 "Bangladeshi air force training aircraft fly past during the celebration of the country’s 45th Victory Day at the national parade ground in Dhaka, December 16, 2015. Representational Image/Reuters")
An old World War II-era airfield in northern Bangladesh, situated just a few kilometres from the Indian border, is drawing attention amid reports of Chinese involvement in its redevelopment.
According to The Times of India (TOI), The Lalmonirhat airbase — once a crucial Allied hub during the Second World War — has resurfaced following recent reports of site visits by Chinese officials and growing activity around the airfield.
Located around 135 km from India’s strategically vital Siliguri Corridor, the initiative has prompted concern within Indian defence and strategic circles.
The airfield lies within the Rangpur division of Bangladesh and is only 12–20 km from the Indian border. It is also within artillery range of Indian forces and closely monitored by India’s eastern military command.
The increased Chinese presence at such proximity to the narrow corridor linking India’s northeast to the rest of the country is being scrutinised amid heightened regional sensitivities.
What we know about Lalmonirhat airbase
Originally constructed in 1931 by British authorities, the Lalmonirhat airfield played a critical role during World War II. It was used as a forward base by the Allied Forces for operations across Southeast Asia, including Myanmar.
The facility reportedly spanned 1,166 acres, featuring a four-kilometre-long runway and substantial tarmac space. Following the Partition, Pakistan briefly reactivated the airfield for civilian use in 1958. However, the base eventually fell into disuse and remained largely dormant for decades.
The site is currently under the control of the Bangladesh Air Force and is one of nine official air bases in the country. Known as BAF Station Lalmonirhat (ICAO code VGLM), it had been considered the second-largest airport in Asia during its operational years.
In 2019, the Bangladesh government under Sheikh Hasina proposed the establishment of an aviation and aerospace university at the site, which is now operational and functions under the command of the Bangladesh Air Force.
More recently, the interim government led by Mohammed Yunu s has advanced a broader initiative to revive six British-era airports, including Lalmonirhat, as part of an economic development push.
Other airports named in this plan include Thakurgaon, Ishwardi, Shamshernagar, Comilla, and Bogra, reported TOI.
Why this matters
The proximity of the Lalmonirhat airbase to India’s Siliguri Corridor — also referred to as the “Chicken’s Neck” — is at the heart of New Delhi’s growing concerns.
The corridor, which lies in northern West Bengal, is just 22 kilometres wide at its narrowest point and connects India’s eight northeastern states to the rest of the mainland. It serves as a critical passage for both civilian and military movement.
Any threat to the corridor could have a destabilising effect on India’s access to its northeastern region, which includes Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya and Sikkim.
Sandwiched between Nepal and Bangladesh, with Bhutan and China nearby, the corridor has become increasingly significant in the context of regional geopolitics.
As Sriparna Pathak, a professor of China Studies at OP Jindal Global University, explained to TOI, “Reports suggest potential Chinese involvement in developing the airbase, possibly as a civilian airport, though fears persist it could serve dual military purposes. This could enable China to monitor Indian military movements or gather intelligence near the [Siliguri] corridor.”
What we know of activity at Lalmonirhat
The nature of the new activity around Lalmonirhat has not been officially clarified — whether it is intended purely for civilian aviation, training purposes, or possible military use.
However, the presence of Chinese personnel and potential dual-use capability has prompted India to increase surveillance over the site. Indian defence officials are assessing what assets might eventually be stationed there and how these could impact regional security calculations.
As per Assam Tribune, a senior Indian official noted, “There are concerns that the air base could be used to monitor Indian military movements during a conflict or serve as an intelligence-gathering hub,” especially in light of ongoing tensions following episodes like the 2017 Doklam standoff near the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction.
Indian military posture in the area is already robust, with the Trishakti Corps headquartered near Siliguri.
Additionally, India has stationed Rafale fighter squadrons at the Hasimara airbase, which lies close to the corridor. This build-up is seen as a necessary buffer against strategic encirclement.
