrophic.” ‘Underestimated warnings’ Allies who share intelligence with Israel said security agencies were misreading reality. An Egyptian intelligence official said Egypt, which often serves as a mediator between Israel and Hamas, had spoken repeatedly with the Israelis about “something big,” without elaborating. He said Israeli officials were focused on the West Bank and played down the threat from Gaza. Netanyahu’s government is made up of supporters of Jewish West Bank settlers who have demanded a security crackdown in the face of a rising tide of violence there over the last 18 months. “We have warned them an explosion of the situation is coming, and very soon, and it would be big. But they underestimated such warnings,” said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn’t authorized to discuss the content of sensitive intelligence discussions with the media. Israel has also been preoccupied and torn apart by Netanyahu’s judicial overhaul plan. Netanyahu had received repeated warnings by his defense chiefs, as well as several former leaders of the country’s intelligence agencies, that the divisive plan was chipping away at the cohesion of the country’s security services. Martin Indyk, who served as a special envoy for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations during the Obama administration, said internal divisions over the legal changes was an aggravating factor that contributed to the Israelis being caught off guard. “That roiled the IDF in a way that was, I think, we discovered was a huge distraction,” he said. With inputs from agencies