India's Big Power aspirations face bigger hurdles

On a tour of party duty in China, comrade Sitaram Yechury has some seemingly gratifying news to convey. Chinese leaders, he says, have assured him that China is keen to improve its relations with India – and that it will even support India’s candidature for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council under certain conditions. For many in India, which aspires for a seat at the High Table of global governance, it would appear that Yechury has succeeded where countless persuasive Indian diplomats have failed: in securing support for India’s candidature from China, the only one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council that has thus far held back on its support. [caption id=“attachment_42747” align=“alignright” width=“380” caption=“India’s dreams of permanent membership of the UN Security Council face high hurdles. Chip East / Reuters”]  [/caption] And what conditions must India meet? According to Yechury, India must disassociate itself from making a joint bid for permanent membership along with three other countries – Japan, Germany and Brazil - who too want in. Given the historical strains in China’s relations with Japan – going back to Japanese occupation and wartime aggression – China would never support Japan, and India would lose out if it tied itself to Japan’s bid. Is this a game-changing prescription that could see India’s Big Power dream come true? Should India become more pragmatic, abandon its allies, and go it alone? Jaswant Singh, one of the most delightful storytellers in Indian politics, once drew on an earthy metaphor to explain the cynical mechanics of Big Power politics. Gaining admittance into the Power Club, he said, was a bit like jostling with a crowd to get into an unreserved train compartment: you do whatever it takes to get in, whereas those inside want to keep you out. But once you manage to get in, you become an ‘insider’ and your best interests lie in similarly ensuring that no one else gets in. India has for some time now been banging on the door of the Big Power compartment, demanding entry on the strength of its growing economic muscle, and the fact that it is home to one-sixth of humanity.  In informal alliance with Japan, Germany and Brazil, it has been pitching for permanent membership of the Security Council, that most exclusive of High Tables. But to its eternal frustration, that door has been wedged firmly in place by the five permanent members inside – the US, the UK, Russia, France and China – who don’t want to debase their club’s exclusivity by letting more members in. In recent years, however, and particularly after the 2008 global financial crisis showed up the changing nature of global economic dynamics, there’s been some chatter about reshaping the power balance at international institutions, including the Security Council. The ostensible purpose of such a rebalancing was to make more room for emerging economies and for countries like Japan and Germany (which, though big economies, were on the wrong side of the Second World War, when the current security architecture was drawn up). Stepping up its diplomatic offensive last year, India secured the support of four of the five permanent members (barring China) for its candidacy. During his visit to India in November last year, US President Barack Obama offered the most unambiguous support: in an address to the Indian parliament, he said, “In the years ahead, I look forward to a reformed United Nations Security Council that includes India as a permanent member.” Yet, the process of reforming the Security Council is exceedingly complex. As Dr Stewart M. Patrick, global governance expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, explained in an interview to me last year, given the entrenched vested interests, there are “high hurdle” for such reforms. And  recent effort by the Group of 4 nations (India, Japan, Germany and Brazil) to circulate a resolution seeking an expansion in the UN Security Council met with at best lukewarm support among member-states. And for all of China’s well-meaning articulations of support as conveyed by Yechury, there is as yet no certainty that China actually favours an expansion in the Security Council.  As a WikiLeaks cable from April 2009 made clear, China was concerned by the “momentum” that was building up for Security Council reform, which it felt was “not good” for the five permanent members.  That cable also quoted Chinese officials as telling US diplomats that the US should not be “proactive” on the subject – and that the “P-5 club” should not be diluted – as, otherwise, “if we end up with a P-10”, both China and the US  would be in trouble. And at the recent Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting, too, China effectively argued against India’s membership proposal. In other words, for all the words of Chinese goodwill whispered into Yechury’s ears, India could be banging on the doors of the Big Power railway compartment for a long while.