How China is engaging closely with Bangladesh
Beyond aviation infrastructure, Chinese companies have significantly expanded their footprint in northern Bangladesh. Projects near Rangpur—close to Lalmonirhat—include manufacturing units, a solar power facility, and a proposed satellite city.
A Dhaka-based journalist, speaking anonymously to TOI, noted that “these factories are operated almost entirely by Chinese personnel, with minimal involvement from local workers.”
Meanwhile, China remains a key supplier of military equipment to Bangladesh. Deepening defence ties between Dhaka and Beijing under the current regime have contributed to Indian concerns over the long-term strategic orientation of its neighbour.
Kalpit Mankikar, a fellow of China-Taiwan Studies at the Observer Research Foundation, stated to TOI, “One thing is China has definite plans for that region. All this while those plans may have been dormant because [deposed Bangladesh PM] Sheikh Hasina was more accommodative towards India’s interests. Now, with the regime change and Mohammed Yunus’ open offer that Bangladesh can serve as a fountainhead against India, China would definitely be tempted to take up the offer [the airport project].”
He added, “We don’t know yet what are China’s plans for the project. But this could be used to monitor civilian and military movement to Northeast from the rest of India and vice versa.”
How Pakistan is involved
Pakistani military and intelligence representatives have also visited sites along the Bangladesh border prior to the Chinese delegation’s arrival, reported TOI.
This has drawn particular scrutiny given Pakistan’s historic involvement with insurgent groups operating in India’s northeast, many of whom found shelter in Bangladesh prior to the crackdown initiated by the Awami League government in 2009.
Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi recently stated: “I had used the word epicentre of terrorism for a particular country [Pakistan]. Now those countrymen, if they go to any other place and they happen to be our neighbour, as far as I am concerned, I should be concerned about it. That they should not be able to use that soil to send terrorists to India.”
The parallel tracks of warming China-Bangladesh and Pakistan-Bangladesh ties — especially in the context of infrastructure and security — are being closely tracked by Indian defence agencies.
How China is expanding along LAC
The potential revival of Lalmonirhat fits into a broader pattern of Chinese military enhancement along India’s periphery.
Since 2024, China has improved infrastructure at several airbases close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC), including in Tingri, Lhunze, Burang, Yutian, and Yarkant, reported NDTV. These upgrades include extended aprons, hardened shelters, engine testing zones, and drone platforms.
Geospatial intelligence researcher Damien Symon explained to NDTV, “These near-simultaneous infrastructure enhancements across multiple Chinese airbases along the Line of Actual Control suggest a deliberate strategy to increase operational reach and readiness in border-adjacent zones.”
The Economic Times quoted former Indian Air Force Vice Chief, Air Marshal Anil Khosla (Retd), who also highlighted the implications. “Airbases like Tingri, Lhunze, and Burang are located close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC), within 25–150 km. This proximity allows for the quick deployment of PLA Air Force (PLAAF) assets to forward positions and shorter response times in case of a border escalation,” he said. “These bases offer greater depth, logistics, and density. The PLAAF can now deploy fighter squadrons and drones rapidly into forward bases.”
He further elaborated on how China is overcoming the challenges of altitude by deploying powerful engines and utilising advanced technologies including drones, airborne early warning systems, and air-to-air refuelling capabilities.
“China’s concept of ‘airbase clusters’ means that even if one is targeted, others nearby can support operations, enhancing tactical flexibility, survivability, and redundancy,” Khosla added.
China has also seen the induction of advanced fifth-generation aircraft — including an estimated 195 J-20 stealth fighters — which continues to present a technological gap .
In late 2024, China also unveiled two new stealth aircraft, reportedly called J-36 and J-50 by Western analysts, designed to operate with drone swarms and artificial intelligence integration.
“These new airbases and platforms may indicate preparations for sustained deployments, rapid mobility and persistent presence near the LAC,” noted Symon.
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With inputs from agencies